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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis discusses the previously unstudied treatment of German civilian internees 
and prisoners of war taken from the German colonies by British and Dominion 
authorities during the First World War. Through this study the links between the First 
World War in the extra-European theatre and the conflict in Europe will be examined. 
Five key issues are posited for investigation. These are: the centralised internment policy 
of the British Empire, the effect of the takeover of German colonies on the cultural 
identity of the British dominions, the effect wartime captivity had on German settlers, 
what extra-European internment tells us about twentieth century mobility and warfare, 
and the integration of the extra-European theatre of the war into the overall Global War 
narrative. The establishment of a global camp system run from the British imperial 
metropole involved the coordination of the military, the Admiralty, Dominion 
governments, and the Colonial and Foreign Offices. The general principles of 
international law were followed but often overridden through the use of reprisals, and 
the notion of trying Germans for ‘war crimes’ had an impact far into the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries. The First World War and the internment of German civilians and 
military prisoners in the extra-European theatre undermined the notion of a common 
European civilising mission in the colonial world. It upset the established colonial racial 
hierarchies, and through ‘enemy alien' legislation helped establish European hierarchies 
of race as defined by nationality, disrupting the pre-war world order of cultural 
globalisation. Through the analysis of German colonial settlers and soldiers in British 
internment, this thesis demonstrates that the First World War was not just a conflict 
between the European Great powers but that it also involved a world-wide remaking of 
ideas, institutions and geopolitics. 
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MAPS 
 
 
 
Map 1. Locations of internment camps in Africa and India with numbers indicating 
camp locations. 
Detail from, Hamburgischer Landesverein vom Roten Kreuz,  Ausschuß für Deutsche 
Kriegsgefangene, Karte von Großbritannien, Italien, Japan und den überseeischen 
Ländern: in denen sich Kriegs- oder Zivilgefangene befinden sowie Bestimmungen 
über den Postverkehr (Friedrichsen, Hamburg, 1917). (See page 9 for key.) 
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Map 2. Locations of internment camps in Australia and New Zealand and the South 
Pacific. 
Detail from, Hamburgischer Landesverein vom Roten Kreuz, Karte von Großbritannien, 
Italien, Japan und den überseeischen Ländern: in denen sich Kriegs- oder 
Zivilgefangene befinden sowie Bestimmungen über den Postverkehr (Friedrichsen, 
Hamburg, 1917). (See page 10 for key.) 
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Map Key*: 
 
(All camps under the administration of the British Empire unless indicated otherwise) 
 
 
Map 1: 
 
32. Las Palmas (Spain)     61. Swakopmund 
34. Hammerwiek (Norway)    62. Capstadt 
35. Aalborg (Denmark)     63. Kimberley 
36. Tofta (Sweden)     64. Winburg 
37. Odense (Denmark)     65. Pietermaritzburg 
38. Bergen (The Netherlands)    66. Durban 
38a. Wierkerchans (The Netherlands)   67. Johannesburg 
39. Pamplona (Spain)     68. Pretoria, Robert Heights 
40. Saragossa (Spain)     69. Lourenço Marques (Portugal) 
41. Alcala (Spain)     70. Beira (Portugal) 
42. Aranjuez (Spain)     71. Macequece (Portugal) 
43. Chios (Greece)     72. Blantyre 
44. Es Saff      73. Tabora (Belgium and Britain) 
45. Ras el-Tin/ Sidi Bishr Alexandria   74. Morogoro 
46. Cairo      75. Zanzibar  
47. Es Saff      76. Mombassa 
48. El Kantara      77. Nairobi 
49. El Ferda      78. Dagshai 
50. Ismailie      78a. Summerpur 
51. Maghil      79. Delhi 
51a. Tanooma      80. Ahmednagar 
52. Aden      81. Belgaum 
53. Sekondi      82. Goa  (Portugal) 
54. Accra      83. Bellaray 
55. Lagos      84. Colombo 
56. Zungeru      84a. Ragama 
57. Loanda (Portugal)     84b. Dyatalawa  
58. Grootfontein  
59. Aus  
60. Okanjande 
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Map 2: 
 
83. Bellaray      95. Langwarren    
84. Colombo      96. Bourke  
84a. Ragama      97. Liverpool 
84b. Dyatalawa      98. Sydney 
85. Mergui      99. Berrima 
86. Kuala Lumpur     100. Trial Bay  
87. Singapore       101. Brisbane 
88. Tenom      101a. Enogerra 
89. Jesselton      102. Hobart 
90. Sandakar      103. Bruni Island 
91. Rottnest Island     104. Devonport 
92. Fremantle      105. Somes Island 
93. Mitcham      105a. Motuihi Island 
93a. Port Cook      106. Rabaul 
93b. Torrens Island     107. Nauru 
94. Melbourne      108. Guam (United States) 
94b. Port Cook 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Not all the numbers refer to actual camps, some were military hospitals and other holding 
stations and French-run internment camps are not indicated. Not all the camps numbered will 
be referred to in this thesis but map locations will be indicated on a camp’s first reference.  
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Introduction: Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees Captured by 
British and Dominion forces from the German Colonies during the 
First World War 
 
This thesis discusses the previously unstudied treatment of German civilian internees and 
prisoners of war taken from the German colonies by British and Dominion authorities during 
the First World War.1 The First World War outside Europe has often been regarded as a 
sideshow to the main theatre of war in the Western Front. While this was true with regard to 
the extent that the extra-European operations determined the outcome of the war, for the 
men and women whose lives were affected through expulsion from their homes, internment, 
and the confiscation of their property, the war outside Europe was an integral part of the 
global conflict. Colonial settlers’ multiple identities such as planters, traders, missionaries and 
reservists meant the lines between who was to be classed as a civilian internee and who as a 
military prisoner were often blurred, making it necessary here to study prisoners of war and 
civilian internees in tandem. Matthew Stibbe’s observation that the uprooting and 
imprisonment of so many civilians within Europe constituted an important aspect of the war’s 
‘radical transformation of social relations and its destruction of common European values’2, is 
also applicable to the extra-European theatre. The colonial theatres of the war, where 
previously racial roles and hierarchies had been more rigidly defined than in Europe, were 
characterised by social transformation influenced through the expansion of the European 
Great War into a global conflict.  
In European historiography the outbreak of the First World War is seen as a departure from 
the relative Great Power cooperation that facilitated a peace lasting from 1871. However, this 
masks the fact that the wider world, in the years before the war, was indeed a violent place. 
The Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 proved that not even Europe was immune from outbreaks of 
armed conflict. In the extra-European world, the First World War certainly marked a massive 
escalation in violence, but it was not a break from the norm. Previously, the Russo-Japanese 
                                               
1
 The German colonies were Togo, Cameroon, German South-West Africa, German East Africa, New 
Guinea, Samoa, The Kiaochow Bay concession, China (with the port town referred to here by its older 
name of Tsingtao, although the modern Pinyin alliteration is Qingdao), and a number of islands in the 
Pacific.  
2
 Matthew Stibbe, ‘Civilian Internment in Europe. 1914-1920’, in Immigrants & Minorities, 26, 1/2 
(March/July 2008), pp. 49–81, p. 49.  
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War (1904-05), and the Italo-Turkish War, in Libya (1911-12), saw innovations in land and air 
warfare that were taken further on the Western Front in 1914-1918. Another key innovation 
that extra-European warfare contributed to the conflict in Europe was the concentration camp. 
The institution of reconcentrados was introduced by the Spanish military in Cuba during the 
Ten Years War (1868-1878) where civilians were concentrated in villages and towns under 
Spanish control, and the Boer War in South Africa (1899-1902) saw the first instances of ‘white 
Europeans’ interned in modern concentration camps.3 The abuses of Africans, as in King 
Leopold’s Congo colony in the 1900s or during the brutal suppression of the Herero uprising in 
German South-West Africa (1904-1907), were well known to contemporaries and provided a 
common stock of public images of colonial violence, such as mutilation, which were drawn on 
in the popular understanding of the fighting in the First World War.4 Violence escalated in the 
colonial sphere with the outbreak of the First World War, but it was not new. One of the major 
differences, however, which this thesis analyses, was that this violence was also being directed 
at Europeans.     
Yet, in the longer term, as Robert Gerwarth and Stephan Malinowski argue, it was not the links 
between internment in the colonial sphere and the concentration camps of the Second World 
War, but the radicalisation of society within Europe during the First World War that was the 
key factor in leading to the gates of Auschwitz.5 This then raises the question: to what 
narrative does the story of Europeans in captivity in the colonies belong? Does this narrative 
                                               
3
 See, Ian Smith and Andreas Stucki, ‘The Colonial Development of Concentration Camps (1868–1902)’, 
in The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 39, 3 (2011), pp. 417-437. Lord Kitchener, British 
Chief of Staff during the Boer War, did, however, refuse to recognise the Boers as European, referring to 
them instead as ‘uncivilized Africander savages with only a thin white veneer’. Ibid., p. 419. The 
concentration camp system was mirrored in the compounds for African labour in the South African 
diamond and gold mines. See page 56. 
4
 The abuses in King Leopold’s Congo are also currently well-known thanks to the commercial success of 
Adam Hochschild’s work. Adam Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism 
in Colonial Africa (MacMillan, London, 1999). 
5
 Robert Gerwarth and Stephan Malinowski, ‘Hannah Arendt’s Ghosts: Reflections on the Disputable 
Path from Windhoek to Auschwitz’, in Central European History 42, 2 (2009), pp. 279–300. A lot of work 
has been done on Germany’s abysmal treatment of Herero captives, in 1904-07, and the influence this 
may or may not have had on German moves to mass intern people in the Second World War. See, 
Benjamin Madley, ‘From Africa to Auschwitz: How German South-West Africa Incubated Ideas and 
Methods Adopted and Developed by the Nazis in Eastern Europe’, in European History Quarterly 35, 3 
(2005), pp. 429–64, Jürgen Zimmerer, ‘Annihilation in Africa: The “Race War” in German Southwest 
Africa (1904-1908) and its Significance for a Global History of Genocide’, in: Bulletin of the German 
Historical Institute, 37 (Autumn, 2005), pp. 51-57. Seven of the twenty-two articles in Michael Perraudin 
and Jürgen Zimmerer (eds), German Colonialism and National Identity (Taylor and Francis, New York, 
2011) are dedicated to the Herero genocide. See also David Olusoga and Casper W. Erichsen, The 
Kaiser’s Holocaust: Germany’s Forgotten Genocide (Faber and Faber, London, 2010). 
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belong within a European context that has repercussions for internment in later conflicts there 
or is it to be confined to the colonial sphere? Can one separate the extra-European and 
European narratives? One answer which this thesis investigates is that internment, through 
international negotiations over treatment and exchange, and through reprisals against 
prisoners in the colonies for action taken against their counterparts in Europe, linked the extra-
European and European theatres together. 
In analysing the treatment of German prisoners of war and civilian internees from the German 
colonies, five main themes will be discussed. First, the management of camps in the extra-
European world was dependent on the centralised policy of the British Empire. This policy 
meant the transfer of European norms of camp management in terms of rules, rations and 
even the physical lay-out of camps through fences and barracks were brought in line with 
European technical innovations.6 A camp system that had initially been developed in what one 
could consider the experimental field of the colonial periphery was now being re-exported to 
the extra-European world.7 This resulted in the establishment of the ‘modern’ European 
internment camp, physically symbolised through barbed wire fences and watch-towers, in the 
extra-European theatre.8  
Second, following the centralised nature of the camp system, this thesis will address the effect 
of the presence of German civilian internees and prisoners of war in Dominion and other 
colonial territories of the British Empire on the development of a strengthened British imperial 
identity. John Darwin has argued that the ‘digger myth’ that emerged in the second half of the 
war in response to the disaster at Gallipoli was not at odds with the ‘Britannic’ tradition and in 
fact fitted neatly with ‘conservative imperial nationalism’.9 While this was ultimately true for 
Australia and New Zealand, during the war there were tensions between London and the 
                                               
6
 Heather Jones, ‘Kriegsgefangenlager: Der moderne Staat und die Radikalisierung der Gefangenschaft 
im Ersten Weltkrieg‘, in Hamburger Edition, 20, 4 (August/September 2011), pp. 61-65. 
7
 Alan Kramer, ‘Einleitung’ in Bettina Greiner and Alan Kramer(eds), Die Welt Der Lager: Zur 
>Erfolgsgeschichte< einer Institution (Hamburger Edition, Hamburg, 2013), p. 17. 
8
 Internment in the early twentieth century was marked by two major innovations. First, a technological 
revolution allowed a certain synergy between the character of internment and scientific advances 
leading to a bureaucratization of camp management, most notably in Britain, where during the First 
World War there were two competing governmental prisoner of war departments. Second, the camps 
became emblematic of modern states and their ability to wage civilised (or uncivilised) warfare. Heather 
Jones, ‘Eine Technologische Revolution? Der Erste Welkrieg und die Radikalisierung des 
Kriegsgefangenenlagers’, in Greiner and Kramer, Die Welt Der Lager, pp. 117-119. 
9
 John Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World System 1830-1970 (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2009), p. 342. 
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Dominions (and India), which were often at odds with one another over the treatment of 
prisoners of war and internees. However, the presence of German prisoners of war and civilian 
internees taken from within the Dominions and from the German colonies helped to 
consolidate a common British identity, one that was in opposition to the German ‘other’.10 The 
ensuing ‘enemy alien’ legislation in Britain and the Empire has been seen as a ‘watershed’ in 
British Imperial history and would contribute to the development of a purely British identity.11 
Third, the development of the camp system and the enhancing of a British imperial identity in 
opposition to a German one meant that the prisoners themselves had to reassess their 
position in the extra-European world. Because of the extension of the war into a colonial 
conflict, ‘whites’ were no longer identified as Europeans but were now singled out by 
nationality. Daniel Steinbach has argued that the war in Africa challenged German settlers to 
re-think their relationship not just with fellow Europeans but also with the Reich.12 The loss of 
the colonies and the colonial role-reversal embodied in internment, and the inability of 
Germany to alleviate their suffering, all contributed to this reappraisal. This colonial role-
reversal can be highlighted by the example of Herr Hornung, a German farmer not interned 
but on parole, who, after the Australian takeover of New Guinea in late 1914, returned to his 
plantation to find it burned down and abandoned by his workers. One of his former employees, 
a Melanesian, approached him and asked if it were now true that the ‘natives’ were allowed to 
kill white Germans.13 The outbreak of war in Europe triggered the takeover of the German 
colonies and challenged the colonial social structures. Through internment and subsequent 
deportation German colonial settlers were knocked down the social ladder. The imperial space 
of the camp viewed from without was certainly British, but, within the ‘contact zones’ of the 
camps themselves, a particular German space could be created.14 This thesis will reconstruct 
                                               
10
 Sebastian Conrad, Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2010), p. 20. 
11
 John C. Bird, The Control of Enemy Aliens in Great Britain 1914-1918 (Garland Publishing, New York, 
1986), p. 345. 
12
 Daniel Steinbach, ‘Defending the Heimat: The Germans in South-West Africa and East Africa During 
the First Word War’, in Heather Jones, Jennifer O’Brien, and Christoph Schmidt-Supprian, (eds), Untold 
War: New Perspectives in the First World War (Leiden, Boston, 2008), p. 180. 
13
 BA, R1001/2615, Krieg in Deutsch-Neuguinea 1914 – 1918. Kaiserlich Deutsches Generalkolonialamt 
für Niederländisch-Indien Batavia, Bericht des Stationsleiters Schmaus, 14
th
 April 1915. ‘Die 
Eingeborenen fragten ihn gleich, ob es wahr sei, dass die Eingeborenen jetzt die deutschen Weissen 
töten dürften.’  
14
 Emily Rosenberg, ‘Transnational Currents in a Shrinking World’, in Emily Rosenberg (ed), A World 
Connecting: 1870-1945 (A History of the World) (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2012), p. 819. 
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this narrative and address questions relating to imperial prestige, racial hierarchies, violence 
and reprisal, and the links between colonial and European internment.  
Fourth, the fluid camp system that will be outlined in this thesis connects to the idea of 
twentieth century mobility and modernity.15 The British policy of evacuating prisoners of war 
and civilian internees from the German colonies reversed, to a certain extent, the pre-war 
routes of labour mobility and migration. 16  Nothing better highlights the intertwining 
geographies of empire and modernity than the establishment of a global internment network 
by the British during the First World War.17 In addition, as Uta Hinz argues, the treatment of 
prisoners of war was an essential aspect of twentieth century warfare, with reciprocal 
escalation and limitation of reprisals on both sides.18 
Finally, the analysis of German prisoners of war and civilian internees from the German 
colonies shows that the colonial theatre, while not being decisive for the overall outcome of 
the war, was actually far from being a mere sideshow to the main event on the Western Front. 
Reprisal punishments (threatened or enacted) against prisoners of war and civilians in the 
colonial sphere were often the direct result of action taken against prisoners and civilians in 
Europe, thus linking the two fronts of internment. Isabel Hull, in her examination of the central 
role played by international law in the conduct of the War, highlights the key role the waves of 
reprisals (exercised with ‘lethal stubbornness’) played in disfiguring the Great War. 19 
Inspections by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and neutral governments 
were meant to allow for transparency in prisoner treatment. However, reports of the bad 
                                               
15
 For discussion on internment camps and modernity see the contributions in: Greiner and Kramer, Die 
Welt Der Lager. 
16
 In the early 1900s there were controversial debates on the freedom of movement and boundaries and 
immigration limitation in Europe, South Africa, the United States and Australia. As Sebastian Conrad 
shows, interest in these debates revealed a global consciousness that developed among German 
political actors especially when these migratory flows of Germans were redirected back to Germany. 
Conrad, Globalisation, p. 9. 
17
 Tony Ballantyne and Antoinette Burton, ‘Empires and the Reach of the Global’, in Rosenberg, A World 
Connecting, p. 297. 
18
 Uta Hinz, ‘Humanität im Krieg? Internationales Rotes Kreuz und Kriegsgefangenenhilfe im Ersten 
Weltkrieg‘, in Jochen Oltmer, (ed), Kriegs gefangene im Europa des Ersten Weltkriegs (Paderborn, 
Munich, 2006), p. 217. Horace Rumbold of the Foreign Office felt that a ‘policy of reprisals seems to pay 
with a nation of bullies like the Germans.’ TNA FO383/110, 165279, 5
th
 November 1915, Horace 
Rumbold, memorandum. 
19
 Isabel Hull, A Scrap of Paper: Breaking and Making International Law during the Great War (Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, 2014), p. 278. Hull shows that reprisals, the direct means by which a belligerent 
may try to force an opponent to behave within the law, were held by contemporaries as the only 
sanction upholding international law. Ibid., p. 279. 
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treatment of prisoners harmed British imperial prestige in the eyes of neutrals and might also 
lead to reprisals by Germany against its British captives. Internment in the extra-European 
theatre also provided the German government with fuel for propaganda to be used in Europe 
by harking back to a pre-existing ‘colonial imagination’20 that provided the imagery for what 
internment in the colonies was like, even if this image was at odds with reality.  
With these factors in mind, the experience of captivity in the British Empire is presented as 
differing from, but linked to the European narrative of internment. The prisoner experience in 
Europe was written and shaped mainly by former officers focusing on six ‘narrative event-
scenarios’, as summarised by Robert Doyle, which were: pre-captivity, capture, removal from 
the front, daily life in captivity, repatriation and finally reflections on time lost.21 The colonial 
narrative followed this basic outline but differs in that removal from the colonial theatre was a 
long and drawn-out process with an emphasis on transport and movement. The understanding 
of ‘race’ is a key element in forming the narrative of internment in the extra-European world. 
As Heather Jones argued, ‘race’ was a defining cultural paradigm that underpinned the 
hierarchies of European imperialism.22 Internment and the loss of the colonies symbolised for 
German settlers a severe racial role reversal that fundamentally changed their position in 
colonial society. 23 They were no longer fellow Europeans but were now ‘enemy aliens,’ often 
under the watch of indigenous guards, and did not enjoy the rights and freedoms that gave 
European whites a superior social status. This role reversal is central to understanding captivity 
in the colonies.  
                                               
20
 Susanne Zantop, Colonial Fantasies: Conquest, Family, and Nation in Precolonial Germany, 1770-1870 
(Duke University Press, Durham, 1997), p. 9. 
21
 Alon Rachamimov, POWs and the Great War: Captivity on the Eastern Front (Berg, New York, 2002), p. 
9.  Rachamimov’s analysis is taken from Robert C. Doyle, Voices from Captivity: Interpreting the 
American POW Narrative (Kansas University Press, Lawrence, 1994). This may be a somewhat crude 
summary as not all memoirs corresponded to these event scenarios.  
22
 In Jones’s view the plural meaning of the term ‘race’ which encompassed both imperial and intra-
European racial hierarchies is crucial to understanding how Germany saw the colonial prisoners of war it 
had captured. Heather Jones, ‘Imperial Captivities: Colonial Prisoners in Germany and the Ottoman 
Empire’, in Santanu Das, (ed), Race, Empire and First World War Writing (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2011), pp. 178-180, based on Annette Becker, Oubliés de la Grande guerre: Humanitaire et 
culture de guerre, 1914-1918: populations occupées, déportés civils, prisonniers de guerre (Noêsis, Paris, 
1998). 
23
 We will follow Jones’s multi-faceted definition of race at the outset of war as containing biological, 
ethnic and national dimensions influenced by ‘social Darwinism.’ Jones, ‘Imperial Captivities’, p. 178. 
(Although a more fitting term to better reflect the variety of influential nineteenth-century theories on 
race, as Francisco Bethencourt argues, would be ‘social evolution’. Francisco Bethencourt, Racisms, 
From the Crusades to the Twentieth Century (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2013), p. 301.)  
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This thesis is divided into seven chapters, each dealing with a different theme or aspect of 
internment in the extra-European world, which will be explained below. In approaching a topic 
which is global in scope many options are available. Firstly, one could take a colony-by-colony 
approach and dedicate each chapter to a single case study. The obvious danger here is that the 
case by case option would sacrifice much of the integrative and comparative analysis that this 
thesis wishes to develop, as well as being a chore for the reader who would have to read the 
same analysis six or seven times in what would essentially be a collection of mini theses. 
Alternatively, one could take a chronological element and provide a year-by-year analysis. 
Again, this would weaken the comparative approach, as, for example, internment in Cameroon 
was short lived while that in German East Africa remained open-ended, due to the 
continuation of hostilities up to and beyond the armistice in Europe. The thematic approach 
best serves this analysis as it allows for the transnational and comparative nature of 
internment in the extra-European theatre. Each chapter will be given a theme, within which 
framework we can consider each colony and how the Dominions and British government 
handled specific cases of internment. To maintain coherence in the narrative, however, each 
theme will be treated chronologically, with most chapters extending their analysis throughout 
the course of the war. 
The first chapter will incorporate a historiographical review of the existing secondary literature 
on prisoners of war, focusing on three works which represent the three main trends in 
prisoner of war studies, by Alon Rachamimov, Matthew Stibbe and Heather Jones.24 When 
looking at internment in the extra-European sphere through the prism of existing work on 
camps in Europe, the question also arises of how to mould the geographical context of this 
thesis into a coherent narrative, and to incorporate the unique issues geography raises that do 
not apply to the existing European case studies. To deal with this, reference will be made to 
literature dealing specifically with the war in Africa, the Pacific and indeed to global studies of 
the First World War. With race and imperial prestige playing prominent roles in the coming 
chapters, these fields of historical study will also need to be discussed. Finally, the 
transnational nature of internment in the extra-European theatre (with German citizens, not 
only from the Reich’s colonies but also those living in British protectorates and Dominions, at 
                                               
24
 Heather Jones, Violence Against Prisoners of War in the First World War: Britain France and Germany 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011), Rachamimov, POWs and the Great War, and Matthew 
Stibbe, British Civilian Internees in Germany: The Ruhleben Camp, 1914-18, (Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 2008). 
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its core) will necessitate an engagement with transnational history (the history of the 
movement of peoples, ideas, technologies and institutions across national, or colonial, 
boundaries), and the absolute racial differences established in the German colonies.25  
It will be necessary, in chapter two, to go through the colonies individually in order to show 
where the prison camps were established and how they were administered, before the thesis 
moves to the main thematic treatment. This chapter will tell the reader how many prisoners 
there were, who they were and where they were held. It will not only take each colony one by 
one, but it will also show how internment policies meant the crossing of national boundaries, 
with Britain interning prisoners of very heterogeneous backgrounds in various locations of 
differing climate and other conditions while at the same time seeking a uniformity of 
treatment. This chapter will also hint at the difficulty of categorising prisoners, and of tracking 
them as their internment developed.  
Chapter three will begin the thematic analysis by looking at acts of violence from three angles: 
violence against prisoners by indigenous populations, violence against prisoners by camp 
guards and authorities, and violence committed by prisoners themselves. Although the 
violence exhibited towards prisoners outside Europe paled in comparison to that inside Europe, 
the role reversal of the Germans from colonial administrators to captives was signified through 
violent processes. The main focus of this chapter will be in assessing how acts of violence, 
mainly perpetrated by authorities on the periphery, and the British reaction to them, helped 
shape policy towards prisoners and in turn created a more centralised prison administration. 
Violence, although sporadic, was the key prism through which German colonial settlers viewed 
the takeover of the colonies, and subsequent internment and aspects of violence will return in 
subsequent chapters. 
The fourth chapter will consider how incarceration or restriction of movement led to an 
increased awareness of a German national identity. The effects of internment on prisoner 
identities and the notion of the camp space have been explored through lenses supplied by 
Michel Foucault, Giorgio Agamben and Benedict Anderson and will be the subject of chapter 
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four. 26  Do the camps established in the extra-European world conform to these 
interpretations? For example is it possible to follow Matthew Stibbe’s examination of 
Ruhleben and the formation of the imagined camp community and transplant this technique 
onto Ahmednagar camp in India?27 This chapter, following Sebastian Conrad’s ideas on the 
‘renewal’ of the nation at the periphery’, will sketch the effect that internment of German 
colonial settlers (and their interaction with other Germans while in internment) had on their 
sense of identity in terms of patriotism, class and gender.28 In internment German settlers 
became much more than an ‘appendix of the Kaiserreich’.29  
Chapter four will conclude with a look at the attitudes of interned German Askari (although 
this is a subject that certainly requires more extensive analysis than this thesis can provide).30 
While the documentary evidence about Askari in internment is scant, a lot has been written on 
the myth of the loyal Askari, and this literature will be drawn upon to provide an insight into 
the internment of indigenous troops and their attitudes to Germany and Britain.31 
Chapter five looks at how internment and the defeat of the German colonies were reported in 
Europe and how Britain presented the takeover of the colonies to the local population. It looks 
at prisoners’ communications with the outside world and attempts by returned colonial 
Germans to publish their experiences in Germany. Internment in the colonies received 
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 Foucault explores the use of punishment and the prison camp. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: 
The Birth of the Prison, (Penguin, London, 1979), Agamben’s study of the camp space builds on Carl 
Schmitt’s idea of a state of exception where the rule of law is transcended. For Agamben this is 
highlighted in the camp space and this notion has been very influential in shaping the study of 
internment, although more in relation to the concentration camps of the Second Word War. Giorgio 
Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (University Press Stanford, Stanford, 1998). 
Anderson’s ideas on how nationalism is conveyed through an imagined community again finds its 
expressions in camp society, most notably in Matthew Stibbe’s work on Ruhleben in Berlin. Benedict 
Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (Verso, New York, 
2006). 
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 Stibbe’s analysis of Ruhleben sees the camp as an ‘imagined’ or ‘symbolic’ community with prisoners’ 
experiences of internment mediated by differences in class, race, nationality and level of education. 
Stibbe, British Civilian Internees in Germany, p. 4. 
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 Conrad, Globalisation, p. 26. 
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 Andreas Eckert, ‘Germany and Africa in the Late Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: An Entangled 
History?’, in Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocka, Comparative and Transnational History: Central 
European Approaches and New Perspectives (Berghahn Books, New York, 2009), p. 227. 
30
 While mainly used in reference to German East African troops, here Askari will refer to all indigenous 
troops used throughout the German colonies. 
31
 The image of the African soldiers is becoming more nuanced. See, Michelle Moyd, ‘‘We don’t want to 
die for nothing’: Askari at war in German East Africa’, in Das, Race, Empire and First World War Writing, 
pp. 90-107. Unfortunately this thesis will be unable to contribute much to the development of this side 
of the history of the war, as black prisoners of war rarely appear in the British and German archives. 
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coverage in the German press. The term ‘propaganda’ acquired its modern connotations in 
Europe during the First World War and was an important part of the overall struggle for 
dominance.32 Newspapers served to inform and also to influence opinions on the war. This was 
especially important, as the print media were at the height of their influence, meaning that 
public justification for fighting the war had to be sought through them, not only to motivate 
one’s own soldiers and civilians but also to influence neutral opinion. Through newspaper 
reports, journals and other publications this chapter will seek to assess how the colonial 
campaigns and the taking of prisoners from the extra-European theatre were woven into the 
narrative of the war in Europe. It will focus on German perceptions of captivity in the colonies 
and attempts by former prisoners to have their voice heard in mainland Germany. It will also 
look at official German attempts to expose acts of ‘barbarism’ by indigenous troops in the 
colonial theatre, as part of a wider propaganda campaign that included the demonization of 
colonial troops on the Western Front in an attempt to show the Allies as having broken with 
‘colour solidarity’.33  
While the thesis draws on the historiography of internment within Europe for its conceptual 
framework, comparative models will also be sought in the extra-European theatre itself. 
Chapter six, therefore, takes the two contrasting examples of the internment of German 
colonial settlers in French West Africa and Japan for comparisons with British internment. 
While the focus will be on these models, mention will also be made of Germans interned in 
other empires such as the Spanish and Portuguese. These other extra-European camps were 
well-known to the British and indeed to the contemporary popular press, and will provide 
interesting contrasts. Importantly, both the French and Japanese examples left longer lasting 
legacies, one negative and one positive, than did the British. 
Chapter seven will focus on the repatriation of prisoners and the inter-war years. Movement of 
prisoners was continuous throughout the war. The key difference from Europe was that by the 
end of the war, German civilian internees from outside Europe (especially German East Africa) 
were considered by the British and Germans alike as separate from those civilians held in the 
British Isles and thus could not avail themselves of the same repatriation schemes afforded to 
those held in Europe. This chapter will look at this movement and the interdepartmental 
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 Alice Goldfarb Marquis, ‘Words as Weapons: Propaganda in Britain and Germany during the First 
World War’, in Journal of Contemporary History, 13, 3 (July, 1978), pp. 467-498, p. 468. 
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 Marc Ferro, Colonization: A Global History (Routledge, London/New York, 1997), p. 79. 
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tensions it caused between the Foreign Office and the Admiralty. Repatriation was an ongoing 
process during the war, although not everyone qualified to be sent home. By the end of the 
war more practical considerations concerning the lack of shipping and resources came to the 
fore, but the eventual goal of repatriation to Germany of captives from the colonies remained 
in force although this was affected by the Versailles Treaty and the establishment of the 
Mandate system.  
Chapter seven will finish with a look at former colonial Germans in Germany in the 1920s and 
the integration of the treatment of German prisoners of war and civilian internees during the 
War into the ‘black shame on the Rhine’ propaganda produced in response to the Allied 
occupation of the Rhineland in the wake of the war.34 In the immediate years after the Paris 
Peace Treaty there was little sign of official irredentist claims on the German colonies. Once 
Germany joined the League of Nations in 1926, however, there was a revival in interest in the 
colonial question and when the Nazi party came to power in 1933 the return of the German 
colonies became government policy.   
In conclusion, conditions for prisoners from the former German colonies could have been very 
different had the war in the colonies remained more distinct from the conflict in Europe, 
perhaps showing stronger continuities with the neglect shown to internees during the Boer 
War. The global dimensions of the war, however, meant that stronger checks and balances 
were in place during the First World War. Public opinion, British imperial prestige, and the 
need to conform to international law played large roles in how internment was managed. The 
ability of the metropolitan government to intervene and moderate the role of military and 
Dominion authorities was of crucial importance in prisoner treatment. However, the main 
differentiating factor between the colonial theatre of the First World War and previous 
colonial wars was that the enemy (Germany) held large numbers of British prisoners. Fear of 
reciprocal action was a major determining factor in prisoner treatment. Through its analysis of 
German colonial settlers in British extra-European internment camps, this thesis follows the 
idea that the First World War was not just a conflict confined to the battle fields of Europe but 
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it was also a development that forced a world-wide remaking of ideas, institutions and 
geopolitics.35  
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Chapter One: Internment in the First World War and the Global 
Context (Historiography) 
 
This chapter discusses the current historiography on captivity in the First World War and on 
the integration of the extra-European theatre into the narrative of the war as a global conflict. 
It first offers an outline of the primary source material used in this thesis and then discusses 
the significant secondary literature relating to the global dimensions of the war and 
internment. Recent studies of prisoners of war and civilian internees in Europe during the First 
World War have focused on violence, mismanagement of camps and the use of forced labour.1 
With regard to the European theatre, Richard Speed’s concept of a ‘liberal tradition of 
captivity’2 existing in contrast to the new modern form of totalised combat has been 
comprehensively challenged. However, is this evident in the theatres of war outside Europe? 
The war is increasingly no longer looked at as just a European affair and following the new 
trends towards global and transnational history, the voices of those from the extra-European 
theatres are being heard more often in the historiography. Coupled with this, more stress is 
being placed on cultural perspectives on the war. The importance of the present study is that 
through analysis of German prisoners from the former Reich colonies it addresses a glaring gap 
in the historiography of not only prisoner of war treatment in the twentieth century, but also 
deals with the study of empires in transition, race, violence and transnational movements of 
people.  
Popular understanding of the war in the colonies, at least from the European perspective, has 
been coloured by such comic historical novels as Mimi and Toutou go Forth or An Ice Cream 
War.3 These represent the war in the colonies as an eccentric side-show to the conflict in 
Europe, between colonial settlers who were neighbours forced to fight one another in 
response to their patriotic duty but with no real animosity on either side. This can best be 
highlighted through the final scene of the Côte d'Ivoire film Black and White in Colour, where 
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 See: Jones, Violence Against Prisoners of War, and Matthew Stibbe (ed), Captivity, Forced Labour and 
Forced Migration in Europe during the First World War, (Routledge, London/New York, 2009). 
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 Richard Speed, Prisoners, Diplomats and the Great War: A study of Diplomacy in Captivity (Greenwood, 
New York, 1990) p. 152. Rather than being an exception to the idea of Total War, Heather Jones sees 
captivity as an integral part of the conflict which transformed our idea of warfare.  
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 Giles Forden, Mimi and Toutou Go Forth: The Bizarre Battle of Lake Tanganyika (Penguin, London, 
2005), William Boyd, An Ice Cream War, (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1982). Also worthy of note is the 
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after defeating the German garrison the victorious French and British white troops invite the 
German officers for drinks and dancing, much to the bemusement of the Africans who had 
suffered during the fighting. 4 However, academic attention is turning more and more towards 
the colonial conflict and it is now a subject of serious study rather than fodder for ‘ripping 
yarns’.5 Studies focus on the displacement of indigenous populations, the enforced enrolment 
of carriers and the transfer of African, Indian, Chinese and Indo-Chinese soldiers and labourers 
to Europe. The colonial contribution to the war is now regarded as an integral part of the 
conflict and no longer a mere ‘side show’.6 
There is a vast amount of primary source material relating to prisoners from the former 
German colonies in the British National Archives (TNA). The Prisoners of War and Aliens 
Department was set up by the Foreign Office in 1915 and continued its work until well into 
1919. The 547 large bound volumes left behind by the department under the code FO383 deal 
with the imprisonment or internment of members of the armed forces, civilians and merchant 
seamen, both Allied and foreign, during the First World War, and the period following the 
Armistice, leading up to the conclusion of the peace treaties with the enemy countries in 1919-
20. These files have been used by many authors when looking at British prisoners in Europe 
but have yet to be exploited fully by those looking at Germans in captivity in camps outside 
Europe.7 The files provide an invaluable insight, through inspections, petitions and complaints, 
into how exactly these camps were run and how they developed during the course of the war. 
Added to this, the files contain many extracts from diaries, letters and postcards that were 
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 Original title: La Victoire en chantant, (Artco-Film, France 3 cinéma, Côte d'Ivoire, 1976). 
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 For example the numerous books written about Gunther Plüschow who escaped from Tsingtao and 
England, the latest being, Anton Rippon, Gunther Pluschow: Airman, Escaper and Explorer (Pen and 
Sword Military, London, 2009). 
6
 David Killingray and James K. Matthews, ‘”Beasts of Burden”: British West African Carriers in the First 
World War’, Canadian Journal of African Studies, 13, 1-2 (1979), pp. 5-23, and Melvin E. Page (ed), Africa 
and the First World War (Macmillan, London, 1987), were two prominent works on the colonial 
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experience of the war are Santanu Das (ed), Race, Empire and First World War Writing, Heike Liebau, 
Katrin Bromber, et al (eds), The World in World Wars (Studies in Global Social History) (Brill, Leiden, 
2010), Xu Guoqi, Strangers on the Western Front: Chinese Workers in the Great War (Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, MA, 2011), Timothy Winegard, Indigenous Peoples of the British Dominions and the 
First World War (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011), and Michelle Moyd, Violent 
Intermediaries: African Soldiers, Conquest, and Everyday Colonialism in German East Africa (To be 
published by Ohio University Press, Athens, July 2014).  
7
 For example see Uwe Schulte-Varendorff, Krieg in Kamerun: Die deutsche Kolonie im Ersten Weltkrieg 
(Ch.Links, Berlin, 2011) which although making excellent use of German source material neglects the 
British archives. 
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intercepted by and brought to the Foreign Office’s attention by the censor. These documents 
enable a much greater understanding of how the prisoners viewed themselves and also 
highlight the fact that they often saw the war as very much an interruption of everyday 
business and expected normality to return after peace. In addition to the Foreign Office files, 
the Colonial Office, War Office and Admiralty contain in their records some further insightful 
information, especially with regard to the initial capture and shipping of prisoners.  
The British War Office established a Department of Prisoners of War in August 1914 under 
Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert Belfield. This department controlled the treatment of prisoners 
in Britain, regulating camp conditions and, importantly, regulating the use of violence against 
captives.8  The Foreign Office, as mentioned above, had its own competing department, the 
Prisoners and Aliens Department under Sir Francis Dyke Acland. This department dealt 
specifically with inquiries about the treatment of British prisoners, and with enemy prisoners 
who were in captivity overseas. Within the Foreign Office it was one of four specific 
departments established at the outbreak of war to deal with the challenges of fighting a global 
conflict.9 It was predictable that the prisoners departments in the War Office and in the 
Foreign Office would come into conflict, mainly over responses to the treatment of British 
prisoners in Germany. Except in the cases of some officer prisoners, the Foreign Office 
maintained autonomy over the management of prisoners taken outside Europe and was able 
to ensure as the war progressed a more or less uniform treatment of prisoners by the 
Dominion governments.10  
Foreign Office primacy in prisoner affairs in the extra-European theatre was known to the 
prisoners themselves, who sought to bypass the Dominion governments in their 
correspondence and questioned the legitimacy of independent polices enacted on them.11 
Regular inter-Departmental meetings were held between the Admiralty, Foreign, War and 
Colonial Offices to discuss and come to agreements over aspects of prisoner treatment. The 
four departments all had different concerns. The Admiralty were always keen to limit the 
amount of unnecessary shipping traffic, the War Office argued for the military necessity of the 
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 Jones, Violence Against Prisoners, p. 16. 
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 The others were, The War Department, Parliamentary Department, and Contraband Department. As 
the war went on, more departments were established to make an eventual total of eighteen emergency 
departments. 
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 In contrast, the War Office took primacy over the dealings of prisoners on the Western Front. This 
reflects the more civilian nature of internment in the extra-European theatre. 
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 See chapter five. 
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removal of Germans from territory taken and the Colonial Office backed this up but were also 
reluctant to allow prisoners be sent to areas such as India or South Africa where they might 
arouse sympathies from the local population. The Foreign Office’s guiding view was that it was 
necessary to ensure the best possible treatment of German prisoners, as it was ever mindful of 
the threat of reprisals against British prisoners in German hands, and the reactions that any 
bad treatment of prisoners would cause among neutral countries.12 This was especially true 
before the United States, which had been the liaison between Britain and Germany in regard 
to prisoners’ affairs, joined the war.  
Apart from the Foreign Office files, this thesis will draw on files from the other ministries. The 
Colonial Office was not primarily concerned about prisoner treatment, but its responsibility for 
property claims meant it had to deal with German inhabitants of the colonies and it had a 
vested interest in the acquisition and security of Germany territory. The War Office files are 
important for accounts of fighting in the colonies and are particularly useful through the 
collection of captured diaries, most notably the diary of Heinrich Schnee (Governor of German 
East Africa 1912-1918). As this project will refer to maritime transportation in terms of its 
restrictions during the blockade and the repatriation of prisoners and internees, the Admiralty 
files are also important.  
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) archives in Geneva house an extensive 
archive of correspondence and reports on prisoner camps. These archives are only recently 
being exploited to their full potential. Heather Jones used them effectively in Violence Against 
Prisoners of War. The ICRC were involved in the inspection of camps and also acted as go-
betweens in establishing meetings and conferences between the belligerents. One of the key 
advantages of these archives is the clarity with which they describe each camp, something 
which the Foreign Office files do not do particularly well. The archives are rich in material 
relating to the camps, with the ICRC compiling scrapbooks of newspaper and other media 
reports on each one. The archives also hold letters from prisoners of war. In addition, the ICRC 
published a journal of their reports on the camps that they visited, which along with the British 
military’s plans of the layout and administration provide the reader with a detailed portrayal of 
the complicated nature of the camp systems outside Europe.  
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Independently of the ICRC, the German Red Cross at Hamburg and Frankfurt also kept detailed 
records of press reports on prisoners of war in the colonies.13 The archives, now housed in the 
Bundesarchiv in Berlin-Lichterfelde (BA), are divided by region and by camp in the R67 series.14 
Apart from keeping cuttings from newspapers, the Red Cross also catalogued their weekly 
reports on a camp by camp basis, these reports being drawn from ICRC inspections and 
correspondence. They also provide letters and postcards from family members of prisoners 
and internees and through these well catalogued files one can gain an appreciation of the 
global scale of internment in the First World War.   
In Germany the main government archive to be drawn on will be the Bundesarchiv in Berlin-
Lichterfelde. The most fruitful files here have been those of the Reichskolonialamt (RKA), 
R1001. The RKA received copies of almost all correspondence relating to prisoners of war and 
civilian internees from the colonies. This series has obvious advantages, for the researcher, 
over the files of the Auswärtiges Amt (the German Foreign Office) as the RKA filtered out a lot 
of the files related to Europe. Apart from merely copying correspondence the RKA was the 
ministry most concerned with the colonial settlers, and did more than any other government 
department to compile files relating to their treatment. This thesis will also use the files of the 
Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft (DKG), R8023, mainly for its correspondence in the inter-war 
years. Theodor Seitz (Governor of German South-West Africa, 1910-1915) and Heinrich Schnee, 
among other influential German colonialists, were key members of this organisation and it was 
the first place that former prisoners and internees turned to when seeking advice on a return 
to their colonial homes, lodging complaints or requesting financial aid.  
In the interwar period, the Great War as fought in the trenches dominated the historical 
narrative. There was relatively little space for discussion of prisoners, let alone those taken in 
far flung colonies that had ceased to exist. Wilhelm Doegen’s 1921 book, Kriegsgefangene 
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 Both also published pamphlets for general sale. For example, in April 1917 the Hamburg section 
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Völker, was one of the first to publish facts and figures for camps.15 The book mainly focused 
on prisoners in Germany: in agreement with general German public opinion, he argued that 
the treatment of prisoners there was very humane. The most important text, for this study, to 
come out of the inter-war years relating to prisoners’ experiences of captivity was Hans 
Weiland and Leopold Kern’s In Feindeshand.16 While Weiland was a member of the Christian 
Social Party and the Bundesvereinigung ehemaliger österreichischer Kriegsgefangener 
(B.e.ö.K.) 17  and had close links to the Austro-Fascist elite, especially Kurt Schuschnigg 
(Chancellor of Austria 1934-1938), the book did publish memoirs from a broad political 
spectrum.18 This monumental, two-volume work gathered together memoirs, Red Cross 
reports, and analyses of captivity from around 477 contributors, including Paul von 
Hindenburg. It is one of the few published sources that deals directly with the experiences of 
prisoners from the former colonies, with chapters dedicated to Cairo, Singapore, South Africa 
and Japan among others. It remains a vital primary source text and has extensive chapters 
dedicated to and written by former prisoners in the Reich colonies. Alon Rachamimov used it 
extensively in his work, as should any author who is concerned with the study of captivity in 
the First World War. The biggest limitation of these two volumes is that they were mainly 
written by officers and others who were higher up the class ladder, thus providing the reader 
with an experience of captivity that was different from that of the ordinary German soldier or 
colonial farmer.  
Apart from some popular fictionalised accounts of internment in the First World War the other 
major work published in the 1930’s was Theater Ohne Frau.19 This book helped create the 
perception that the German prisoners had a comfortable life in captivity. It looked at the 
growth of amateur theatre and its role in the camps in maintaining the prisoners’ spirits and 
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 I am grateful to Hannes Leidinger for this information. 
19
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although mainly focusing on camps in Russia it has chapters dedicated to the Dominions and 
Japan. It provides an interesting insight into an aspect of camp life but has perhaps overplayed 
the role of such dramatics and downplayed the harshness of camp life. 
The DKG, which one would expect to have published memoirs of prisoners’ experiences in 
captivity, dedicated little if any time to reminiscing about the actual fighting of the First World 
War in the colonies and was more concerned with advertising the glory and the just nature of 
German colonial rule in the face of international accusations of Germany’s unsuitability to run 
colonies. In the inter-war period there were many works of German colonial revisionism, 
arguing for a return of Germany’s rightful possessions. Many of these were overseen by 
Heinrich Schnee and accompanied with colourful illustrations highlighting the good work done 
by Germany outside Europe such as the Lexikon Für Deutsch Kolonial Geschichte.20 Although 
Schnee had been governor of German East Africa during the war and was president of the 
Bundes des Auslandsdeutschen and DKG, he rarely wrote about internment in the German 
colonies. It was as if the First World War had never happened, and none of the colonial settlers 
had experienced imprisonment, but somehow the colonies had been lost. This may be due to 
Schnee himself being part of the myth of Germany being undefeated in the field, with no place 
for internment in this myth. It is interesting that although the DKG used the Versailles treaty as 
the main rallying point for the return of the colonies, they never emphasised the 
imprisonment and deportation of German colonial citizens, even though this had been a bone 
of contention during the war itself. 
While published memoirs of captivity are not as numerous as on other aspects of the war, 
there are a few key publications by prisoners themselves. At the forefront of the German 
colonial project (as in many other colonial projects) were Christian missionaries, and many of 
them were interned once the war broke out. The Berliner Missionsgesellschaft and the Basel 
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 Schnee was the most prolific writer of all the German colonialists and published quite extensively, 
with some of his work being translated into English. See: Heinrich Schnee, Als letzter Gouverneur in 
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(eds), Die Zukunft der Deutschen Kolonien (Friedrich Andreas Verlag, Perthes OAG, Gotha, 1918). 
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Mission21 published pamphlets and regular magazines detailing the war and its effect on 
missionaries in Africa and elsewhere. The Basel Missionaries in Cameroon in particular were 
vocal about what they felt was maltreatment by the British. A few other private memoirs 
survive that deal with time in internment. Albert Achilles, a member of the Schutztruppe 
(‘Protection Force’, the German colonial armies) who fought in German East Africa, for 
example, provides an insight into daily life in the camps in India that would be impossible to 
find in the archives of the ICRC or elsewhere.22  In the inter-war period there was a spate of 
publications of ‘Afrikabücher’ (Travelogues, novels, geographic and anthropological studies 
related to Germany’s former African colonies), the most famous being Hans Grimm’s Volk 
Ohne Raum23 with 480,000 copies in print by 1940. These books used internment during the 
war (although usually only briefly dealt with, if at all), and mainly the loss and decline of the 
colonies to portray Germans as the victims of British and French colonialism. As Britta Schilling 
points out, these publications expressed a combination of the ‘communicative’ and ‘cultural’ 
memory of Germany’s colonial period.24 
In addressing current historiography, the study of the treatment of prisoners by the British and 
Dominion forces, by shifting the focus away from Europe, brings the paradigm of prisoners and 
the First World War into a more global and transnational context. Sebastian Conrad has shown 
the processes through which emigration and immigration linked the Kaiserreich both mentally 
and physically with a world that had been fundamentally restructured by modern 
colonialism.25 We follow this transnational thread and take it one step further by analysing the 
forced internment and expulsion of Germans in and from the colonial world, and its effect on 
German identity. The internment of Europeans in the extra-European world broke through one 
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of the ‘racialised’ notions of space in Imperial policy.26 In Africa there was the feeling among 
the vastly out-numbered Germans that Europeans, whilst they might fight each other at home, 
would not do so abroad. They felt that colonial neutrality was enshrined in law under the 
articles drawn up by the ‘unprecedented, if ineffective, experiment at international control of 
the tropics’ that was the Berlin Act of 1884/85.27 Keeping up the appearance of colonial 
solidarity was not just desirable for the German settlers but they also considered it a legal 
obligation. It simply was not possible, however, to contain the First World War and its effects 
on national identity  to the European sphere. 
Christian Koller’s useful review of the literature on the war in Africa28 investigates how far Hew 
Strachan’s characterisation of the First World War as a ‘global conflict’ is reflected in the new 
narratives of the First World War.29 Koller argues that the development of the historiography 
of the First World War in relation to Africa directly mirrors the developments in history in 
general over the last sixty years. The ‘post-colonial turn’, with imperial and colonial warfare 
being a topic at the intersection of ‘new military history’, global history and imperial and 
colonial history has attracted increased attention in recent years and resulted in a range of 
new studies on the African theatres of war.30 General histories of the war still focus on Europe 
although it now is almost obligatory to feature chapters on Africa and further afield.31 The 
Encyclopaedia of the First World War, published in German in 2003 and in English in 2012, 
includes entries on ‘African’ topics such as colonial warfare, colonial troops in Europe, South 
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Africa, German South-West Africa, German East Africa, and North Africa, as well as an 
introductory article on the war’s global aspects. The Blackwell Companion to the First World 
War also deals with the African dimension, although it ignores China and the Pacific.32 
Lawrence Sondhaus’ textbook World War One. The Global Revolution looks at the war in Africa 
and Asia but condenses these theatres into one chapter.33 Hew Strachan’s To Arms remains 
the most complete attempt to look at the war’s extra-European theatres from a military 
perspective.34 Most recently the Cambridge History of the First World War, particularly volume 
one, offers a comprehensive introduction to the global aspects of the war.35  
Annette Becker’s landmark 1998 publication, Oubliés de la Grande Guerre: humanitaire et 
culture de guerre, 1914-1918, sparked an increase in the study of prisoners of war in the First 
World War and how their treatment fits or does not fit into the treatment of prisoners and 
captives in war time over the course of the twentieth century.36 However, the treatment of 
German prisoners outside Europe remains a missing element in our understanding of the 
conflict.37 The question to be addressed is: to what narrative do Europeans in colonial 
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internment belong? Iain R. Smith and Andreas Stucki asserted that the colonial development of 
internment followed a different path from that of Europe leading to the development of ‘new 
villages’ in Malaya in the 1950s and the ‘strategic hamlet’ system in Vietnam in the 1960/70’s 
instead of the European narrative of internment that resulted in the camps of the Second 
World War.38 The prisoners from the German colonies should be placed somewhere in 
between these narratives of European and extra-European internment.  
It is difficult, if not impossible to understand fully the changes in German colonial policy after 
the First World War without looking at the experiences of the almost 20,000 Germans who 
spent the war incarcerated or repatriated to Germany and witnessed first-hand the collapse of 
the overseas Reich.39 Historical research has focused on the build-up of German colonies and 
the effects on the indigenous population, the development of genocidal ideology in the 
colonies and its alleged export to Europe.40 The Germans who were taken prisoner were the 
living legacy of the German colonial policy and their influence after the war through the DKG 
and through the rebuilding of the colony in South-West Africa (albeit under direction from the 
Union of South Africa’s government) kept the flame of colonial revisionism alive. The existing 
historiography on internment in the colonies offers questions that can be applied to this 
project.  
As Isabel Hull maintains for Germany, Britain also approached the war in the colonies from 
within the framework of its military culture.41 How the British Empire reacted to war in Africa 
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was coloured by its experience in the Boer War and some continuities remained, explicitly 
illustrated through the recycling of camps used during the Boer conflict to house Germans in 
the Great War. The number of prisoners and the geographical scale were much larger in the 
1914-1918 conflict, and the threat of reprisals from Germany against British prisoners acted as 
a huge controlling influence. In reaction to this threat, the Foreign Office had to constantly 
remind the Dominion governments that it held primacy over the treatment of prisoners of war.  
 Most works cite the comparatively good treatment of captives by Britain but none factor in 
the treatment of prisoners outside Europe under British or Dominion administration.42 In the 
colonies we see a more ‘modern’ brand of prisoner treatment and management which clearly 
marked a break with nineteenth century values, especially racial solidarity among European 
colonisers. This was a traumatic breaking point not just for those captured but also for some of 
those who did the capturing. The forced evacuation and mass shipment of prisoners across the 
globe contained elements of both twentieth century modern warfare and nineteenth century 
humanitarian ideals. German officers were not offered parole after a fair fight as had 
happened in previous conflicts between Great Powers outside Europe.43 The spread of 
‘Wilsonian’ ideals of self-determination and the necessity of portraying Germany as the guilty 
party in conducting the conflict forced a reappraisal by the British government of how exactly 
it was going to ensure that its new colonial possessions were to stay British after the war.44 
                                                                                                                                         
2011). This thesis will move from comparisons of colonial and European warfare to investigating 
whether colonial internment is properly comparable to European internment. 
42
 Heather Jones, in her comparative analysis on violence, cites Britain’s treatment of prisoners of war as 
following a ‘Sonderweg’ in that cultural factors restrained extreme violence against prisoners of war. 
Jones, Violence Against Prisoners, p. 376. Alan Kramer countered the myth of good prisoner treatment 
in the case of the Central-Powers but did not look at Britain. Alan Kramer, Dynamic of Destruction: 
Culture and Mass Killing in the First World War (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007), p. 62. Alan 
Kramer has also looked at Italian prisoners in Austria-Hungary. Kramer, Alan, ‘Prisoners in the First 
World War’, in Sibylle Scheipers (ed), Prisoners in War (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010). Another 
key work discussing the harsh realities of internment in Austria-Hungary, which unfortunately has not 
been translated into English is, Giovanna Procacci, Soldati e prigionieri italiani nella Grande Guerra: con 
una raccolta di lettere inedi (Bollati Boringhieri, Turin, 2000). 
43
 Russian Officers captured during the Russo-Japanese war were allowed to return home after signing 
an oath of neutrality. Olive Checkland, Humanitarianism and the Emperor’s Japan 1877-1977 (St. 
Martin’s Press, London, 1994), p. 47. 
44
 Woodrow Wilson was against a formal annexation of Germany’s colonies but through the 
establishment of the Mandate system, settled for something similar. David Stevenson, 1914-1918: The 
History of the First World War (Penguin, London, 2004), p. 516. 
35 
 
 
 
The First World War, as John Darwin argues, marked a violent rupture with the nineteenth 
century world in which the expansion of the British Empire had been possible.45 While seeing 
more transition and development in the British Empire than Darwin’s idea of rupture, this 
thesis discusses the nature of warfare in the extra-European theatre of the First World War.46 
Was it a war in the old nineteenth century tradition with better weaponry or was it a modern, 
total war which marked the beginning of the Urkatastrophe that was the short twentieth 
century? Prisoner of war studies have been at the forefront of this debate. Alon Rachamimov 
and Richard Speed both argued that the treatment of prisoners of war was organised on the 
lines of gentlemanly diplomacy and humanitarian consideration of older traditions ensuring 
good treatment of captives, although both see a radicalisation in prisoner treatment in 
Russia.47 These ideas have been challenged, especially in regard to the forced labour camps 
directly behind the lines in Europe during the war where the treatment of prisoners fits more 
with the brutality that followed in the Spanish Civil War and the Second World War.48  
Captivity also caused tensions between captors; the British government had to take a strong 
line to ensure uniform treatment of prisoners in the Dominion-run camps. Hermann Hiery’s 
work has looked at the effect of the ‘sub-Imperial’ (understood here as the takeover of a 
German colony by one of the British Dominions) mission in Samoa and New Guinea as carried 
out by the New Zealand and Australian governments respectively.49 The Union of South Africa 
also had to be dealt with carefully at the beginning of the conflict, to ensure its loyalty.50 The 
treatment of prisoners in the Dominions has been overlooked in studies of these ‘sub-Imperial’ 
missions. The Australians’ treatment of their German captives in New Guinea and in their own 
prison camps caused great tensions between the Australian government and the British, who 
feared bad treatment of prisoners would lead to reprisals against British captives in German 
hands. This issue has not previously been looked at in any detail, but it is vital in explaining 
why the British intervened more directly in Dominion affairs. The other major work focusing on 
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Australia and its treatment of prisoners is Enemy Aliens by Gerhard Fischer.51 The book gives a 
detailed account of civilian captivity in Australia, but misses out some vital sources that are 
available in the Foreign Office relating to violence against prisoners. Fischer’s and Hiery’s 
books see captivity in Australia and the Pacific as generally humane and just, but do not 
explore the use of prisoners in projecting the sub-imperial mission into the Pacific.52    
As mentioned, the study of prisoners of war has established itself in the historiography of the 
First World War. Thanks to work by historians starting with Richard Speed, Stéphane Audoin-
Rouzeau, Annette Becker, and Alon Rachamimov, one does not need to start with a blank slate. 
Three main texts that highlight the different approaches in the prisoner of war field are  Alon 
Rachamimov’s POWs and the Great War: Captivity on the Eastern Front, Matthew Stibbe’s 
British Civilian Internees in Germany: The Ruhleben Camp, 1914-18 and Heather Jones’s 
Violence Against Prisoners of War in the First World War: Britain, France and Germany, 1914-
1920.53 As this thesis uses the analysis of Rachamimov, Stibbe and Jones as the back-bone of 
this project it will be necessary here to discuss each work and explain how this thesis to 
develops their ideas further.  
Rachamimov maintained that the memory of the Great War is focused on the mechanisation 
and mass mobilisation of modern warfare, and that the minor role that prisoners of war play in 
the historiography of the First World War is due to five factors, four of which are relevant to 
this study and will be discussed here.54 The first is that the relative comfort that prisoners of 
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war enjoyed in comparison to the soldiers in the trenches makes the history of First World War 
internment look rather quaint. His book dealt with prisoners who were interned in Russia, and 
does paint a rather rosy picture of their internment.55 There are parallels with the prisoners 
from the German colonies. From the point of the view of those fighting on the Western Front, 
internment in well organised camps in far-flung India or New Guinea may have been 
preferable to modern mechanised combat, and the hardships of the prisoners seem 
insignificant in comparison to the suffering in trenches.  
Secondly, Rachamimov raised the familiar nature of prisoner of war misery. The majority of the 
prisoners in Europe suffered only normal deprivation: the main problem, he claims, as the war 
dragged on, was boredom, that led to Stacheldrahtkrankheit or ‘barbed wire disease’56 which 
in the colonial context was compounded by tropical neurasthenia. This does not mean that 
there were no problems with the camp systems anywhere in the belligerent countries. 
However, prisoners’ suffering was relative, as in the camps outside Europe they were far 
removed from the death and suffering of the Western Front. Nonetheless, they still felt the 
effects of incarceration; as one prisoner in South Africa summed up: ‘Would even the most 
sumptuous feast replace freedom? Would even the most magnificent dwelling replace 
liberty?’57 In addition, prisoners through internment were cut off from their societies and as 
Annette Becker shows, the physical boundaries of the camp served as a metaphor of the 
‘double exclusion’ of prisoners from German society - the society before 1914, and, for military 
age men, the trench society from 1914 to 1918.58 
Third, one has to look at the social background of prisoner of war memoirists. As Rachamimov 
noted, the contributions in In Feindeshand were mainly from the officer corps whose 
experiences, in general, were far more comfortable than, and altogether different from, those 
of the rank and file. This aspect is even more apparent in the case of prisoners from the Reich’s 
colonies: not only were there cases where the officers were kept in separate houses; there 
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were also cases of them being incarcerated in separate countries, as in the case of the 
separation of rank and file and officers from East Africa, who were sent to South-West Africa, 
India, Malta or Egypt, depending on rank and status. Finally, for Rachamimov, prisoner 
internment during the First World War lacked not only the pathos but also the dramatic quality 
of narratives from the fighting and, in the case of the war in the colonies, dealt with 
victimisation. According to these memoirs, it was first and foremost an outrage that one 
civilised colonial power would attack another. Fighting in Europe was one thing but to bring 
the war into Africa was quite another. According to most German narratives, the extension of 
warfare into the colonial sphere threatened to destroy Europe’s prestige and put the stability 
of imperial control at risk.  
Matthew Stibbe’s work on British civilian prisoners in Ruhleben (Berlin), through its pursuit of 
the image of an imagined community held together along national and linguistic lines, adds 
more complexity to our understanding of captivity in the First World War.59 In Ruhleben, the 
British prisoners were able to hold on to and cultivate their national identity through the 
setting up of various institutions, such as sports teams, educational classes, theatre and even a 
mock election to send representatives to the British parliament. In the camp one can see a 
microcosm of early twentieth century British society with all its attendant social distinctions 
such as one old Etonian who was able to hire a valet from among the lower-class prisoners in 
the camp.60  Stibbe views the camp in terms of a ‘symbolic community’ and looks at how 
prisoners’ experiences varied depending on their education level, class, race and nationality.61 
This community was born both from the prisoners’ detachment from Britain and from the 
converse need to establish closer connections with the nation under whose flag they were 
being held captive. 
The significance of Stibbe’s work for this project is that, although he looks at the legal 
structures, his main focus is on camp culture. His book also brings out an interesting 
comparison between the image and reality of internee treatment. The Foreign Office was 
interested in Ruhleben and the conditions in prisoner camps. It strongly denied any reports of 
German good treatment of prisoners, used for propaganda purposes. Even though they had 
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their suspicions that treatment was not so bad in Ruhleben, it was unacceptable to the British 
propaganda effort for the Germans to be seen as humane.62 Stibbe concludes that the facts of 
Ruhleben do not match the propaganda, and despite some earlier findings to the contrary the 
reputation of Ruhleben being a prisoners’ paradise, albeit an unexciting one, is justified. 
Ruhleben shared some similarities with some of the camps outside Europe, such as 
Ahmednagar, Maharashtra State, India (Map 1, no. 80)63, which will be focused on in chapter 
four. The ‘imagined community’ at Ahmednagar exhibited the class structures of German 
colonial society but also highlighted tensions between Germans coming from different 
contexts, those who had been in India before the war and those who were transferred to 
Ahmednagar from German East Africa. 
Heather Jones is the only one of these three writers to take a comparative approach, looking 
at the treatment of captives by France, Germany and Britain. She focuses on the forced labour 
camp system as a tool to highlight the continuities of violence in captivity in the twentieth 
century. The policy of ignoring international law and forcing prisoners to work in labour camps 
highlights how immediate necessity and reprisal doctrine often overshadowed humanitarian 
concerns in war time. By focussing on Europe, Jones overlooks the role played by Germans in 
captivity outside the continent in justifying reprisals against British prisoners in Germany. The 
camps at Ahmednagar, Pietermaritzburg (South Africa), Liverpool (New South Wales), and 
others provided the Auswärtiges Amt with ample evidence, either real or false, of the 
mistreatment of German citizens at the hands of British or Dominion Authorities.  
In the face of reprisal threats the treatment of prisoners needed to be uniform across the 
British Empire.64 This was true not just of those incarcerated but also related to civilians on 
parole. The example of French prisoners in Germany being sent to labour camps in the 
Rhineland marshes in reprisal for France’s maltreatment of its German prisoners in Africa was 
not lost on the British. Conversely, Britain used internees from colonial camps, especially East 
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Africa, to exact reprisals for the maltreatment of British civilians in German-occupied Belgium 
and France. Negotiations between Germany and Britain over exchanges and prisoner 
treatment ensured that some of those civilians were spared evacuation from East Africa and 
the hardships of internment in India.  
Jones’s book concludes that even though First World War incarceration took place within the 
hypertrophied legal context of The Hague and Geneva Conventions and military, naval, and 
civil law, there remained ample space for abuse of these regulations. Building on Annette 
Becker’s work it brings violence back into the analysis of prisoners of war. Up until this work, 
the prevailing image of prisoners during the First World War had been, as in Jean Renoir’s 1938 
film La Grande Illusion, of prisoners engaged in quaint pastimes such as gardening, putting on 
theatre performances and mounting gallant escape attempts. Jones’s book brings the more 
powerful paradigm of violence into prisoner treatment, thus connecting captivity in the First 
World War more concretely with the Second World War and twentieth century captivity in 
general. The groundwork laid through the comparative approach in Jones’s work serves as a 
useful model to locate the narrative of internment of Europeans in the extra-European world. 
This study takes a global and transnational view of the history of internment in the extra-
European world. It will not only look at the experiences of prisoners from diverse colonial 
locations of internment under the British Empire, but will also use the models of the French 
and Japanese empires (chapter six) for comparison and to highlight the transfers of prisoners 
across colonial borders. These models also fit with an ‘interactive comparative method’, i.e. 
they will allow us to comment on the phenomenon of internment in the extra-European 
theatre from outside the borders of the British Empire.65 However, France will feature in this 
thesis not only for comparative purposes but also because the contemporary propaganda and 
literature produced in Germany mainly dealt with France, connecting internment in the 
colonies to the French use of ‘Senegalese’ troops on the Western Front and post-war ‘black 
shame’ propaganda connected to France’s occupation of the left bank of the Rhine.66 France, 
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mainly fighting on the West African fronts held fewer German prisoners than the British in 
Africa but their internment in Dahomey, Benin, provided the major propaganda campaign in 
Germany during the war with regard to internment in the extra-European theatre.67  
Japan provides a counter-balance to both the French and more importantly British Empires’ 
treatment of prisoners. Similar to the trajectory of captivity in other colonies, except East 
Africa, a large haul of German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners was taken early in the war, 
after the siege of German-controlled Tsingtao by Japan, and thus had to endure almost five 
years in captivity. The historiography of the camps in Japan is much richer and better 
developed than that of the camps under British and Dominion administration. Charles Burdick 
and Ursula Moessner’s book on German prisoners in Japan has been the standard work in 
English on the topic, but is now dated and although based on German sources, almost 
completely overlooks the Japanese angle.68 In Japan there has been, and still is, an avid 
interest in the camps as they provide a positive example of Japanese humanitarianism from a 
century overshadowed by events in 1937-1945.69 The main focus of these studies has been on 
the camp at Bando, Shikoku, but increasingly the research is expanding to cover other camps. 
In building upon this research, it is important to situate the experience of German and Austro-
Hungarian prisoners in Japan within the overall paradigm of First World War imprisonment. 
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The reputation of Japan for good treatment of prisoners was prevalent among belligerent 
countries even during the war and became accepted as fact. Though there have been a few 
dissenters, it is difficult to disagree with the evidence that in Japan during the First World War 
prisoner treatment was humane when compared with contemporary standards.70  
To conclude, German colonial settlers as prisoners of war and civilian internees during the First 
World War is a forgotten aspect of German colonial history. William Roger Louis’s Great Britain 
and Germany’s Lost Colonies 1914-1919, published in 1967, scarcely mentions internment and 
in most accounts of Germany’s defeat in the colonial theatre and (with a few exceptions) little 
has since changed.71 Hiery has revived interest in the study of the colonies during the Great 
War,72 but although some of his work deals with prisoners, he looks at them exclusively in 
relation to the takeover of colonies by the ‘sub-Empires’ but not from the perspective of 
twentieth century captivity. This analysis of the treatment of prisoners of war will look at this 
‘sub-Imperial’ process and following the work of Jack Robinson and Ronald Gallagher, argues 
that internment policy was driven by European considerations.73 Recent work on the rise, fall 
and re-emergence of the colonial movement in Germany has almost completely overlooked 
what happened to the men and women who, throughout their captivity, maintained the hope 
that the colonies would be returned and they could go back to their homes.74 Studies of the 
German colonies through the war have focused their attention on German East Africa and 
have tended towards military history.75 The campaign there was dramatic and through the 
character of Colonel (later General) Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck (commander of German troops 
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in German East Africa) had a great publicist.76 The myth of an army undefeated in the (colonial) 
field would overshadow the experience of those who were captured in German East Africa and 
spent the war in captivity, in India, Egypt or Malta.77 This thesis seeks to recover this 
experience and the consequences it has for our understanding of diplomacy, internment and 
identity in the First World War. 
The geographical scale of internment outside Europe was huge, with a much larger variety of 
resources used than in previous colonial conflicts to deal with this through the Admiralty, the 
Colonial and India Offices, and the governments of the Dominion countries. The treatment of 
prisoners required a much greater coordination of effort between various departments, 
setting norms in place that were in turn ready-made and applied in the Second World War.78 
This study of combatant prisoners and internees outside Europe contributes to the completion 
of the picture of captivity in the First World War and brings to light new and important 
information on how strategies to take over the German colonies were developed and their 
long lasting consequences. It also reassesses the nature of the First World War, placing the 
world-wide internment network run by the British Empire in the Great War firmly alongside 
the battles on the Western Front in the category of modern warfare, rather than as a final 
hurrah for nineteenth century aristocratic ideals. The management of prisoners of war in the 
extra-European theatre of the First World War was indeed global and the camp and transport 
systems that evolved to deal with these prisoners helped to mark the First World War as the 
first truly modern war of total mobilisation. The next chapter will map out the geography and 
evolution of the global camp network. 
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Chapter Two: The Geography of Internment 
Before embarking on the thematic analysis of this thesis, it is important to map out internment 
from each German colony, and the global camp network, (including the transfer of German 
nationals across borders) that was established during the First World War. The First World War 
needs to be understood ‘in transnational terms even if it was fought for national needs’ and 
imperial interaction was at the heart of the conflict.1 The first shots British shots were fired by 
the West African Frontier Force and the first territory taken was by the New Zealanders when 
they took over the island of Samoa. The Chief of Naval War Staff, Sir Frederick Doveton 
Sturdee, recorded two days before Britain entered the war, ‘it would be well to accept all 
offers from Dominions to attack German colonies. Besides being a powerful threat, it will help 
stimulate the Imperial idea’.2 The planned territorial gains from the takeover of the German 
colonies were hoped to strengthen the British Empire spiritually as well as geographically. It 
was clear from the outset of the war, as one prisoner noted, that Germany was vastly 
outnumbered in the struggle for its place in the sun.3 Internment and expulsion would be the 
key policies enacted throughout the former German colonies once under British control and 
linked to an Empire-wide strategy. Deportation as an imperial strategy was not new to the First 
World War; it had previously been applied to French-speaking Acadians in North America in 
the 1750s and was again put into use against the Kikuyu and the Ganda in East Africa as 
recently as the 1950s.4 What was different in the First World War was that the deportation 
policies were aimed at ‘Europeans’ and they were to be permanent.5 
 Although colonial aims were not the main motivation in mobilising the British Empire for war, 
once conflict broke out, it acted swiftly to take over all of Germany’s overseas possessions.6 In 
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the opening exchanges of the war in Europe the British did not capture significant numbers of 
prisoners but rather suffered many losses due to men captured. In the colonies it was the 
reverse, with most German colonies, with the exception of East Africa, having fallen to British, 
British Dominion, French or Japanese forces by 1916.7 Because of the huge areas covered and 
the great differences in the process of capture and treatment the British needed centralised 
control over their prisoner management in order to ensure uniform treatment, a consideration 
that grew ever more pressing as the number of British captured by the Germans rose and the 
threat of reprisals became more real. Nonetheless, the British Empire had to face a number of 
challenges regarding its internment practices, which were similar across different geographical 
regions. This chapter looks at what controls the British put in place, and then moves on to a 
colony by colony commentary on the nature of capture and internment. It will estimate how 
many prisoners were held overseas in Allied camps and consider where and how their 
internment developed. Internment in one colony did not operate in isolation but was linked to 
the overall camp network established during the war. Once this groundwork has been laid it 
the following chapters will take up the thematic threads as described in the introduction.   
At the outbreak of the war there were an estimated 25,000 Germans living in Togo, Cameroon, 
South-West Africa, German East Africa, New Guinea, Samoa, Tsingtao (the Kiaochow Bay 
concession in China) and some other small Pacific islands such as the Carolines. The settler 
population had increased significantly since the beginning of the century (in 1902 there were 
only 7,500 Germans living in the colonies), but there was still a demand for more settlers.8 
Germany’s policy on the defence of these possessions was never very clear. Grand Admiral of 
the German navy, Alfred von Tirpitz, was delighted that Germany had acquired the excellent 
deep water port at Tsingtao, but was less interested in developing its potential as a naval 
station. Germany’s policy in the extra-European world seemed to be more one centred on a 
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peaceful co-existence with its Great Power colonial neighbours.9 Indeed, outlying areas such as 
Samoa were almost completely reliant on British help. To illustrate this dependency, the 
Amtmann (District Officer) of German Sawai’i, now part of Fiji, was an Irishman named 
Williams who, when called to Berlin, met an incredulous Kaiser who asked ‘How is it you are a 
Governor of a German island and cannot speak the language?’10 It was difficult to attract even 
adventurous young men to the hard lifestyle of building a remote colony from scratch, to say 
nothing of women.11 To make up for in this short-fall in numbers initially the colonies accepted 
large numbers of other Europeans to settle within their borders. The drive to recruit more and 
more Germans to settle abroad was still in development in 1914. Relations between the 
German settlers and their British neighbours remained cordial until the outbreak of the war.12 
Unlike in western Europe, where now as then, the majority tend to see ‘peace as the default 
position, the normal state of mankind, and are surprised when it fails’,13 in the colonies, before 
the First World War, unrest and warfare were normal but usually the targets of imperial 
aggression were the indigenous others, not fellow Europeans.14German colonial administrators 
pinned their hopes on the 1914 war not extending beyond the borders of continental Europe. 
The German colonies were not built for defence, their security resting on International law and 
a sense of a common European mission. The colonial administrators and German government 
hoped that the Berlin Conference (also known as the Congo Conference) of 1884/85 had 
enshrined colonial neutrality in a legal document and that the other Powers were prepared to 
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honour it.15 During the war the German government upheld this position, as highlighted in this 
excerpt from a Note Verbale to the British Foreign Office in 1916: ‘The German government 
has always maintained the view that it is contrary to the laws of nations to arrest and deport 
the peaceful population of occupied territory […] if these considerations apply to the case in 
the European theatre of war, they apply in a greater degree, in the opinion of the German 
government, in the case of African territory. At the beginning of the war the German 
government, mindful of the common interests of civilised nations (Kulturvölker) on African soil, 
was prepared to restrict itself to within the limits defined by Act One of the General Acts of the 
Berlin Conference […] and to abstain from the introduction of war measures in colonial 
territory in Africa.’16  
It was, however, easy to cry foul-play when faced with overwhelming odds but as the Berlin 
Conference only specifically named neutrality on the Congo River, any legal obligations it could 
offer to the African colonies of Togo, Cameroon, German East Africa and South-West Africa 
were only indirect at best. Nonetheless, either genuinely or for propaganda purposes Germany 
saw the takeover of the colonies as a breach of international law, and often referred to it in tit-
for-tat exchanges with the British who they claimed had been the main offenders in breaking 
international agreements.17 The German government was of course arguing from a position of 
weakness in attempting to dissuade its enemies from attacking its colonies. 
The German captives were also well aware of their rights under the Geneva and Hague 
conventions and made explicit references to them in their complaints, often highlighting 
abuses of international law under British officers (to the embarrassment of the Foreign Office). 
International law played a key role in the war and prisoner administration with the 
conventions being the most important texts for the treatment of prisoners of war. In the 
African, Pacific and Asian colonies, the conventions were not only applicable with regard to the 
treatment of prisoners of war but also gave them a legal standing for protection of their 
property. Article 46 of The Hague Treaty, (stating; ‘Family honour and rights, the lives of 
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persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be respected. 
Private property cannot be confiscated.’),18 which was often cited by the Germans, put the 
responsibility upon the British, under international law, to ensure that German-owned houses 
and land were protected and that once hostilities were over, captives would be free to return 
to their daily lives. The convention, while mainly honoured in the case of prisoner treatment, 
was not respected in the same manner as regards property. While property rights were 
generally respected in the treatment of civilian internees in Europe, in the colonies the 
requisition of German property was an important military objective and once taken there was 
no question of it being returned to the original owner. It will be shown that circumventing The 
Hague Convention on property rights was foremost in the Foreign Office’s mind in its policy of 
deporting civilians from the Reich Colonies.19 
Using the opportunity provided by the war, the Allies took over German-held territory and 
secured it for their own colonial ambitions. France, Portugal and Belgium all sought gains in 
Africa. The war, sparked in Europe, enabled the colonial powers to once again redraw the map 
of Africa, albeit cloaking their ambitions in the language of tutelage of what were perceived as 
less-developed peoples instead of mere imperial expansion. Japan perceived the war as a once 
in a century opportunity to establish a strong foothold not just geographically but also 
politically in a China that had been destabilised by the 1911-12 revolution.20 The Australians 
and the New Zealanders saw the war as a chance to establish their own spheres of influence in 
the Pacific. They felt that Germany had not been worthy of running the colonies and through 
its laissez-faire approach to colonial management had left its possessions wide open to the 
expansionist ambitions of Japan. Japan, although the British Empire’s ally, was viewed with 
suspicion: this was after all a period of heightened anxiety over the ‘Yellow Peril’.21 Taking over 
Germany’s colonies would not only prevent them from falling into Japanese hands but would 
also create a buffer zone against any direct threats to the mainland from the Japanese Empire 
in the future. Similarly, South Africa used the war to expand its sphere of influence into 
German South-West Africa and even into German East Africa. Britain was also keen, from a 
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military and naval viewpoint, to eliminate the German presence overseas. The immediate 
necessity of taking over the colonies to dismantle any ports which could be used for German 
shipping, wireless communications or coal bunkering, and the rounding up of German civilians 
to prevent agitation among the local populations, fitted into the more long-term objective of 
confining Germany to Europe and disabling its naval threat, to ensure British dominance in sea 
power.22  
For a clear understanding of the geographical context of this thesis it will be necessary to look 
at each colony and its respective camps individually. The camps run by the British and the 
Dominion governments covered a huge area. Where there were Germans, there were camps. 
Prison camps were not just established for captured colonial troops, but as in the Boer War 
previously, all enemy civilians were registered or rounded up for internment. It was a huge 
task in administration and engineering, larger than the concentration camp system established 
in the 1899-1902 conflict in South Africa.23 Prisoner of war and civilian internee camps were 
set up in areas as remote as Bermuda, where thirty-nine Germans spent the war in captivity, or 
Tenom, North Borneo (Map 2, no. 88), which housed only five. There were naturally larger 
complexes set up in areas that had bigger enemy populations. In Australia, for example, there 
were a number of civilian internee camps, the largest being Liverpool in Sydney which had a 
prisoner population of 4,500 (Map 2, no. 97). The camp system was vast and there were 
around twenty-four camps (excluding hospitals, and ships which were often counted in ICRC 
reports as camps) under British and Dominion administration that either partly or exclusively 
housed German prisoners from the colonies, as well as camps in Japan, the Belgian Congo and 
French and Portuguese Africa.24 The following section will look at each colony in this study 
individually. It will highlight where and when the prisoners in each colony were taken and 
where they were interned.  
Togo was the smallest of Germany’s African possessions and the first one to fall. It was taken 
in August 1914 by a joint British and French force. While it may have been geographically 
insignificant, the town of Kamina in the colony possessed Germany’s only radio transmitter, 
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apart from that at Nauen outside Berlin, powerful enough to transmit across continents.25 This 
was significant as capturing it cut communications and prevented the relaying of information 
from Germany to the colonies. More importantly, German ships could no longer receive radio 
transmissions, further crippling the German navy. The telegraph was the communications hub 
that connected Germany to its African possessions: once the wire was cut and the telegraph 
shut down, not only Togo, but also the rest of German Africa lost a vital link to the 
metropole.26 The introduction of the station had led to the development of a curious class 
system in the colony whereby the telegraph operators enjoyed higher wages and better links 
to home. This seems to have caused some conflict with those German settlers who had been in 
the Togo longer and had worked hard to develop the colony.27  
As Togo fell so early in the war, the experience of the prisoners taken there illustrates the 
initial stages of British prisoner treatment. The takeover of Togo had been under a joint British-
French force but the British did deal with a lot of the prisoners, although many of them 
(especially males) were handed over to the French.28 The acting Governor Hans-Georg von 
Doering was interned in French West Africa for his part in the defence of the colony.29 Rather 
than interning the civilians of Togo the British arranged for them to be shipped back to Britain 
via the Gold Coast, but allowed married women the option of joining their husbands in 
internment by the French in Dahomey.30 Once in Britain, arrangements were made with the 
neutral Dutch government for their transportation from Liverpool to Rotterdam (via train to 
London), where they were then allowed to cross the border home to Germany. The main 
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military action in Togo was the destruction of the radio station by its operators, which 
prevented the Allies making use of it. There was no real military presence in Togo, only a small 
police force of ten German police officers backed up with 600 indigenous troops.31 At this early 
stage of the war, Christian missionaries were allowed to remain in the colony and at their 
stations, a policy that was to be revised as the war continued and the ‘spirit of 1914’ turned 
sour.32 Total figures for those deported during the course of the war from Togo are difficult to 
ascertain, but initially 243 people were shipped to the United Kingdom and the group of 
missionaries were eventually sent to the Gold Coast for internment in 1916.33 Around 280 
Germans were handed over to the French and interned in Dahomey.34 
Although Duala (Douala), the main port in Cameroon, was taken early in the war (September 
1914), the rest of the colony fell in early 1916.35 As the colony was not under Allied control for 
some time the treatment of civilians was harsher than that in Togo and showed a development 
in the general attitude toward prisoners.36 After the capture of Duala the German residents 
were rounded up and publicly marched to the docks before being put on board ships and in 
the same fashion as those from Togo sent back to Germany or kept in incarceration in Britain, 
mainly at Knockaloe on the Isle of Man.37  
Cameroon, again like Togo, was taken by a joint British-French force. France had taken over 
the bulk of fighting in Cameroon by the end of the conflict there in 1916. There were some 
cases where the British handed over captives who were wanted for crimes by the French, but 
in general they followed the policy of deportation of officers and other ranks back to Britain 
and repatriation of civilians to Germany. Those Germans who were repatriated voiced their 
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displeasure at their treatment. Once back in Germany or on neutral territory they were free to 
publish uncensored and sometimes sensational accounts of their period, no matter how short, 
in enemy hands. 
Unlike in Togo, the British wasted no time in rounding up Christian Missionaries; they were 
especially suspicious of the Baseler Missionsgesellschaft. Basel Missionaries had been at the 
forefront of the Christianizing mission in Africa, having established churches in Togo and the 
Gold Coast by 1828 before founding its first mission in Cameroon in 1885.38 Although the Basel 
mission had its headquarters in Switzerland, its membership in the colonies was mainly 
German.39 There could, therefore, be no possibility of allowing them to remain in Cameroon as 
they were very much ‘enemy aliens’. General Charles Macpherson Dobell (Commander in Chief 
of British operations in West Africa) claimed that while not all were on active service at the 
time of capture, 171 of the Basel missionaries were reservists. 40 The mission houses were 
confiscated by British troops and its buildings in the Gold Coast were converted into an 
internment camp to house missionaries from Togo, Cameroon, Nigeria and the Gold Coast 
itself, before their deportation to Germany.41 The missionaries, men and women, wrote of 
their accounts of mistreatment at the hands of not only white but also black British troops 
adding further weight to the German contention that the British had no respect for 
international law.42 
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One novel aspect of the conflict in Cameroon was the situation concerning Fernando Po, a 
Spanish possession off the coast of Duala. The British and French Armies had by 1916 taken 
over the entire colony of Cameroon, but a large contingent of the German Schutztruppe, 
around 200 European Officers and 12,000 indigenous troops, including their wives and children, 
fled and sought refuge in Spanish Guinea.43 From there they were taken to Fernando Po, 
where they were to be interned for the duration of the war. Under the leadership of the 
former Governor of Cameroon, Karl Ebermaier, they virtually took over the island and started 
plans to re-arm and re-take Cameroon. This naturally set off alarm bells in Britain and France, 
which threatened to invade the Spanish colony if the King of Spain did not take matters under 
his control. The problem was solved by shipping the European captives to Spain where, much 
to the annoyance of the British, they were kept in relative luxury and were allowed to 
communicate freely with Germany. 44  
The development of camps in German South-West Africa was complex. It was the only German 
colony in Africa actually to have formal prisoner of war camps established on its territory.45 
The initial stages of the war saw a now familiar pattern of expulsion of civilians and military 
from the colony but with some prisoners being transported to the neighbouring Union of 
South Africa. The camp established at Pietermaritzburg in South Africa (Map 1, no. 65) was 
enormous by colonial standards, housing around 2,600 inmates, most of whom had been living 
in the Union prior to the war.46 The camp contained a mix of prisoners of war and civilian 
internees from South-West Africa, South Africa, Rhodesia, the Belgian Congo and German East 
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Africa. In addition, the authorities allowed 750 Germans to live on parole but under 
observation.47   
The war in Southern Africa was problematic for the British. The declaration of war and the 
attempt to mobilise the Dominion immediately sparked a rebellion from Boer officers who had 
suffered at the hands of the British a little over a decade before. The rebellion was quickly put 
down, giving the authorities time to focus on South-West Africa. However, internment also 
carried a heavy legacy from the Boer War and South Africa was reluctant to intern German 
civilians, due to a feared public backlash. This never really materialised and as the war 
developed the South African public became more and more anti-German. However, the South 
African authorities were keen to maintain their new possession as a white colony and saw no 
need to evacuate civilians en masse as in the other German colonies; rather they felt that 
Germans would integrate themselves into an expanded South Africa much as the Boers had 
before them.48   
Administratively there was quite a strain on the Union government, which became increasingly 
reluctant to accept new prisoners and began to send civilian internees back to German South-
West Africa, provided they could pay their own way.49 The main argument for repatriating 
civilians back to South-West Africa was that there was a shortfall in the number of white 
settlers needed to establish control of the newly taken colony. German South-West Africa had 
been the scene of the brutally put down Herero uprising and it was feared that the European 
war might once again plunge the colony into chaos. 144 civilian internees were allowed to 
return to the colony and their farms and jobs. A special commission was even set up under Dr 
Ludwig Kastl and the former Governor Theodor Seitz, which was allowed to receive funds 
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directly from Germany to support the returned Germans.50 The money was to be designated 
exclusively for the relief of destitute settlers and not to be given to officers or colonial 
officials.51 Nonetheless it must not be forgotten that the Union of South Africa government 
had to tread carefully for fear of any agitation that might be caused by disgruntled South-West 
Africans, who were after all closely connected to many Boer residents within the Union.52  
In conformity with The Hague agreements, and due to the Union Governments reluctance to 
allow military prisoners on its territory, two camps were established in South-West Africa. 
There was one camp exclusively for officers established at Okanjande (Map 1, no. 60) and 
another for the rank and file at Aus (Map 1, no. 59), although some officers volunteered to join 
the rank and file camp as camp leaders. The camps were administered along the lines of those 
in Britain. The 1,461 prisoners at Aus were relatively free and any work they undertook was 
voluntary and in the interests of camp maintenance.53 Some of the more menial jobs such as 
cleaning the latrines were done by Askari prisoners. Local workers initially did the cooking, but 
after protests the prisoners were allowed to cook for themselves. The problem of importing 
the food-stuffs that the Germans were used to remained, but the mood of the camp changed 
noticeably once the prisoners could cook and pay out of their own pockets for extra rations.54 
The officer camp at Okanjande was much more casually run, and those interned there did not 
undertake any work and were free to have their servants attend to their needs. They were 
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even allowed the luxury of going on hunts that could last for three days.55 There were no 
complaints about the food, bedding or climate as there had been at Aus.  
Partly due to resistance in South Africa, German civilians were not expelled from German 
South-West Africa as they had been in Togo, Cameroon or East Africa.56 Former Governor 
Theodor Seitz was never interned and kept on in the colony and his initiatives in relief for the 
civilian population influenced the War Office and Navy in coming up with plans to send 
Germans from East Africa to be housed with farmers in South-West Africa, this transport being 
relatively easy and their accommodation costing little to the Crown. However, these plans 
were never fully realised, but with a respectable bulk of the German administration remaining 
in South-West Africa during the war, paroled civilians and interned prisoners of war in the 
former colony benefited from their political influence and fund raising.57 
This decision not to intern Seitz was surprising: he had after all been the leader of the German 
military efforts in the region, and the British were considering trying him for human rights 
abuses in a post-war war crimes trial. The main reason for not bringing Seitz to trial 
immediately was the threat of reprisal against British officers in Germany, and the War Office 
reasoned that there was no reason to conduct a hasty trial now, when there would be plenty 
of time after a British victory to try him as they pleased.58 One other reason for his lenient 
treatment may have been his status with the Auswärtiges Amt. The German government was 
keen to get Seitz back to Germany, and on a number of occasions it offered man for man 
exchanges with captured British officers. It is not clear if holding Seitz in seemingly 
comfortable captivity helped improve the lot of British officers in Germany is unclear. What is 
clear, however, is that Seitz was initially scheduled for repatriation but was discovered 
attempting to smuggle a large number of diamonds out of the country.59 Whether these were 
for personal gain or to protect German assets, it put an end to any idea of Seitz being allowed 
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out of German South-West Africa and the British government would no longer entertain any 
exchange proposals for this accused ‘swindler’.60 
As Anne Samson has shown, Louis Botha, the Prime Minister of South Africa, resisted calls 
during the war for deportation or internment of civilians in South-West Africa for fear of the 
white population being overwhelmed and outnumbered by the black, making any uprisings in 
the unstable colony more difficult to suppress.61 This fear extended to how South Africa fought 
the war: the Union of South Africa government refused offers from black troops to fight in the 
takeover of German South-West Africa but did enrol between 23,000 and 24,000 non-white 
labourers for service in building railways and in transport work there.62 There were still a 
number of transfers of civilians into internment in South Africa during the war and the 
comparison between their perceived maltreatment and that of not only the Boers in the 
previous war, but also of black workers in diamond mines, was not lost on them.63 In 1918, 
there were around 12,000 Germans still living in South-West Africa, but around half of them 
were deported later that year. 
Similar to the other colonies, German East Africa was initially felt to be ‘much too near to be 
dangerous. Just a handful of comrades who spoke German, over the border as it were… So 
nobody worried.’64 However, hostilities there would last beyond the armistice in Europe. The 
guerrilla warfare in East Africa is the most extensively covered aspect of the war in Africa, and 
overshadows the prisoner narrative. Lettow-Vorbeck was able to return to Berlin in 1919 im 
Felde unbesiegt, and was used as a prime example of German military genius. However, the 
reality was quite different. Lettow-Vorbeck could claim to have diverted, through his guerrilla 
campaign, valuable manpower and resources that the British could have used to focus on 
Europe, but in protecting the colony, he failed. The key strategic points in German East Africa 
were quickly taken and although Lettow-Vorbeck’s skirmishes, led from within Portuguese 
territory, were an annoyance, they were never going to result in a retaking of the colony. 
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The development by both sets of belligerents of the myth of Lettow-Vorbeck as an honourable 
fighter who gave the British a good chase lasted until well after the Second World War and still 
resonates today. This feting of Lettow-Vorbeck by the British in the inter-war years and his 
willingness to participate in it disillusioned some of the lower rank soldiers who had served 
with him in Africa; ‘Have we forgotten that the British and their Allies have stolen our colonies 
and property.[?] We Germans abroad have who fought with every means available for the 
recovery of our colonies have been stabbed in the back’65 Lettow-Vorbeck’s code of honour as 
a warrior in the nineteenth century tradition was central to this myth and his treatment as a 
prisoner in 1918, while not completely driven by ideals of honour, reflected this.66   
Heinrich Schnee as governor of German East Africa initially opposed Lettow-Vorbeck’s strategy, 
and favoured a conciliatory approach towards the British. But, once Lettow-Vorbeck forced his 
hand through military action, Schnee enthusiastically threw his lot in with the army and 
enjoyed the fruits of the legend of being undefeated in the field (in the inter-war period). 
Schnee’s internment was brief: he was merely held in transition ‘camps’ in late 1918 until he 
could triumphantly march with Lettow-Vorbeck through Berlin in March 1919.  
Keeping track of prisoners from East Africa is a major headache for the historian. The 
movement of prisoners was very fluid and would have been even more so until the armistice 
ended British plans to transfer to Australia those who had been captured and sent to India. 
Initial captives were sent to Cairo for internment, where the numbers swelled to around 
1,300.67 Some of the officers were then transferred either to Malta, to join the 1,000 prisoners 
from various parts of the British Empire and the Mesopotamia front who were held there, or 
sent on for internment in Britain itself. In Malta the main camp was Verdala with the Red Cross 
estimating around 700 inmates there in February 1917.68 Egypt was also a major transport 
destination for prisoners from German East Africa. In Egypt the main camp was Sidi Bishr in 
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Alexandria, although a number were interned in the predominantly Turkish camp at Ras el-Tin, 
also in Alexandria (Map 1, no. 45).69 Sidi Bishr was divided into two camps, one civilian and one 
military. The civilian camp was small and not strictly civilian in nature as it held fifty officers 
and eleven colonial officials from German East Africa. In comparison to Ahmednagar (India) 
there were fewer complaints from these camps, as the inmates found the climate to be 
suitable for Europeans who had spent long periods in the tropics.70  
India accepted a large influx of prisoners from East Africa. Due to a rolling repatriation system 
in place in India and the transfer of prisoners in and out of the country, it is difficult to 
establish exactly how many prisoners spent time interned in India over the course of the war. 
Ahmednagar camp, a former British army barracks, was originally opened to house prisoners 
who were in India at the beginning of the war. By 1917 the camp population was up to 1,621 
as the camp accepted prisoners from the East African front.71 Ahmednagar was the biggest 
camp in India and although not exclusively for German East Africans, they made up the bulk of 
the camp population.72 The camp was divided into officer, rank and file, and civilian areas. The 
camp buildings for officers and civilians were all made out of stone, whereas those for the rank 
and file varied between stone and tin. The camp came to resemble a village, albeit without 
women, much like Ruhleben camp as discussed by Stibbe.  
A civilian camp, purpose-built for women and children, was established in Belgaum, India (Map 
1, no. 81).73 It was not initially designed to be a permanent camp, just one where women could 
stay while they awaited repatriation to Germany. Restrictions due to the blockade, German 
unrestricted submarine warfare and the Navy’s need to divert ships to other aspects of fighting 
the war severely limited Allied shipping and the repatriation of women was interrupted.74 
Moreover many of the women protested at the thought of having to take the arduous trip 
back to Germany, with their children, but without their husbands and without any prospects 
once they arrived back in the Fatherland. These two factors forced a rethink in strategy and 
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although requests for husbands to be transferred to Belgaum to be with their wives were 
refused, easier communication between the two camps was opened.  
A camp at Blantyre in Nyasaland (Malawi, Map 1, no. 72) was also opened up to deal with 
civilians, again mainly women.75 Women in the colonies according to British thinking needed to 
be removed to impress upon the Germans and indigenous population alike that the colonies 
had been lost and now belonged to the British.76 How to manage these women and children 
became a problem when they could no longer be easily shipped back to Germany. South Africa 
was willing to accept women and children from East Africa but only on a temporary basis. 
Plans to send them to Australia were tabled as the best answer to the problem, but the 
Foreign Office in early 1918 was attempting to negotiate an exchange of these civilians for 
British civilians who were kept in Belgium and it was deemed inadvisable to move them so far 
away. Belgaum was unpopular and was rightly criticised by the German government for its 
unsuitable climate, but for the time being there was nowhere else to send them.77 
The surrender on 25th November 1918 and brief spell in captivity of Lettow-Vorbeck’s army 
was notable for the lack of animosity on the British side towards them.78 Schnee and Lettow-
Vorbeck, on surrender, were sent to Dar es Salaam where they were housed in European-style 
accommodation and in the interests of maintaining European prestige were allowed to march 
with their men as far as the docks fully armed.79 The British authorities were worried about 
how humiliating fellow whites might affect the future running of the new territory in their 
hands. This only further helped reinforce in Schnee and the rest of the German troops’ minds 
that they had indeed been undefeated in the field and only the cessation of hostilities in 
Europe had forced them to give up.  
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As mentioned, Australia and New Zealand were anxious to use the war as an opportunity to 
take over Germany’s colonies and create a buffer zone that would protect the two countries 
from a feared attack by the Japanese. They reached an agreement whereby Australia would 
take New Guinea and New Zealand would take Samoa. The Daily Telegraph, in September 
1914, outlined the main goal in capturing the German South Pacific colonies for Britain: ‘As a 
matter of fact, but for one thing, we might have waited until the end of the war before 
bothering about either Samoa or German New Guinea […] but the important point about the 
capture, so far as the war is concerned, is that the New Guinea wireless will now come under 
British control.’80 As in the capture of Togo, the disrupting German communications was a key 
part of strategy. In Australia and New Zealand, too, the Foreign Office retained primacy over 
prison camp management, causing tension between both Dominion governments and their 
increasingly anti-German citizens. The camps run in mainland Australia were maintained by the 
government but those in New Guinea came under the direct control of the occupying 
Australian army.81 New Zealand took over Samoa and transported most of its Germans 
inhabitants out of the colony.82  
With the agreement with New Zealand in place, Australia moved into New Guinea and on to 
the island of Nauru (part of the German Marshall Islands protectorate, map 2, no. 107). The 
entire Australian fleet was mobilised to take over New Guinea.83 Even though they had 
overwhelming numbers, the Australians met some initial resistance from the Germans who 
had mobilised troops to protect the island. This gave the Germans more bargaining leverage in 
the surrender than their numbers should have permitted. Its terms would become important 
later on when disputes over evacuations and property rights arose. The system set up in these 
areas resembled the situation in South-West Africa, albeit with the absence of prisoner of war 
camps. As in Togo there was no major military presence in these colonies and to make up for 
the initial lack of Australian troops, German police were allowed to operate as usual in the 
more remote areas of the colony. Apart from the arrests of the chief of police and a few others 
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who had put up resistance, the terms of the surrender allowed for other police in the interests 
of security, especially in outlying areas, to remain at their posts.84 
Although most of the Germans were essentially free on parole, they were not allowed to leave 
New Guinea and their correspondence with the outside world was restricted. German was no 
longer used as the official language of the colony, and there were a number of incidents of 
Germans being beaten by Australian soldiers. It was naturally difficult for a German who had 
been treated in this way to seek redress through the Australian courts that were established. 
There were periods when the administrators of the colony failed to maintain discipline among 
the occupying troops. In 1915, in response to fears that the German settlers were planning to 
acquire arms, all Germans including women and children were rounded up into concentration 
camps, and almost all Germans were removed from the colony and sent to Australia by 
November 1915.85  
Eduard Haber, the Deputy Governor of New Guinea86, was initially taken to Australia and from 
there deported to Germany via the United States in January 1915. Haber used his trip through 
the United States to speak to various newspapers and publicise the Germans’ plight in New 
Guinea. Haber was an honourable soldier but once back in Germany, and allured by the chance 
to return to the fighting, very much regretted having given his parole to the Australians as part 
of the surrender terms.87 Writing to the Auswärtiges Amt in March 1915 he noted, ‘my desire 
is and was to remain fully at the disposal of the German Imperial authorities.’88 A man of his 
word, Haber proposed the idea of a parole exchange. On the outbreak of war he had captured 
the Australian Lieutenant General Wylde, who accepted Haber’s offer of parole. Haber now 
proposed that if his parole were nullified he would in turn rescind Wylde’s (who was no longer 
on German territory). William Hughes, the Australian Prime Minister, refused on the grounds 
that there was ‘considerable doubt as to Dr Haber’s authority to bind his government by 
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accepting a surrender of Lieut. General Wylde’s parole.’89 Helmuth von Moltke, now in the role 
of stellvertretender Chef des Generalstabes der Armee (Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the 
Army), was also unconvinced of the success of the plan, arguing that the British often referred 
to Wylde as a ‘damned old fool’ and it served British interests better to keep Haber on parole 
than release Wylde. In the end, von Moltke argued, ‘Whoever gives their word of honour must 
accept the consequences’,90 meaning Haber’s experience of the war conformed to Speed’s 
‘liberal tradition’ and the gravity with which giving parole was treated. However, the following 
year the German government, in a Note Verbale to the Foreign Office, stated that any parole 
given by a German civilian would ‘be regarded as incompatible with his military duties and will 
therefore have no effect on the fulfilment of these duties.’91 The example set by Haber would 
not be repeated, signifying the shift towards total warfare. 
Samoa was the first German colony to fall to another power after New Zealand’s rapid 
takeover of the island. New Zealand was also the first British Dominion to intern civilians 
(August 1914). Curiously, the fall of Samoa was initially welcomed by the German business 
men who had been operating there. They felt that New Zealand administration would benefit 
the colony due to New Zealand’s proximity, opening new markets and enabling a closer home 
country – colony cooperation that had not existed under German rule.92 This optimism soon 
turned to despair as almost immediately after the occupation German businesses were 
forbidden to import or export, the German Mark was replaced by the Sterling under the newly 
established bank of New Zealand and most of the Germans were deported to camps in New 
Zealand.  
The Germans left on parole in Samoa were much more restricted than those in New Guinea 
and their situation was a far cry from the conditions of those in South-West Africa. There were 
many worrying incidents of alcohol-influenced attacks on German residents and their servants. 
These attacks were perhaps overshadowed by attacks on the Chinese coolies who, in 
contradiction to ‘race patriotism’93, were imported to work on the island.94  
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There were two camps in New Zealand for prisoners from Samoa, one at Motuihi, off the coast 
of Auckland (Map 2, no. 105a), and the other on Somes Island in Wellington Bay (Map 2, no. 
105). Conditions on Somes Island were terrible. The barracks were wooden, damp, unheated 
and dirty. The regime in the camps was also harsh with, as at Ahmednagar, frequent cases of 
solitary confinement for minor infringements. In contrast to complaints about the adverse 
conditions of tropical weather in other camps in this study, the inmates in New Zealand 
frequently complained about the intolerable cold and rain that was totally unsuitable for those 
who had spent years in the hot weather of Samoa. The former Governor Erich Schultz’s 
complaints highlight one major aspect of the camps in New Zealand: officers and rank and file 
were not being treated altogether differently.95 The main difference was that officers were 
interned in the slightly more climatically suitable Motuihi, while the rank and file were on the 
wetter Somes Island.96 
Internment in Japan, (along with French West Africa) will be looked at in more detail in chapter 
six. However, to complete the survey of internment in the German colonies a look at the 
Kiaochow Bay concession in China and the German Pacific islands north of the equator is 
necessary.  
The siege of Tsingtao ended in victory for the Japanese, who acquired a strategic new territory 
and around 4,800 combatant prisoners. Unlike the British, the Japanese never interned 
civilians during the war even in Japan itself, much to Britain’s consternation. In Germany, on 
the outbreak of war, approximately eighty Japanese civilians were interned, but after Japanese 
protests they were released. Japan also refused to agree to exchange its prisoners for British or 
French prisoners in German hands, a point which understandably caused further tension 
between the partners in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 
The military prisoners in Japan were held in twelve camps which were spread throughout 
three of the four main islands of the country.97 The camps varied from purpose-built wood and 
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brick barracks to temple grounds. The largest was Bando, which was built in 1916 and housed 
inmates from three previous camps, to total around 1,100 prisoners; and the smallest was 
Shizuoka, which housed 108. Japan’s experience of housing 40,000 Russian prisoners of war in 
1904-05 meant it was prepared structurally for dealing with captives.98  The camps as 
elsewhere were initially not without teething problems: the Germans were not accustomed to 
the food, conditions and having to take orders from what they perceived to be a ‘lesser race’. 
However, there were no major incidents of violence or deprivation as occurred in other camps. 
With the opening of the purpose built Bando, internment in Japan acquired a reputation for 
prisoner care that was unparalleled in twentieth century wartime captivity.99 Meyer-Waldeck, 
on his arrival in Japan, publicly expressed his gratitude to the Japanese for their good sense in 
allowing German officers to keep their swords and praised the Japanese army for putting up a 
good fight.100 The camps in Japan, especially Bando, became an arena for cultural exchange 
between the German prisoners and not just their guards but also the wider Japanese public 
and are the most well-known camps in the extra-European theatre of the First World War. 
Like Japan, Britain also had recent experience of dealing with large numbers of captives, as 
they had interned around 150,000 Boer civilians and a similar number of black Africans during 
the war in South Africa. Britain’s policy of interning all German civilians within the Empire and 
any of those picked up by the navy led to the creation of a global integrated camp network. 
The camp system, with its reliance on the navy to transport prisoners from location to location, 
was not a new concept but was much more developed during the First World War than in 
previous conflicts.101 The camp network was as vast as the British Empire itself. It centred on 
four main hubs; Britain, Australia, South Africa and Canada. There were camps in Jamaica, 
Trinidad and Tobago which took in any German civilians in the Caribbean, Trinidad housing 
around fifty inmates.102 As well as being holding centres for prisoners destined for the more 
permanent settlements in Canada, they were used to hold prisoners who had been captured at 
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sea, either from U-Boats or other ships, before they were again moved on to Canada or Britain. 
U-Boat crews were the most problematic and due to the bitter nature of unrestricted warfare, 
they were often denied POW status and held as criminals to be tried by court martial.103 
The initial strategy at the outset of war was a policy designed to remove German civilians from 
their colonies and from the British ones and repatriate them to Germany. Through their 
transportation the German prisoners came into contact with one another, for example those 
captured in Togo sharing ships with those from Cameroon and West Africa. Although coming 
from different colonial backgrounds, prisoners were able to find common cause in what they 
felt was their mistreatment under international law, as shown by protests and petitions sent to 
the Foreign Office.  
 Within Europe, the boredom and inactivity of long years in internment could lead to ‘barbed 
wire disease’, which became a legitimate reason for internment in Switzerland.104 In addition, 
prisoners in the extra-European theatre were also affected by conditions particular to tropical 
climates.105 The camp doctor in Ahmednagar argued that there were major differences 
between internment in Europe and in the colonies: ‘Life behind the wire without any comforts, 
separated from one’s relatives and in anxiety about the future has a very different effect upon 
one’s health in the tropics than it would at home.’106 The nineteenth century idea of the 
adverse effects of the colonial climate on Europeans prominently featured in camp complaints. 
The German government often called for the repatriation of its citizens, citing the unsuitability 
of the climate as the main reason. In some cases such as that of Ludovica Schultze in Samoa, 
the diagnosis of neurasthesia tropica was grounds enough for repatriation to Germany, or 
removal to Europe.107 The Institut für Tropenkrankheiten (Institute for Tropical Diseases) in 
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Hamburg wrote to the RKA listing the ill effects of living in internment for extended periods of 
time on the East African coast. According to the institute, not only were diseases such as 
malaria and Blackwater fever common in the area; the climate itself was damaging to north-
Europeans. They believed that the adverse climate caused sleeplessness with negative mental 
effects, and was particularly damaging for women as it disturbed menstrual cycles, leading to 
anaemia. In children, the climate apparently caused a loss of appetite hampering their 
development. The institute concluded; ‘A long period, especially over years, of continuous 
residence on the German East African coast is extremely unhealthy, even life-threatening, for 
North Europeans.’ If they were not to be allowed to return to Germany, the institute argued 
that families should at least be allowed to travel to the cooler climes of the mountains once a 
year to recover their strength.108  
Although the Red Cross report noted that Ahmednagar was one of the most suitable places in 
India for internment camps, the climate remained the main point of complaint from the 
inmates and German government alike. A Note Verbale from the German government stated, 
‘To shut up Europeans, when not thereto necessary, in a compact prisoners camp in a tropical 
place like Ahmednagar is a measure of unwarranted rigour and cruelty.’109 There was an 
outbreak of bubonic plague in the camp in November 1916. The disease was isolated and 
contained but only provided Germany with further evidence of the unsuitability of the area for 
Europeans. The British did not see the camp as a permanent fixture and discussed various 
plans as to what do with these prisoners of war.110 Once the objective had been completed of 
evacuating prisoners from the immediate war theatre, it was then hoped to implement plans 
to remove prisoners from India. In addition to problems of climate India, German prisoners of 
war were not popular among the local British population who saw them as a threat to the 
peace and stability of the region. The Foreign Office certainly took climate into consideration 
when moving prisoners to other camps with repatriation, internment in South Africa or 
Australia being the most widely discussed options. 
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The transfer of modern European camp norms to the extra-European camp system is 
highlighted in the example Okanjande in German South-West Africa. Barbed wire was such an 
enduring symbol of the war and internment that prisoner of war societies in the inter-war 
period wore pieces of the twisted metal on their lapels as a badge of membership. It was not 
just among prisoners that barbed wire had the ‘artistic role of evoking the monstrous sublimity 
of the forces of destruction liberated by modern war’,111 but it came to symbolise the war as a 
whole. Okanjande, however, was surrounded not by barbed wire but by thorn trees, a material 
that evoked only too strongly among the German inhabitants memories of a different war; the 
Herero war of the previous decade. 112 
The brutality of treatment and the high death rates of the Herero in internment will not be 
discussed here, but the symbolism was not lost on the German inmates who were now 
corralled behind the same barrier that they had used to incarcerate the Herero.113 Using the 
same material that enclosed animals or indigenous farmers’ Kraals114 to intern prisoners was 
seen by prisoners as calculated to humiliate the Germans in the eyes of the indigenous 
population. The thorn tree fences were deemed to be unhygienic by the prisoners, who 
complained that the rubbish from the camp was building up in the thorns. They also prevented 
the prisoners from enjoying the health benefits of a strong breeze. However, the complaints 
also referred back to the lack of European-style internment for the prisoners. Being interned 
behind bushes and in tents was not a treatment befitting European soldiers. George Murphy of 
the United States Consul, in his report on Aus and Okanjande agreed that the bushes should be 
removed. He considered they provided no real obstacle to escape and the bush-barrier 
‘unnecessarily humiliates them in the eyes of the natives.’115 If prisoners on the Western Front 
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were provided the luxury of barbed wire, then those Germans who fought in the colonies 
should be treated no differently.   
Of all the prisoners looked at here, those from German East Africa were most mobile, with 
some travelling from East Africa, to India, on to South Africa, and then to Britain before finally 
being repatriated through the Netherlands. The Union of South Africa government became 
less willing to hold prisoners as the war dragged on, and the Admiralty would not allow the 
transportation of prisoners through the Suez Canal. Travel constraints became problematic in 
exchange negotiations. At the various Hague meetings that were attended by Britain and 
Germany agreements on prisoner exchanges were discussed. It was agreed that all civilians 
over forty-five years old would be either sent back to their home country or interned in a 
neutral country, in Switzerland or the Netherlands. The British were clear that these 
agreements would not be extended to those prisoners held outside the United Kingdom, so 
prisoners in the Dominions and other parts of the Empire were denied a chance of a return to 
Europe. 
The numbers of prisoners of war were also not entirely equal. Although, the British Empire as 
whole held more prisoners and internees than Germany, in Europe Germany held more.116 
Hence, the German proposal of a man for man exchange was rejected, with the British trying 
to push for an all-out exchange which would have meant roughly one German for every four 
British. The proposals stalled, but as the British feared any reprisals that might have been 
exacted against their civilians in Belgium, they postponed plans to move all German East 
Africans to Australia.117 Medical corps personnel were in fact exchanged, leading to one 
example of a former colonial prisoner almost returning to battle: Max Zupitza, former head of 
the medical corps in German South-West Africa, who had been repatriated from Togo through 
an exchange agreement in 1916. Zupitza then masterminded a plan to send supplies to Lettow-
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Vorbeck’s troops by airship. The plan was not perfectly thought out, however, and failed, 
forcing him and his crew to return home.118  
As the war continued, the British military and the navy saw the opportunity not just to remove 
Germans from the former German colonies, but also from all parts of the Empire where their 
presence might prove problematic in the future, resulting in, for example, the shipping of 
prisoners from Bermuda to Canada.119 The largest numbers of prisoners on the move found 
themselves in Australia. With China’s entry into the war, the civilian internment camp on St 
John’s Island in Hong Kong was closed down and captives there, along with the 3,000 Germans 
who had been living in China, were sent to Australia. The camps in Australia swelled in number, 
with new additions from Asia coming at regular intervals. In addition to the Chinese Germans, 
captives from Singapore, Borneo and Ceylon followed.120   
In June 1918 the Foreign Office, for the purpose of prisoner exchange, undertook a survey to 
establish exactly how many civilian prisoners of war Britain had and where they were being 
kept. They found that there were 32,000 civilian prisoners in total with 11,000 of them being 
held outside Britain and dotted across the Empire.121 These figures do not however convey an 
accurate sense of the total number of prisoners that were taken over the course of the war. 
The mobility of prisoners, as seen throughout this chapter was varied. Some prisoners were 
only interned for a short time in 1914 and then sent back to Germany, while others, such as 
those in Samoa, would have to spend the duration of the war in virtual isolation on Somes 
Island. The movement of prisoners also caused logistical problems once the war ended. Were 
these displaced Germans to be brought back to Germany? How would property rights in the 
former colonies be dealt with? These questions will be dealt with in more detail in chapter 
seven. The repatriation effort at the end of the war was a large scale shipping operation that 
had to be paid out of the Reich’s diminished coffers. The lack of available vessels or the funds 
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to finance them and wrangling between the Allies meant that some prisoners would have to 
spend an extra year in captivity before they were finally shipped home. 
Because of the nature of German colonialism with its focus on the spread of business and 
enterprise and its lack of military preparedness, categorising prisoners was a difficult task. 
Germans in the colonies often had dual or triple identities: the Basel missionaries, for example, 
could be identified as priests, businessmen, or soldiers depending on the context. National 
identities were not as readily defined; colonisers geographically detached from mainland 
Germany sought support and trading contacts from the more proximate British Empire. Thus, 
in the Union of South Africa, there were examples of Germans, once identified as such, having 
to apply to Berlin for passports to ensure that they would receive legal benefits and protection 
from their forgotten homeland.122 
Captivity provided a chance for the Germans in the colonies to reach out and meet one 
another. The South-West Africans eagerly volunteered to accept and support their 
counterparts from the East. The camps themselves provided a meeting ground for Germans 
from various backgrounds. Those who were permanent residents in India found themselves 
incarcerated with Germans from Africa and the Middle-East. These transnational, cross-border 
meetings must surely have cemented a common cause between the Germans overseas. Once 
back in Germany, memories of the period of incarceration during the war influenced how the 
future revisionist aims for the colonies took shape. How the captives were treated will be the 
subject of the following chapters. 
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Chapter Three: Rum, Solitary and the Lash: Violence against 
Prisoners from the German Colonies 
 
Recent work on the treatment of prisoners in the First World War has deconstructed the long 
held image of just and humane treatment of captives during the war that was prevalent up 
until the early 1990’s.1 In colonial theatres of war, as Smith and Stucki pointed out for all the 
European colonial powers, fighting an enemy categorised as ‘uncivilised’ lowered the barrier to 
more extreme measures of warfare.2 While German settlers were undoubtedly members of 
the colonial elite, Germany’s invasion of Belgium and the ensuing atrocities committed by 
German troops gave the British grounds for referring to their fellow Europeans as also being at 
the level of uncivilised ‘barbarians’.3 Here we address the question of violence against 
prisoners of war and civilian internees from the German colonies and how the image of 
colonial violence against prisoners came to exemplify the racial role reversal that took place 
through the internment of white Europeans in the colonial world. While looking at incidents 
from all across the global camp network, this chapter will highlight some examples of actual 
and alleged violence against captives focusing on the camp administration on Somes Island, 
New Zealand, punishment policy in Ahmednagar, India, transportation of prisoners from Duala, 
Cameroon, rioting in Pietermaritzburg, South Africa, and the public flogging at Rabaul, New 
Guinea (Map 2, no 106). 
In assessing violence against military and civilian prisoners we will address four main questions. 
Firstly, this chapter will address the question of what forms violence took. Secondly, were 
public displays of violence against prisoners purposefully used as a tool for the takeover of the 
colonies? The final two questions are inter-connected, linked to the overall argument of this 
thesis, and will look at who or what was placing restraint on the uses of violence and how 
reactions to violence within the British Empire show the cohesion,  or lack of cohesion,  
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between Britain and the Dominions. Did, as Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker put 
it, common cause and ethnic and cultural unity rally the Dominions?4  
The ‘short twentieth’ century saw new forms of mechanised warfare and a further 
strengthening of extreme nationalist ideologies. The treatment of prisoners also changed 
radically; in one respect, with the foundation of international law through The Geneva and 
Hague Conventions, prisoners had more legal backing than before with regard to their 
treatment. International Law only applied to ‘civilised’ nations, however, meaning Germans 
could claim protection under it, whereas the unfortunate Herero in 1904-07 could not. On the 
other hand, hatreds that developed during the war ensured that the image of the prisoner as a 
noble enemy who deserved decent treatment was put to one side. The sinking of the Lusitania 
in 1915 and the reaction to it among camp guards and the general public, as the British Foreign 
Office records show, made life for German prisoners that much worse.5 
A broad definition of violence can be explained through a joke in Slavoj Zizek’s book on the 
term: a factory worker is suspected of stealing by his boss. So every day the boss has the 
security guards check the contents of the worker’s wheelbarrow as he leaves the factory each 
evening. This continues for a few days and yet the boss can find no evidence of stealing, until 
the penny drops. What the worker is stealing is the wheelbarrows.6 What the joke highlights is 
that, in looking for the more explicit forms of violence in beatings, torture and other physical 
forms of maltreatment, it is often forgotten that the capture and confinement of prisoners is in 
itself a symbol of state violence. Captivity in warfare functions through the threat of violence, 
no matter how well treated the captives are. As Heather Jones says, to become a prisoner of 
war was to come under the control of systems of power based on physical force.7 However, 
while keeping this in mind, this chapter focuses on more explicit forms of violence, defined by 
Jones as the use or threat of physical force, both discriminate and indiscriminate, against a 
prisoner of war, by an enemy subject.8 It is difficult when researching the camps in Asia and 
Africa to distinguish between what were real cases of violence against prisoners and what 
were in fact lies, made up by prisoners in order, either to better their lot as captives, or to 
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serve as anti-British propaganda. Nonetheless, violence was the key lens through which many 
prisoners from the former Reich colonies viewed their experience of internment.  
The often sporadic nature of violence and the remoteness of some of the camps led to a lot of 
misinformation, either purposely or not, coming through to Berlin and then being fed on to 
London through neutral embassies. The following looks at some examples of abuses of 
prisoners, beginning with the often alcohol-fuelled physical punishment of prisoners by guards 
and then on to incidents of rioting. This will serve to highlight the perpetrators of violence, and 
show that violence was not limited to its use by custodians against prisoners; the examples 
used show violence from within the camp, including violence committed by the prisoners 
themselves. 
The distance of the camps from Europe and from efficient postal routes often led to 
misinformation. The contemporary imagination of what life was like in the remote areas of the 
German and British Empires did not need much prompting to conjure up images of colonial 
violence in the camps. Even though accusations of abuse often turned out to be false, the 
British took them seriously enough to file official reports. For example, in June 1918, the 
Foreign Office received a Note Verbale from Germany asking about the alleged spearing to 
death by ‘natives’ of five German planters in New Guinea.9 This was a recurring theme in 
German complaints over the course of the war and was one which the British, for prestige 
reasons, seriously sought to limit. Although New Guinea was under direct Australian control 
(and Samoa was under New Zealand), it was the British who were accused of allowing the local 
population to attack Europeans and while these accusations often proved fraudulent, they 
played a central role in propaganda related to the colonies. 
In Samoa the colonial recruitment policy of the New Zealand authorities created space for the 
abuse of German civilians.10 According to Erich Schultz, the new Administrator of Samoa, 
Robert Logan, addressed the Germans upon the takeover with the threat: ‘You are prominent 
men of the colony, you have to suffer first, think what you Germans are doing in Belgium.’11 
Under the terms of the surrender, the majority of German civilians were allowed to remain on 
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parole.12 Germans who lived outside the main settlements were even allowed to carry 
revolvers, to protect themselves rather than having a European family ‘placed at the mercy of 
the Chinese’.13 This rule stayed in force until early 1918 when the New Zealand authorities 
placed more severe restrictions on the movement of Germans within the colony, resulting in 
civilians who had previously been on parole being sent to join the ‘rough and undesirable 
elements, […] middle-aged men of the working class’14 who had been interned on Somes Island 
immediately after the takeover of Samoa. 15  Hermann Hiery has looked into the mal-
administration of the colony in detail and pointed out one aspect that had direct consequences 
for German civilians on Samoa: alcohol abuse. The New Zealand office of military 
administration, in an effort to meet the demand for beer decided to draw supplies directly 
from one of the largest breweries in Australia, and Hiery claims that had the Guinness book of 
records existed during the war, the Samoa occupying force would claim the record for the 
smallest force with the largest capacity to drink.16 Needless to say, the effective management 
of the colony was not at the forefront of these troops’ minds. 
In late 1916 the Foreign Office commissioned a report to look into abuse of prisoners on 
Somes Island, the camp where most of the prisoners from Samoa had been sent. The 
commission sat for twenty-two days, interviewing 113 witnesses. The report found that there 
was systematic abuse by the guards, caused by the fact that the guards had ‘not all been men 
fit to hold such positions.’17  The commission recommended that greater care needed to be 
taken in future and that a complete ban on alcohol, not only for the prisoners but also for the 
guards, should be enforced on the island.18 Indiscipline among the guards on Somes and 
among the occupying troops in Samoa caused problems throughout the war and cases of 
violence against prisoners at the hands of camp guards who took their own initiative was a 
continuing headache for the Foreign Office and one which the German government sought to 
exploit for propaganda purposes. 
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Samoa was not, however, the only place with alcohol problems; in New Guinea there was a 
similar situation. District judge Gustav Weber equated newspaper reports from Australia on 
the moral improvement of the Australian people with the fact that they had sent all the bad 
elements in Australian society to colonise New Guinea.19 Colonel F.B. Heritage, of the New 
Guinea administration, admitted that alcohol was a problem, but claimed that, due to a 
drought on the island, there was not enough drinking water and troops were resorting to 
alcoholic drinks to slake their thirst.20 Roy Alexander, a British prisoner on board the German 
cruiser Wolf, sarcastically remarked that it was only when the Wolf captured a ship bound for 
Rabaul containing the island’s liquor supply ‘that Rabaul began to realise the full horrors of 
warfare [...] the prospects of a scarcity of booze were too terrible to contemplate.’21 Most 
problematic was not the fact that Australian soldiers were getting drunk, but that once 
intoxicated they were abusing the German and local populations.22 Cases of Germans being 
forced to sing the British national anthem and drink toasts to King George V, and more serious, 
looting and beating of German civilians and their servants were all reported to the British 
Foreign Office.23 
When faced with real acts of officially sanctioned violence against Germans in the colonies, 
however, the Foreign Office was quick to directly intervene and push for punishments, through 
dismissal, demotion or cashiering of those who had been responsible. The increase in incidents 
of violence against prisoners forced the Foreign Office to remind the Dominion governments 
who was in charge when it came to prisoner policy.   
On 11th October 1915, the German government sent its concerns to the Foreign Office about 
rumours of public floggings of prisoners at Torrens Island in South Australia (Map 2, no. 93b).24  
The British were candid about the investigation of the flogging; it was decided that it would be 
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best to ‘make a clean breast of it.’25 Although admitting that the British did ‘not come very well 
out of this’26, the Foreign Office hoped that it would not have to express regret as, from its 
point of view, the flogging was no worse than the German practice of tying British prisoners to 
posts in the winter.27 The inquiry into the flogging was launched in August 1915. It found that 
the flogging of two prisoners, John Gerdes and Wilhelm Holmann (who claimed, but could not 
prove Swedish citizenship), had been ordered on their re-capture after attempting to escape. 
Although The Hague Conventions stated that disciplinary measures could be taken against 
those who escaped, flogging was deemed too harsh by the Germans and Robert Cecil, Under-
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, concurred.28 The punishment was humiliating, Gerdes 
describing it in detail: ‘They tied my hands up to the tree above my head. They pulled my 
trousers down and put my shirt over my head. They gave me thirty strokes with the cat.’29 The 
punishment was carried out with the other prisoners present by way of setting an example. 
However, of most concern was that one of the prisoners had photographed the punishment 
and had tried to send prints home. Sergeant Mackintosh, who ordered the flogging, was 
reprimanded for his behaviour and cashiered. 
Interviews conducted with the Camp Commander, Captain G.E. Hawkes, showed that he 
believed the punishment was justified as way of instilling discipline in the camp. He maintained 
that insolence was rife in the camp with the prisoners often referring to the guards as ‘British 
Bastards’.30 Perhaps more worrying for the prestige of the empire was that the prisoners had 
also taken to scrawling ‘filthy and insulting remarks across portraits of members of the royal 
family’.31 Hawkes claimed he had had ‘unlimited powers as to the use of the bayonet and the 
rifle’.32 He was a notorious drunkard who on one occasion fired shots into a tent wounding a 
prisoner, a Mr Raetzsch. To add further insult Hawkes was quoted by a number of prisoners 
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interviewed as bawling at the men: ‘you are German bastards, stinking rotten pigs, low down 
dogs, if you were not tied up I would knock you down and drown you.’33 The camp doctor, Dr 
Meyer, claimed he had inspected nine men who bore the scars of bayonet wounds, and the 
guards themselves had mentioned that they were under orders to use bayonets on the 
prisoners. 34 The findings of the inquiry at Torrens were that although the flogging was unjust, 
it had had an immediate effect on improving discipline at the camp. Tellingly, a ban on the 
possession of cameras was now implemented in the camp.  
Along with the flogging at Torrens Island and another in Langwarren camp (Melbourne, map 2, 
no. 95) there was a further case of humiliation of civilian prisoners at Liverpool camp on 
mainland Australia, where after visiting hours the inmates (civilians) were forced to crawl 
through a six-wire fence in full view of their wives and relatives. 35 Moreover, the British 
Foreign Office had to reprimand the Australian government for using civilian internees as 
forced labour. The prisoners in Liverpool camp went on strike in protest and in reaction the 
camp guards staged a ‘mock execution’ of the ringleader, Captain Schmidt, who was taken to 
the forest by the camp, blind-folded and shots fired over his head. He was then sent to 
Berrima camp in New South Wales (Map 2, no. 99), but the impression given to the inmates of 
Liverpool was that he had been executed, with the guards showing the prisoners a freshly 
heaped mound of earth that was supposedly Schmidt’s grave. 36  Robert Cecil, whilst 
acknowledging that forced civilian labour had been used, maintained that this and other 
instances of violence had occurred by ‘mistake’ and had been stopped.37 
Although Canada did not intern any German prisoners from Reich colonies it is important to 
make a few remarks on incidents of violence there to highlight this Empire-wide problem, as 
there were parallels with prisoner of war treatment in New Zealand, Australia and South Africa. 
The vast majority of prisoners in Canada were civilian internees and Canada’s policy of 
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internment was similar to that of Britain and the other Dominions.38 Canada, which had 
treated its own Chinese labourers harshly,39 was the only Dominion to force its civilian 
internees into hard labour.40  There were also many complaints from Berlin about the 
mistreatment of internees in Canada. For example, Richard Hein, an inmate of the camp at 
Kingston, Ontario, had strayed too close to the camp wire and was shot twice in the arm by a 
sentry. To avoid a scandal, Hein was released and allowed to go to America for medical 
treatment.41 With the fear of reprisals against their own troops in mind, the Foreign Office had 
to ensure that acts of violence remained isolated.  
In February 1916, Britain received requests from the Germans for neutral inspections of the 
camps in Canada as they had heard of various abuses being committed in the camps in Banff, 
Amerherst, Calgary and Leithbridge. The Germans were concerned that civilian internees were 
being used as forced labour and also demanded that two Sergeants in particular, Sergeants 
Mellor and Hume, be brought to trial for the way they abused their prisoners. The Germans 
gave the British a deadline of 1st March to reply with full reports on all colonial camps, not just 
those in Canada. Failure to meet the deadline meant the German government would ‘be 
forced, to their regret, to consider the question of adopting certain retaliatory measures 
without delay.’42 In response the Foreign Office duly gathered all US consul reports on all 
Britain’s extra-European camps for dispatch to Germany.43   
The American reports on Canada highlighted some serious abuses in the camp system north of 
their border. In Leithbridge not only were civilian internees punished by being placed in dark 
cells and given a diet of bread and water for four to five days, but the camp authorities 
admitted to this being a policy. Prisoners were also handcuffed and trussed with little 
provocation. Sergeant Hume, the camp commander, had bayonetted one prisoner, Mr Koziol, 
thus hospitalising him. Hume had only received a caution for this attack. Samuel C. Read, who 
compiled the report, mentioned that the abuses had become more severe in the wake of the 
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Lusitania sinking. The potential repercussions of these revelations for British prisoners in 
Germany were obvious. They also affected Britain’s ability to complain to German government 
over its treatment of British prisoners as Horace Rumbold noted; ‘We hope that immediate 
steps will be taken to remedy the abuses complained of and that our position as regards 
making complaints to the German government about similar abuses [German mal-treatment 
of British prisoners of war] is [not] greatly weakened.’44 
Indiscipline among camp guards and commanders was a serious problem for the Foreign Office, 
reflected by the pains it took to investigate allegations. The more frequently cases came up of 
camp guards or soldiers over-stepping lines or breaking codes of conduct, the more difficult it 
became to present these as isolated cases. The freedom to write letters allowed prisoners to 
vocalise their complaints. However, letter writing was not the only way in which prisoners 
could make their opinions heard. In extreme cases the captives were prepared to riot to get 
their point across. 
Riots broke out in many of the camps across the British Empire. The camp at Douglas on the 
Isle of Man experienced a riot which resulted in the death of six prisoners.45 However, the 
most notorious riot to happen in British camps took place in Singapore in the wake of the 
Singapore Mutiny. Also known as the Sepoy Mutiny, the Singapore Mutiny, beginning on the 
15th February, 1915, lasted around seven days and resulted in the deaths of forty-seven British 
soldiers and civilians. 46 It was sparked by rumours that the Sepoys were to be sent to Europe 
or Turkey to fight against fellow Muslims. The German prisoners housed in the Tanglin 
barracks (Map 2, no. 87), took advantage of the mutiny to riot and launch escape attempts.47 
The rioting in the barracks was quite serious and led to the wounding of nine camp guards and 
the successful escape of two German prisoners.48   
In response to the South African government’s policy of asking German civilians to voluntarily 
identify themselves to the authorities on the outbreak of war, a limited pro-German rebellion 
took place in Pietermaritzburg in October 1914, leading to the denial of parole and the 
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internment of many German civilians. The camps were already overcrowded and in protest at 
the swelling numbers and cramped conditions, the prisoners rioted. Further riots in May 1915 
in South Africa resulted in even harsher restrictions on parole for German civilians and the 
influx of prisoners from German South-West Africa. In response, plans were drawn up to 
expand the camps and improve conditions for prisoners. Even after suppression of the riots 
and rebellions, however, H.G. Harrison of the Foreign Office still complained that the ‘Union 
government have an inevitable tenderness towards the Huns’.49  
Incidents of riots by prisoners continued throughout the war. In December 1917, unconfirmed 
reports reached the Foreign Office of rioting in Malta in response to the cutting off of 
communication between prisoners and the colonies in reprisal for Germany’s treatment of 
British civilians in occupied Belgium.50 After the Armistice, riots threatened to break out in 
Holsworthy camp in Australia. The Acting U.S. Consul General J.H. Anderson feared that unless 
the prisoners were given an exact date for their repatriation there would be a rebellion. The 
Foreign Office was quick to respond and sent back an approximate date if only to quell fears of 
riots.51 Riots, although an extreme tool, were to a certain extent effective in making the 
prisoners’ voices heard and bringing about reforms or changes in the camps. 
The incidents looked at here have highlighted two interactions of violence in captivity. Abuse 
of prisoners most often occurred because of bad management. It was difficult to get the right 
kind of manpower, firstly, to go out and take a colony and then to act as guards when they got 
there. The ‘heat and inactivity’52 in Samoa drove the New Zealanders to drink and unlike in 
New Guinea where there were plenty of birds of paradise to shoot, the soldiers relieved their 
boredom on the local population.53 Prisoners could also use violence to vocalise their own 
demands. The extreme cases of rioting and the threats of riots were taken note of by the 
British and steps in each case were taken to alleviate the situation, whether it was something 
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as straightforward as informing prisoners of the expected date of repatriation, or, as in the 
aftermath of the riots in Singapore, full scale camp evacuation to Australia.54  
In all cases, forms of violence provoked a reaction from the Foreign Office. Abuse by guards 
and riots for better conditions could affect the conditions of British prisoners in German hands. 
In addition, as will be explored in later chapters, accusations of violence by ‘natives’ against 
prisoners were the key thrust in German anti-British propaganda related to internment in the 
colonies and could damage British prestige among neutral countries. The next section of this 
chapter will look at public punishments of prisoners in India and the Dominions, and how they 
also prompted the Foreign Office to remind the Dominion governments of who was in charge 
of setting camp conditions. 
For Europeans the maintenance of proper appearances was highly important. One only has to 
think of the scene from Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness when Marlow meets the 
impressively dressed commercial officer in the Congo: ‘Near the buildings I met a white man, 
in such an unexpected elegance of get-up that in the first moment I took him for a sort of 
vision […] I respected his collars, his vast cuffs, his brushed hair. His appearance was certainly 
that of a hairdresser’s dummy; but in the great demoralization of the land he kept up his 
appearance. That’s backbone.’55 Empires are to a certain extent built on prestige. Degrading 
the German settlers physically through public parade or corporal punishment helped 
psychologically to mark the transition of power from Germany to Britain and the Dominions. 
Yet although such actions could tarnish the image of the Germans in the colonies, they could 
do just as much damage to the prestige of the British Empire, which was after all trying to 
prove itself the more civilised of the two. 
Having looked at violence in captivity from two angles, violence against prisoners by guards 
and violence by prisoners against guards, we now turn our attention to more official acts of 
violence against prisoners in the form of legally sanctioned punishments. This chapter will now 
look at three main examples of public displays of prisoners: firstly forced deportation of 
civilians, the handling of prisoners within the camp, and finally public punishments. Prisoners, 
especially prisoners of war, were not immune from punishments even under the terms of 
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international law. 56  However, the Foreign Office, as always, was eager to limit any 
punishments against prisoners. The ever present threat of reprisals against British prisoners in 
German hands shaped the Foreign Office’s reaction to reports of violence or deprivation of 
rights of prisoners. Britain had ostensibly entered the war to protect Belgium and needed to 
maintain its humanitarian image, especially as the British intended to try Germany for war 
crimes after the war.57 With this in mind it was vital to ensure that the Dominions treated their 
prisoners within the required boundaries of international law. 
The most common reprisal punishments took the form of tit-for-tat exchanges between 
Germany and Britain. Most of these punishments were not overtly violent. By the end of the 
war these reprisals could be divided into five categories as outlined by Isabel Hull: non-
notification of capture, denial of mail, use of prisoner labour in the fire zone, automatic 
reprisal for German action (the Hague agreements stipulated that two months’ notice should 
be given before enacting reprisal), and treating German officers like common soldiers.58 The 
longest running reprisal punishment for prisoners from the former Reich’s colonies was the 
stopping of mail between camps and civilians, especially correspondence between India, Egypt, 
Malta and German East Africa.59 This was, as mentioned in reference to the rioting in Malta, in 
response to German treatment of British civilians in Belgium. What concerns this chapter are 
the forms of punishment used in the camps in the colonies and how punishments were used 
not merely for their disciplinary effect but as a tool to instil the reality of the German defeat 
into the German settlers and local population alike.  
Duala, in Cameroon, had fallen to the British in early 1915 but the rest of the colony was not 
fully under British (or French) control until 1916. The British policy of complete evacuation of 
the white civilian population was rushed and badly organised, bringing public complaints from 
the German settlers. As in other colonies, many of the Germans in Cameroon had not, even 
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after the defeat of the German army, expected to be deported from their homes.60 The British, 
under General Charles Dobell, assembled the Germans in the courtyard of the town hospital, 
ostensibly for a roll-call. The Germans were told that they would merely be asked to register 
their names and address with the new authorities. It came as a shock when it was announced 
that they had only three-quarters of an hour to gather their belongings before returning to the 
hospital, where they would then be marched off to the docks, without the aid of their porters, 
and put aboard the SS Obuassi for transportation via Accra, the Gold Coast (Map 1, no. 54), to 
Britain.61   
The Germans had to suffer the humiliation of being led to the docks for repatriation under 
black guards and watched by those who until recently had been their colonial inferiors. A 
German Lieutenant and Basel Missionary, Otto Wienecke, claimed that some of the onlookers 
jeered and ‘men and women under the very eyes of the English and French Officers were 
buffeted with the hands and butt-ends of rifles of the [black] soldiers.’62 While the actual 
physical violence against the prisoners was minimal, the shame of being defeated and treated 
like colonial subjects was most humiliating. The British would not agree to allow the Germans 
to march to the docks and to board the ships by themselves, an act which might have rescued 
some semblance of dignity for the prisoners. They preferred to have them publicly shown as 
defeated, further confirming among the population of Duala and elsewhere that there was a 
new, stronger colonial regime, in the form of British troops, in charge. 
The fact that German civilians living in the colonies had actually been taken prisoner was the 
first claim of ill-treatment. They felt that as non-combatants they were protected under The 
Hague Conventions and that the Berlin Conference of 1884/85 had legally obliged all states to 
remain neutral in Africa. The Director of Theology at the Basel Mission, Dr Theodor Oehler,63 
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published an article in the Basler Nachrichten that dealt with the way in which the German 
settlers in Cameroon were evicted from their land contrary.64 He also reported that German 
civilians were gathered together at the hospital in Duala and given little time to gather their 
belongings before being marched through the streets struggling to carry what few possessions 
they could bring. They had to suffer verbal abuse from the British guards further humiliating 
them in public. As Dr G. Lohringer, another missionary, noted; ‘only an African colonialist can 
appreciate what it means if British officers talk to blacks of whites as ‘German swine’ or if a 
German actually has to let himself be called a ‘German pig’ by blacks.’65  
Oehler’s article drew on eye-witness accounts from within the missionary community. If it was 
not bad enough that the locals in Cameroon were spitting and throwing stones at the helpless 
German prisoners, according to one of the Mission’s sisters, Charlotte Schüler, they were 
greeted with similar stones and jeers upon their arrival at Liverpool.66 The men and women 
were then separated, with the women being sent to London and then on to the Netherlands 
for repatriation and the men transferred for internment in the United Kingdom.67 Comparing 
the local Cameroonians to the Liverpudlians at the docks made it easy to equate colonial 
barbarity with British. General Charles Dobell claimed that the Duala population were angry 
with the Germans and that they were throwing stones at the Germans in retaliation for the 
way they had been treated under German colonial rule.68 He did not, however, offer an 
explanation for the behaviour of the people of Liverpool, but he maintained that the captives 
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were treated very respectfully and although there had been some plundering of German goods 
by non-Allied forces (i.e. the Germans themselves) and other locals the authorities had quickly 
put a stop to it.69 Finally he argued, the Germans from West Africa were transferred to the 
United Kingdom as the weather there was more favourable to Europeans.70 
   
Public parades of Germans through the towns where they had once governed were a very 
visual way of expressing to the indigenous population that a new imperial power was in charge. 
Public punishments of prisoners, to put it in Foucauldian terms, provided visual manifestations 
of  how the British Empire was able to assert itself as the primary armed power and not only 
demonstrated how it enforced its laws but also who its enemies were.71 One must keep in 
mind that the Germans were used to being top of the colonial racial hierarchy and to be placed 
in such in a position through public marches was humiliating. 
   
At the camp in Ahmednagar, India, a further public punishment was in place for prisoners. 
Ahmednagar mainly housed combatant prisoners from German East Africa. Prisoners who 
disobeyed camp regulations were liable to be placed in solitary confinement in punishment 
cells. These cells were visible from the road-side, meaning that passers-by could quite easily 
see the prisoners through the cell windows.72 Punishment had again become a spectacle. On 
hearing of this, the Foreign Office recommended that lattice work screens be erected to shield 
the prisoners from the gaze of the public.73 While punishment cells existed in many camps, 
public punishment was not acceptable to the British authorities.74  
Forced labour was not prevalent in the extra-European camps of the British Empire, although it 
was used in Canada for extended periods. However, one camp, about which little information 
remains, Kanus, in German South-West Africa may also have been used for forced labour. 
From the available evidence it seems that the camp was established in reprisal for German 
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treatment of civilians in occupied Belgium and also as a transfer camp designed to hold 
prisoners who were unruly in other camps, mainly Pietermaritzburg. 75 Most disconcerting for 
Adolf Jelinek (an Austro-Hungarian inmate, whose letters to the Swedish consul in South Africa 
provide the main archival evidence for the camp), was that prisoners were being forced to 
complete manual tasks in full view of the indigenous population. According to Jelinek, the use 
of prisoner labour was, ‘a disgrace to a nation laying claim to civilisation, and lowering the 
prestige of the white man, by extracting manual labour from civil POWs […] while idle natives 
are looking on.’76 In sum, through public parades, public punishments and allegedly forcing 
prisoners to work in front of the colonial other, German colonial settlers were ‘subjected to a 
ritualised gaze that is an endowment of the power of the aggressor.’77 
In New Guinea there was another serious and much more public case of punishment, the 
flogging of Germans in Rabaul, which again tried the Foreign Office’s patience and opened up 
the possibility of reprisals by the Germans against British subjects. Hermann Hiery referred to 
the ‘Cox affair’ (as the flogging became known) in his book on the war in the Pacific, but he 
omitted many details about the British and German reactions to it. He saw the incident as a 
rare moment in the history of a people where emotions were given free rein and recklessly 
broke down all the barriers raised by reason.78  
The Sydney Wednesday in April 1916 reported that ‘The public whipping of Germans at Rabaul 
has deeply excited Germany where the occurrence is reviled as among the greatest horrors of 
the war.’79While this was a definite exaggeration, the Germans had received word of the public 
flogging of German subjects in New Guinea and sent their complaints to the Foreign Office 
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listing their demands, as well as a lengthy report on Rabaul. Most concerning was the flogging, 
and how it could have been allowed to happen. Flogging German civilians had, according to 
the German note, scorned ‘all civilisation and every feeling for the pride of the white race, 
under the cloak of legal proceedings, subjected German subjects to a brutal act of force in 
public exhibition and thereby heaped upon the German name and dignity unheard of ignominy 
reaching far beyond the frontiers of New Guinea.’80 William Holmes, the administrator who 
had ordered the flogging, had apparently wanted to set a public example. As the British 
Foreign Office noted, this had the potential for ‘awkward’ consequences for British prisoners.81 
The flogging took place in Proclamation Square in Rabaul and was open to the white public; 
German citizens were ordered to be present. Holmes claimed to have ensured that no ‘natives’ 
were present and had had guards posted around the square to prevent them from entering. 
One of the Australian soldiers present was in possession of a camera and took photographs 
which went on to be circulated as picture postcards. The Germans had two main demands: 
Holmes and Provost Ravenscourt were to be put on trial, and all pictures and postcards of the 
event were to be confiscated.   
The report ordered by the Australian government and written up by the principal medical 
officer for New Guinea, Dr Frederick A. Maguire, with comments from Professor of Law, Pitt 
Cobbett of the University of Sydney, reached the Foreign Office in January 1915.82  It outlined 
the events which led to the flogging. The accused had been tried and convicted for accusing 
Reverend William Cox of being a British spy and attacking him prior to the Australian takeover 
of New Guinea. Regierungsarzt Dr Braunert and seven other men, one night after taking a 
considerable amount of alcohol,83 were found to have beaten Reverend Cox at gunpoint as if 
he were a ‘Kanaka’ (a Polynesian). In Cobbett’s opinion the fact that Reverend Cox was white 
and humiliated in such a fashion necessitated the punishment of the Germans responsible, and 
the flogging was within the bounds of the Hague Convention.84 The Australian Government 
added that the attack on Cox was calculated to bring the British character into contempt and 
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to affect ‘natives in attitude towards’ the new occupying power.85 The punishment which took 
place under the recently raised British flag was prompt and exemplary. The men to be flogged 
were each in turn spread-eagled face downwards over a large travelling trunk about three feet 
high, much like the one they had thrown Reverend Cox over when they beat him. They were 
handcuffed with the cuffs tied to a stake in front of the box while their legs were tied with 
rope behind the box. Before and after the flogging the men were medically examined. As 
Cobbett argued, ‘the fullest publicity was given to the punitive proceedings, this being indeed 
essential to their efficacy as a deterrent and a military precaution.’86  
In the view of  Kaiserliche Bezirksrichter, Gustav Weber, the result of the flogging would ‘be 
that the natives will not consider the punishment as being inflicted to some individuals only 
but will regard it as a dishonouring punishment of the whole German population who in their 
eyes will forever be degraded to Kanakas.’87 He also somewhat prophetically saw that the 
prisoners would rather commit suicide than suffer the flogging ‘as not only their reputation 
but also their future and existence will be ruined.’88 All Germans were ordered to be present 
and even the Catholic Bishop from the nearby island of Vunapope was invited to attend.89 The 
report from Maguire and Cobbett was not what the Foreign Office wanted to hear. From the 
first complaints received from Berlin, they had suspected that the stories were exaggerated 
and would eventually even be proven to be false; now the information from the Australians 
proved otherwise. Dr Braunert, who had been so humiliated by the public flogging, attempted 
to commit suicide in his cell. He was, according to Kaufmann Kuhn ‘completely broken’, a 
personification of the impact that the colonial role reversal enacted by the takeover of the 
German colonies had on the German population.90 
The Foreign Office placed the responsibility on Holmes and had the Australian government 
reprimand him for his ‘irregular’ action.91 Contrary to Cobbett’s and Maguire’s opinions the 
Australian Prime Minister noted that not only did the subject lend itself to sensational 
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treatment and Germany would ‘certainly seize upon the incident for use in neutral countries’, 
but also flogging was ‘completely opposed to the modern British spirit’.92 What should be 
noted here is that while the flogging of white Europeans was against the British spirit, flogging 
other members of colonial society was not.93 A rather disturbing report on the disciplining of 
Chinese labour by the New Guinea Company in 1919 highlights this: ‘An experiment was made 
by importing Chinese Coolies, but with no better result. The Chinamen did not thrive at 
Finchhafen and commenced to desert. In the beginning such an event was the signal for a 
cannibal feast somewhere in the neighbourhood, but after the company has [sic] promised the 
natives a reward in tobacco and loincloth for bringing back the escapees, the elusive Chinamen 
were triumphantly returned and duly flogged. The Chinamen naturally resented [sic], and the 
Chinese as a rule not estimating life very highly, they commenced hanging themselves with the 
least provocation, till at last it became quite a mania, apparently not troubling in the least 
about the loss of capital they inflicted on the company.’94 The Australian attitude toward the 
Chinese was very different from that towards German settlers, with the Chinese being reduced 
to the status of a mere commodity good.95 
Rather than having the effect of maintaining order and discipline, harsh treatment of wartime 
German prisoners in the form of corporal punishment normally reserved for non-whites only 
had the effect of bringing the British Empire into disrepute. As after the incident at Torrens 
Island the Foreign Office feared that there would be reprisals against British prisoners in 
Germany.96 The only positive aspect of which they could inform Berlin was that they were 
certain that the local New Guineans had been successfully kept out of Proclamation Square 
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and thus could not witness the punishment.97 There were, however, quite a few other 
witnesses to the flogging. Most problematic were the photographs.    
The photographs were printed as postcards by the soldiers and sold around the islands by 
Australian soldiers for 3d a piece and posted home. A. McKay, an Australian soldier present on 
the day, speaking in 1965 described how one of the onlookers hid a camera in his shirt while 
he and some others standing in the front row stepped aside to allow him to take 
photographs.98 The photographs show clearly the scene in Proclamation Square. One can see 
one of the Germans tied over the trunk with his face obscured as the gathered crowd watches 
on. Although a graphic reminder of the end of Germany as a colonial power, the photographs 
also had potential as a powerful propaganda tool for Germany to show the British as 
barbarians. Therefore, while officially demanding that all photographs be destroyed, Berlin 
was keen to get hold of copies. A letter from Singapore informed the British Foreign Office that 
an American named Frank Macdonald was in the middle of doing a deal to sell the original 
negatives to the Germans.99 The Kaiserliches Konsulat in Soerabaja (Surabaya) in the Dutch 
East Indies paid £50 for the photos. However, whether it intended to supress the photographs 
or make use of them for propaganda purposes is not clear.100 Macdonald claimed that contrary 
to the official reports the local New Guineans had been present to observe the punishments. 
In the wake of the abuses on Torrens island and at Rabaul it was necessary to revise the 
handbook on war precautions that had been issued to the Australian authorities.101 In 
response to instances where the British felt the Dominions had overstepped their authority, 
they were willing to intervene and ensure a more unified policy, which would be important in 
the short term for preventing reprisals against British prisoners of war in Germany and in the 
longer term as the Empire looked to a post-war trial of Germans for war crimes. 
The British were wary of punishing prisoners even for crimes that could legitimately have been 
acted on. A report of a commission of enquiry into the treatment of prisoners of war by the 
German protectorate authorities in German South-West Africa, before it was conquered by 
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South African forces, was written up in 1916. This report highlighted German abuses of British 
prisoners. Louis Botha claimed in his accompanying letter to the Foreign Office, that British 
prisoners had been treated ‘worse than the natives would be treated in the Union’.102 There 
were also suggestions that an Oberleutnant Venuleth would be brought to justice for his part 
in murdering two ‘Bushmen’.103 No immediate action was taken on the murder and along with 
the report of abuse of British prisoners, it was to be used for propaganda purposes only. The 
War Office stressed that it was inadvisable to hold a trial of any of the Germans responsible, 
namely of Theodor Seitz for his role as Governor of the colony and responsibility for prisoners 
and of Venuleth, as the Germans might very well hold counter-trials based on the alleged 
British use of ‘dum-dum’ bullets. The report served as a piece of propaganda and the War 
Office hoped that the evidence taken from it would be useful at ‘the conclusion of hostilities 
when we can consider the question of “war crimes” committed by Germany as a whole.’104  
The threat of reprisals could have a direct effect on prisoner punishment. The punishments the 
authorities in Samoa were handing down to prisoners had to be revised under pressure from 
the Foreign Office. In 1915, a prisoner, Franz Pfeill, was sentenced to three years in prison for 
‘escaping’. The Auswärtiges Amt quickly got word of this and threatened counter-measures 
against a prisoner, Lieutenant Templar, held in Germany. Pfeill, after Foreign Office 
intervention, was quickly released on parole.105 In early 1916 Horace Rumbold, of the Prisoners 
of War Department of the Foreign Office, stated the need to ‘hint that they [the New Zealand 
authorities] should be careful about the sentences they inflict on German prisoners in view of 
the fact that these sentences may react unfavourably on British prisoners in Germany.’106  
Two main factors influenced the Foreign Office when receiving reports on prisoner 
punishments. They were: first, would the punishments result in reprisals against British 
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prisoners, and second, what effect would they have on Britain’s image and attempts to put 
together a case against Germany for war crimes? The proposal of post-war trials acted as a 
‘public place-holder’ for more drastic action which Britain could not immediately enact.107 
Therefore it was simply unacceptable that the Dominion governments were overriding Foreign 
Office authority over prisoner management and thus endangering the lives of British 
servicemen in enemy hands and tarnishing the Empire’s reputation. From early on in the war, 
due to the reports of mistreatment of prisoners in the colonies, the Foreign Office had to 
reassert its authority over the Dominion powers in prisoner policy in order to ensure that the 
treatment of prisoners would be uniform.108  
To conclude, one of the primary reasons Alon Rachamimov listed for what he called the 
general lack of interest in prisoner of war studies was the familiar nature of prisoner of war 
misery.109 Prisoners, he wrote, had the misfortune to suffer from hardships that had affected 
humanity over the centuries: hunger, over-crowding, disease and hard labour. These were all 
overshadowed by the modern style of combat that took place on the Western Front and the 
new forms of misery that it entailed. The camps and their locations, Rachamimov argued, were 
only novel in the traditional sense of the word, that they were located in a different country 
and thus within a novel cultural environment. Rachamimov argued this using the example of 
Siberia, but his argument does not exactly hold true. As Jones has recently shown, even within 
Western Europe, prisoners were witnesses to and victims of increasingly brutal acts which 
shared much more with the battlefields of the front than with the quaint image of gentleman 
prisoners surveying the surrounding flora and fauna of their respective camps.110   
While the acts of violence against prisoners described here did not compare, in brutality, with 
the forced labour battalions on the Western Front, they were important for defining the 
colonial role reversal that took place with the loss of the German colonies. They have to be 
seen in the context of Allied accusations of German violence on occupied territory in Europe. 
The only German territory occupied by Britain during the war was the Reich’s colonial 
possessions. Violence against the prisoners there was used by the German government as 
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proof of the brutality of its enemy, who was willing to sacrifice the common European mission 
in Africa for territorial gain. Violence also had to be dealt with sensitively by the British. 
Punishment or maltreatment of prisoners in the occupied German colonies could harm British 
prisoners in Germany and British prestige. Fear of reprisals and the need to present Germany 
as the ultimate violator of international law meant that incidents of abuse of prisoners had to 
be limited to as few as possible. After entering the war in defence of Belgium, Britain needed a 
moral as well as a military victory. 
After their capture and the loss of their colonies, the German prisoners went from being 
colonial masters to persona non grata. This role reversal will be looked at in more depth in the 
next chapter. This chapter has focused on highlighting how this reversal was effected through 
violence. Public displays of prisoners such as the marching of captives under guard to the 
docks as occurred in Cameroon, Accra, or South-West Africa encouraged anger towards 
captives. Now was a chance either for settling scores or simply getting caught up in the 
excitement of the event. It was the first time that many people would have seen white 
Europeans under black guards. In Samoa, where the social ranking was perhaps more complex, 
the Germans were pushed to the bottom of the social ladder, enjoying even fewer rights than 
the Chinese labourers in terms of freedom of movement.111 Presenting defeat to the enemy 
was also important. The flogging of prisoners at Rabaul publicly displayed the relegation of 
Germans to the bottom of the colonial social order. 
By denying the Germans a dignified surrender, the British authorities stripped them of their 
status as European equals among the colonisers. It was important for the British to show that 
Germany was defeated, not just to British but also former German colonial subjects. The 
deportation of Germans from the colonies underlined to the world that German influence 
would not be allowed to return. Violence against prisoners took many forms and this chapter 
has only looked at the more explicit manifestations of it. Participation in the war and the 
Dominions’ takeover of the former German colonies helped make nations out of South Africa, 
Australia, and New Zealand.112 Nonetheless, the Foreign Office’s interventions in reaction to 
acts of violence against Germans and the inability of the Dominions to deal with problems 
adequately also brought the British Empire closer to being a cohesive fighting unit. The strain 
this caused in the British Foreign Office can be summed up in Robert Gilbert Vansittart’s 
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acerbic remarks on the Australian decision to deport Germans from the island of Nauru: ‘If 
only the Australian Government could be induced to treat the matter [the deportation] 
seriously and with competence.’113 While actual violence against prisoners in the extra-
European camps never went to the extremes characteristic of captivity in Europe, the image of 
violence still remained the key feature through that many prisoners attributed to their 
experience of internment. This image will be discussed further in later chapters but the next 
chapter will turn its attention to the realities of internment in the extra-European sphere. 
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Chapter Four: Der Krieg ist kein Afternoon Tea.1 Identity and 
Internment in the Extra-European Camps 
  
This chapter will address the extra-European internment camp network from within, by 
looking at the experience in captivity of the inmates and of those in the immediate localities 
around the camp. In keeping with common themes from other studies of prisoners of war, we 
will look at identity in the camps in terms of patriotism, class and gender. Although moving 
beyond the boundaries laid out at the beginning of the thesis, it will also be necessary to look 
at the internment of indigenous prisoners and to address, albeit briefly, debates on the 
identity of Askari troops and the myth of their eternal loyalty.2 During the war in the extra-
European theatre both captor and captured moved away from a common European identity in 
the colonies towards separate national identities. This chapter asks whether this creation, or 
re-creation, of German identity included all classes, or whether class differences in the 
colonies were too well established to be broken down. In addition it will examine the clear 
male-female divide and the difference in experience of internment between the two genders. 
It will analyse why Britain interned female settlers and the effects of the metaphorical 
‘emasculation’ of internment on these women.3 Building on the ideas brought out in chapter 
three on propaganda, it will consider attempts to connect the plight of prisoners abroad with 
the more stereotypically ‘masculine’ affair of the war on the Western Front.   
Matthew Stibbe’s work on the camp for British civilian internees at Ruhleben, Berlin 
highlighted the creation of an ‘imagined community’ within the camp. Indeed one could add 
that although internment was a real experience for those behind the wire, it was also an 
imagined, though more peripheral, experience for the captor nations and for friendly 
supporters at home and in neutral countries. In the context of this study we would have liked 
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to add a fourth dimension, internment of Europeans as an imagined experience among 
indigenous populations. However, the archival evidence consulted is not sufficient to do justice 
to such a study. Stibbe’s exploration of internment was mediated by three factors, race, class, 
and nationality.4 In addition to external influences, the imperial space of the camp was also 
shaped from within. The four themes of patriotism, class, gender and race addressed in this 
chapter will provide a road map to understand how this occurred.  
The maintenance of links, through the observance of patriotic customs, between the colonial 
periphery and the German centre were important in keeping the German Imperial mission 
alive. In fact, in Wilhelmine Germany one of the main arguments for the establishment of 
German colonies had been the fear of a dilution of German patriotism caused by German 
emigration. It would be much better for the metropole if adventurous Germans could be 
directed toward the German colonial sphere rather than have their labour and loyalties 
displaced to Brazil or the United States.5 The cultivation of this German colonial space was also 
heavily reliant on German women, not only in terms of debates on race mixing (the need to 
produce more white German settlers), but also in the image of female settlers as the cultural, 
economic and political partners of their male counterparts.6 Although the creation of a fully 
German identity, defined through a distinctly German work ethic, was underway in the 
colonies before the war, it remained subservient to the ‘European/Native’ distinction.  
Ambitious plans for the establishment of German overseas empire belied the fact that before 
the war there was a distinct lack of Germans willing to move to the German colonies. This 
meant that the communities in the German colonies were formed of mixed nationalities, 
consisting of various European and American settlers. Thus, in the pre-war years there was a 
great deal of interaction between Germans and their fellow Europeans in the Reich colonies 
and beyond. As previously mentioned, the Germans in Samoa initially welcomed the idea of 
New Zealand taking over the colony, as it would strengthen the existing economic ties 
between the two sets of islands. Lord Kitchener, for example, had close ties to German East 
Africa; he was part of the Zanzibar Boundary Commission that divided German and British East 
Africa in 1885 and in addition to owning a coffee plantation close to the German East African 
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border, he visited the German territory regularly. Kitchener indeed saw no reason for the 
extension of the war into the colonies, although of course it did so.7 The example of one 
German living in South Africa who, according to the Kölnische Zeitung, was interned in Robert 
Heights, Pretoria (Map 1, no. 68), even though he had fought in three wars under the British 
flag is an illustrative case of how the extension of the First World War to the extra-European 
world challenged European settlers’ patriotic identities.8 
Before the war, the Teuton clubs in places such as Singapore and Yokohama were the centres 
of European, not just German, social life with their ample supply of German-style beer, often 
brewed locally.9 German colonial settlers’ pre-war connections to Britain meant that their 
patriotic identities were often not clearly defined. Joseph Karl Postel, captured in Cameroon, 
and interned in Baronscourt, England, complained bitterly of the ‘English heads’ in the camp, 
showing that not all internees were patriotic Germans. Pro-English feeling, he wrote, disturbed 
the camp harmony with the ‘First Class Society’ in Baronscourt having become ‘English’, 
praising the English officers and even making their Christmas speeches in English. ‘They had 
ceased to become Germans, they were English.’10 Arthur Wilson, in his memoirs of the 1915 
Singapore Mutiny, noted the difficulties experienced by ‘hyphenated Huns’ when he recalled 
an inmate at Tanglin barracks who was well known in Singapore before the war, bawling out 
‘Rule Britannia’ at the top of his voice and got involved in arguments with another prisoner 
whom he accused of being a ‘sanguinary German sausage’.11 Pro-English sentiment might not 
only cause an uneasy atmosphere: it could also lead to violence. After the Singapore mutiny, 
one prisoner who was accused of being pro-British was transferred to India rather than 
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Australia with the other prisoners, out of fears for his safety.12 In the main, however, with the 
outbreak of war and their subsequent internment, the ‘symbolic differences’ between colonial 
Germans and other Europeans became more defined.13  
Patriotic displays were a prominent feature of camp life. An article in the Daily Mail in 1916 on 
internment in South Africa, noted that of the 2,500 German regulars in South Africa 1,000 
were allowed out on parole while those in the camp flew the German flag and had a band 
strike up Deutschland Über Alles every night.14 Celebrations of the Kaiser’s birthday have been 
marked out in accounts of German prisoners in Europe as the defining act of patriotism and an 
essential aspect in forming the imagined camp community. In the extra-European theatre this 
was no different. An article from Die Freiheit on Ahmednagar in 1915, noted that while there 
was a ban on alcohol in the camp the inmates were nonetheless able to celebrate the Kaiser’s 
birthday ‘in spirit but without spirits.’15 Further, it was not just Kaiser Wilhelm who was 
celebrated. The inmates at Malta (many of whom were from German East Africa) also 
celebrated Kaiser Franz Joseph’s birthday in 1915 with a meal of oxtail soup, salmon, chicken 
and cheesecake with enough coffee and beer for 500 men, German and Austro-Hungarian 
alike. 16  Prisoners were relatively free to express patriotic sentiment in the camps. In 
Ahmednagar it was found that ‘the interned have full liberty to decorate their rooms with 
pictures, photographs, portraits of their sovereign and the German Generals, and with flags 
and patriotic emblems.’17 Through patriotic celebrations of ‘German’ events the prisoners 
could reaffirm a distinct German (or Austro-Hungarian) identity and connect themselves 
mentally to the struggle in Europe.  
The war and the subsequent internment and expulsion of Germans had the effect of rallying 
them around the black, white and red flag. What had once been a sense of European identity 
in the colonies was now replaced by an awareness of German cultural heritage. Germans living 
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in the British Dominions quickly found their identities challenged by the war and many sought 
to reassert their national belonging. While the Germans from the colonies were being 
separated from their European counterparts they were coming more into contact with their 
countrymen from around the globe. Crews from German warships, such as the Emden ended 
up in captivity in the colonies, and their perhaps stronger patriotic bonds to Germany had an 
influence on their fellow captives.18 In the Australian case, as documented in Fischer’s Enemy 
Aliens, Germans who before the war did not necessarily think about their patriotic identity had, 
through Australian attempts to intern all civilians with German backgrounds, to reconsider 
their standing on the continent.19 British subjects experienced a similar new awareness of 
national identity when they were interned in German South-West and German East Africa.  
German missionaries, who made up a sizeable portion of the German settler population, were 
also divided between their higher calling and patriotic emotions. Reverend M. Heinrich, a 
pastor in South Africa, noted the difficulties of being a missionary and also a German national: 
‘I must admit that it is all very well to be in “Holy Orders” and to be thrown together with 
other nationalities, but in times of war it is dangerous, life is very hard. I would prefer to be 
allowed to live with the more than 1,000 German prisoners of war in Pretoria.’20 Missionaries’ 
statements or actions of pro-German loyalty resulted in internment. Bishop Munsch in German 
East Africa, already liable for internment as a German national, did not do himself any favours 
by declaring in January 1915: ‘we trust that God will grant our [Germany’s] arms victory also 
here in Africa and that our protectorate will not fall into the enemy’s hands even 
temporarily.’21 The Bishop was subsequently interned.22 The case in Cameroon of Brother 
Alfons Herrmann, one of the ‘pious gentlemen’ of the Basel Mission, also deserves a mention 
here. 23 Brother Alfons was so determined to do his patriotic duty and help maintain German 
possession of Cameroon that he devised an ‘infernal machine’ with which to sink the British 
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ship the HMS Dwarf, in order to block Duala harbour and to prevent other British ships getting 
through.24 This ‘infernal machine’, essentially a boat loaded with TNT, failed to catch fire and 
Brother Alfons was arrested. 25 According to Frederick Lugard, Governor-General of Nigeria, 
when questioned how such action was compatible with his occupation as a missionary, Alfons, 
giving a good example of conflicting identities in the colonies, replied that he was ‘a soldier 
first and a missionary afterwards.’ 26  
For these men in times of war, their national identity superseded the spiritual one. The British 
authorities were also suspicious of missionaries, carefully checking mission membership 
rosters across the British Empire and the former German colonies to weed Germans out, while 
non-German nationals (mainly Swedish or Swiss) were allowed to remain at their posts.27 The 
internment and expulsion of missionaries from the colonies was met with mixed feelings in 
Britain; for example, the Irish Catholic newspaper objected to Jesuits being expelled from 
German colonies.28 Along with providing newspaper coverage, the editor of the newspaper 
(and Irish nationalist), William F. Dennehy, wrote personally to Austen Chamberlain, Secretary 
of State for India, to lobby against their expulsion and the consequent damage it would cause 
to the Christianizing mission.29 Dennehy unsurprisingly did not object to the expulsion of 
Protestant missionaries such as the Basel mission, as he believed that unlike Catholic Germans 
they were only interested in ‘the extension of the power and supremacy of [their] own 
country’.30 Rather than replying to Dennehy, the Foreign Office informed the Vatican directly 
that it was against the public interest to allow German and Austro-Hungarian missionaries to 
remain in the colonies whatever their creed.31 The attitude of the Foreign Office toward 
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German Missionaries was summed up in this statement from a 1916 report on East Africa: ‘A 
German is a German, whether missionary or soldier, and as such will always be tempted to 
give the enemy (his own people) what assistance he can, so long as detection is difficult.’32  
Once interned, the most dramatic displays of patriotism in the camps were through escape 
attempts. The duty of officers to attempt escape was so much taken for granted that The 
Hague Convention legislated against harsh punishments for those who did try escapes.33 
Nonetheless, expressions of patriotism through escape came with a heavy and often 
humiliating price. One prisoner in Aus, German South-West Africa, Mr Bobbert, after his third 
failed escape attempt was returned to the camp in chains from Luderitzbucht with a number 
of ‘negro criminals who were not handcuffed.’34 In the extra-European theatre, perhaps the 
most daring and successful escape attempt was by one of the officers of the Emden, who used 
the opportunity afforded by the Singapore mutiny to make good his escape, eventually making 
it all the way back to Germany.35 A German Red Cross report on Pietermaritzburg camp from 
1916 noted that even though escape attempts were being punished with sentences ranging 
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from twenty-eight days arrest to fifteen months in prison, prisoners were still attempting to 
break out, concluding that; ‘The patriotism of the prisoners remains very healthy.’36  
If those captured from the German navy were the most pro-active at putting together escape 
attempts, there were others who were keen to follow their lead. In Swakopmund, South-West 
Africa (Map 1, no. 61), an escape plot was hatched which involved help from locals 
sympathetic to the prisoners. German officers under the leadership of Naval Reserve 
Lieutenant Buester were continually sneaking out of the camp late at night to work on a boat 
that had been hidden for them by a local trolley operator, identified as a Mr Brugers, and by 
his foreman, Mr Schneider. They spent weeks saving up their rations and working on the boat. 
On the night of their escape attempt, however, they were discovered and captured, ‘two of 
them by the wife of a Union Railway fitter armed with a broom whose slumbers had been 
disturbed by the noise.’37 Where these officers were planning to sail to is unknown, but the 
court noted that given the condition of the vessel they were attempting to renovate, their plan 
was ‘undoubtedly doomed to failure.’38 However, what this incident does tell us was that the 
officers responded to their patriotic duty and duly made all efforts possible to escape.39 
Whether or not the attempt was realistic or not, at least they kept up appearances and 
followed the necessary patriotic protocol for a captured officer. 
Prisoners in Ahmednagar proposed to escape via Afghanistan, 6,000 kilometres away, and 
collected money and Indian clothes in preparation. They even spent the weeks up to the 
escape sunbathing in a rather ridiculous attempt to blend in with the local population. The 
escape attempt was fruitless, with the escapees getting nowhere near the Afghan border. 40 
Escape attempts from Ahmednagar were harshly punished and also served to highlight the 
racial role reversal of those interned in the colonies. In December 1916 four prisoners (three 
civilians and one officer), attempted to escape from the camp and were captured after two 
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weeks on the run. As punishment for their escape attempt they were sent to a jail in Ratnagiri 
(in Maharashtra) where they were strip-searched by the Indian superintendent, a ‘Parsee’, 
with the emasculating proceeding that ‘such parts as the human rectum had to submit to 
visitation.’41 They were then transferred to Bombay in handcuffs, followed by a crowd of 
spectators, and returned to Ahmednagar where they spent two months in solitary 
confinement. The sentence, especially having to submit to a bodily inspection, was not, 
according to the escapees, fitting punishment for a patriotic crime. ‘We tried to escape and we 
expected proportionate and considerate punishment for obeying the call of patriotism, but we 
find it incomprehensible that after our re-capture we should have been subjected to such 
detestable uncivilised and degrading (to us as Europeans) handling at the hands of the natives 
[…] nothing on earth can compensate us for the trying ordeal and harsh treatment we have 
gone through.’42 How much of this ordeal actually happened was questioned by the British 
Foreign Office, but it felt the account was sure to be believed by the German government 
which would ‘as usual institute reprisals to the detriment of some of our unfortunate PoWS in 
their hands.’43  
One final method of expressing loyalty to the German cause to be looked at was the official 
reassertion of one’s ties to the German state. A report into Pietermaritzburg camp found 139 
inmates who were applying for German citizenship. While many of these prisoners wished to 
reassert their German identity, some of those holding British citizenship may also have been 
applying for German passports to avoid charges of treason, which carried a heavier 
punishment than simply being an ‘enemy alien’.44 This may have been true in some cases, but 
the consular letter concluded that prisoners were appealing more on patriotic grounds: they 
‘could not help showing their German sympathies. They refused to deny their Fatherland now 
they are suffering for their love in the same manner as German citizens have to suffer, and 
                                               
41
 TNA, FO383/288 104382, B.B. Cubbit to William O’Reilly with transcript of a letter from Carl Marnitz 
(one of the four escapees), 25
th
 May 1917. 
42
 Ibid.  
43
 Ibid.  
44
 TNA, FO383/204 253423, US Consul Report on Pietermaritzburg, 15
th
 December 1916. Those who lost 
their nationality were divided into five categories: 1. Those who had lived over ten years outside 
Germany and had not registered at a German Consulate. 2. Emigrants who came to South Africa with 
their parents or were paid for by the South African government. 3. Men who became naturalised British 
citizens. 4. Those born in South Africa and whose parents did not register them at a German Consulate. 
5. Men who had emigrated before age 17 or had not completed military service. 
105 
 
 
 
their families suffer, in this hostile and excited country.’45 The consular note, to be passed on 
to the Auswärtiges Amt, concluded with a request on behalf of these inmates in 
Pietermaritzburg: ‘It is their sincerest wish that their Fatherland will forgive them all sins of 
omission and commission, that they may thus regain a Fatherland of which they are now being 
deprived.’46   
In the light of the fact that preferential treatment was given to what were deemed of ‘friendly 
nationalities’, such as those from Alsace-Lorraine and certain parts of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, these prisoners’ decisions to actively seek out their German identity seem to have 
been driven by patriotism rather than narrow self-interest.47 However, British patriotism, 
expressed through anti-German sentiment, in the colonies also played a role in forcing 
Germans into internment. One of the remarkable aspects of the war, from a South African 
angle, was how quickly the South African government was able to rally the population for war 
and with it to breed anti-German feeling among the general population. 48 An article from a 
South African newspaper, The Star, in December 1914, claimed that over 700 women had 
signed a petition to have all parole rescinded and all Germans interned.49 An incident in mid-
1915 when some German businesses were burned in South Africa led one German, Adolf 
Müller, to believe it was better to be interned rather than to remain on parole as ‘it is terrible, 
under the present circumstances, to remain free’.50 
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The difference between German and British had to be stressed in order to get the troops to 
fight in the colonies. The British had to be presented as the offenders. Theodor Seitz, in an 
address to a group of captured British soldiers in German South-West Africa, stressed the 
differences between Germans and British not only in their national customs but also in their 
methods of warfare; ‘We did not invite you into this country. You invaded our country and 
fought us with natives. We are not like you English people with your beefsteaks and your ham 
and eggs. We are a frugal people; we have a small piece of bread and some coffee for 
breakfast.’51 This statement was intended as much as a rallying call to his troops as it was as an 
insult to the British captives. In the camps patriotic activities and displays of belief in a German 
victory were a way of keeping prisoners occupied through the monotony of daily camp life, 
and were allowed by camp authorities. Those who did not display the necessary patriotic 
fervour for Germany in their habits were in danger of being shunned by their fellow inmates. 
In addition, as one prisoner (Mr Striedl in Pietermaritzburg) noted, the conviction that 
Germany would win the war was the only thing that kept most of the inmates out of the 
‘Irrenhaus’ (the insane asylum).52 However, if unchecked these celebrations of patriotism could 
cause trouble, as in the camp at Kimberley, South Africa (Map 1, no. 63), which housed 
prisoners of war from German South-West Africa. When celebrating the Kaiser’s birthday in 
1915, the prisoners under the influence of alcohol and a ‘rebellious mood’ burned down three 
barracks in the camp.53 Expressions of patriotism, through escape attempts, reassertions of 
national identity and the observation of patriotic customs helped to unify prisoners and to 
cultivate a community within the camps. These elements of common experience, however, 
were offset by class differences. 
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H.M. McAnnally, of the War Office, noted in a report on Ahmednagar that ‘the most 
discontented and in certain ways most difficult to manage are those [prisoners] who are of a 
good social status […] It is evident that the ‘camp’ at Ahmednagar holds many of this class – 
they are chronic grumblers.’54 Most studies of prisoners of war focus heavily on the issue of 
class in the camps. Rachamimov focused on the aristocratic threads that connected the 
belligerent nations, helping them to allow official enemy envoys to inspect camps. As he noted, 
the list of camp inspectors ‘reads like a Who’s Who of Central European aristocracy’.55 These 
aristocratic threads were also responsible for how the memory of internment was shaped 
during the inter-war years. In dealing with class it is impossible to ignore Richard Speed’s idea 
of the ‘liberal tradition of captivity’. The First World War for Speed transformed the nature of 
captivity in warfare. In Europe there was a disparity between the wartime practices of the 
Great Powers and the unattainably high standards set by the Hague Convention.56 By the end 
of the war, according to Speed, Europe was left with two contradictory narratives of captivity, 
the liberal and the radical. The Russian Revolution had changed the nature of captivity and 
now captives were to be seen as potential recruits in the class war. 57  However, the 
historiography of prisoner of war and civilian internees remains very much a history of the 
officer and small businessmen. 
In the extra-European world, as in Europe, camps were separated between prisoner of war 
camps and civilian internment camps, with a further division among the prisoner of war camps 
between those for officers and those for the rank and file. During the war in West Africa (Togo 
and Cameroon), internment was brief, with most civilians being repatriated quickly to 
Germany and the officers and other soldiers being absorbed into the camp network on the 
British Isles.58 In the other colonies, internment was more long-term, and European-style 
camps developed. Class was an important defining feature in dictating how prisoners were to 
be treated. 59 In the early stages of the war and the evacuation of prisoners from the West 
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African theatre, German officers and other prominent colony men were interned in the 
relatively plush surroundings of Baronscourt or Lofthouse in the United Kingdom.60 Here, these 
prisoners could mingle with other officers captured on the Western Front under conditions 
reminiscent of Richard Speed’s idea of the liberal tradition of captivity. In the colonies 
themselves, camps developed along class lines. In Ahmednagar camp there was a clash 
between the established ‘Indian Germans’ and who saw themselves as being superior to the 
newly arrived German East Africans.61 Prisoners taken from Samoa were either kept at Somes 
Island or Motuihi, depending on whether they were officers, officials or men of ‘the lower 
classes’. 
In line with the Empire-wide practice of evacuation, most of the prisoners from German East 
Africa, after an initial period of internment in East Africa, were sent to camps in Malta, Egypt, 
India, and in a few cases, South Africa. Ahmednagar camp in India, however, was one of the 
very few places where a prisoner of war camp for officers, rank and file and civilian internees 
(male only) existed in the same space.62 Ahmednagar, a former British army barracks, was 
divided into three sections A, B and C. A camp was exclusively reserved for combatants while B 
camp included a mix of officers, missionaries and civilians. Work was voluntary; although there 
were attempts to get the prisoners to engage in labour, these were strongly protested against 
and camp commanders relented in the face of protests from the officers in A camp who 
refused to do ‘coolie work’.63 C camp, more commonly referred to as ‘parole camp’, was for 
male civilian internees and those who had negotiated a parole with the Indian Government. In 
C camp prisoners had the choice of sleeping in tents or in ‘Coolie barracks’; most prisoners 
chose the former.64 The camp was opened at the beginning of the war and initially housed 
prisoners of war and male civilian internees who had been living in India at the outbreak of 
war. Over the course of the war the camp experienced an influx of prisoners of war from the 
East Africa campaign. Due to the influx of combatant prisoners from East Africa, construction 
began in late 1917 on new officers’ quarters.  
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With respect to the social structure of camp life, Ahmednagar resembled many European 
internment camps. The camp had a tennis court, football pitch and boxing ring. In addition 
there was a theatre, and internees from Calcutta brought a well-stocked library of books with 
them. While the narrative of gender role reversal in Ahmednagar followed similar patterns to 
those within Europe, however it was the colonial role reversal that caused the greatest impact. 
Rachamimov’s analysis of camp theatre also applies here; ‘in terms of material well-being, 
officers enjoyed preferential treatment in comparison to rank and-file prisoners, but it was 
those cracks and fissures in their privileged sense of superiority that may have hurt the most. 
The dejection they felt about their loss of status and their sense of masculine vulnerability 
would find expression in the elaborate theatrical performances produced in officer camps.’65 
The theatrical performances may not have been as elaborate in the extra-European theatre 
but they provided the same outlet as those described by Rachamimov. Prisoners could also 
avail themselves of music lessons and engage in handicrafts as well as working on the 
publication of the camp newspaper.66 However, the benefits of a thriving camp society were 
not open to all. One prisoner, transferred from German East Africa, noted that the camp shops 
were well stocked with tobacco, eggs, biscuits and wine. The only problem was that he could 
not afford any of these delicacies.67  
The main difference in the social hierarchy of the camp lay in where the inmates were 
captured. Many of the inmates who had lived in India at the outbreak of war belonged to 
English colonial clubs where ‘before the war the British in India only recognised the difference 
between Europeans and natives and always stressed that no matter what the whites would 
have to stick together against the Indians.’68 The war and internment, however, meant a 
relegation for these Germans down the Indian colonial social ladder. Within the camp itself, 
however, they remained the high-society as, in contrast, prisoners from German East Africa 
only had the clothes on their backs and no outside support network to provide them with extra 
money or packages. Albert Achilles, a member of the Schutztruppe captured in East Africa and 
interned in Ahmednagar, noted bitterly that ‘Indian Germans’ were bankers, businessmen or 
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engineers who could rely on a monthly allowance from their bank accounts,69 while the 
German East Africans and other sailors were as poor as ‘church mice’ having to rely on Red 
Cross funds, especially as the currency printed in German East Africa was little better than a 
souvenir.70 He complained that the camps, especially A and B, were ‘hermetically sealed’ from 
the outside world and that the prisoners could not receive any support, financial or otherwise, 
from Germany.71  
This changed with the establishment of the internal ‘Afrikaner Verein’, run by the ‘camp elder’, 
Herr von Geldern. The Verein organised a pool of money to help new arrivals find their feet in 
the camp and provide necessary items such as soap and a change of clothes.72 This continued a 
colonial tradition of single men establishing ‘Chummeries’ to pool their financial resources to 
buy daily essentials and other luxuries that would be out of reach of someone on a single 
man’s salary.73 Here, Ahmednagar serves as a good example of the transnational encounters of 
Germans with one another. On repatriation, the discrepancy between the two groups 
remained noticeable. The Indian Germans needed carts and oxen to carry their possessions 
from the camp to the boats, while the German East Africans only had ‘the shirts on their 
backs’.74 Ahmednagar camp highlights that not all meetings of Germans in internment were 
harmonious and the colonial prisoners who were transferred into countries that already had 
well-established German populations did not always integrate smoothly.75  
Expressing similar concerns Karl Hanssen, the manager of the Deutsche Handels und Plantagen 
Gesellschaft (DHPG), noted in view of the planned removal of Germans from Samoa: ‘I would 
not like to go to New Zealand as the New Zealanders have shown that they have no idea about 
the treatment of prisoners of war, and that a captured gentleman should be treated as such.’76 
This was not completely true as, prisoners in New Zealand were given better treatment 
according to their class which caused problems. The camps were divided on class lines, with 
Somes Island housing the rank and file and Motuihi, the more ‘upper-class’ members of 
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German society. In a newspaper report on Somes Island, some of the familiar class distinctions 
that Stibbe discussed were brought to life.77 The 271 inmates of the camp on Somes Island 
were almost all from the ‘working classes’ and had very little, if any, contacts in New Zealand.78 
Here, according to the New Zealand Herald Tribune, were ‘all kinds of Germans […] swarthy 
men and fair, thick-set and slim; faces such as one sees in the photographs of Germans 
captured by the British and French on the Western Front are visible on Somes Island.’ Similar 
to Ahmednagar, poorer inmates who had ‘no fear of losing “caste” by handling a brush, a 
shovel or a bucket’ could earn extra money from the more well off prisoners, who included 
those taken from Samoa.79  
Some of the prisoners on Somes were not happy with having to live in a camp with the 
working-classes. Somes was often described as a camp for working class prisoners, with 
Motuihi serving to house Government officials and others of higher economic social rank 
including one woman.80 One Dr Glantz, writing from Germany on behalf of some prisoners in 
Somes in December 1916, requested that as members of the ‘upper-class’, they should be sent 
to Motuihi as ‘preferential treatment of the better classes […] awakes jealousy and discontent 
among the lower classes and creates unpleasantness for both the commandant and for the 
prisoners.’81 The camp population could be broken into three social groups, according to Dr 
Glantz, the thirteen prisoners from Samoa, the ‘aristocratic democrats’ and ‘the rest.’ In 
response to these petitions the Foreign Office had the German prisoners captured in Samoa 
transferred to Motuihi.82  
The camp on Motuihi housed prisoners from Samoa and also Germans who had been living in 
New Zealand before the war, who (like the Indian Germans in Ahmednagar) had better local 
support and were seen as an upper-class in the camp. The island was small (440 acres) and the 
food bad, but the prisoners could alleviate their boredom and supplement their diets with 
fishing and make monthly trips to Auckland. The camp was broken down into two sections, 
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fourteen men and two women as prisoners ‘first class’ and twenty men as prisoners ‘second 
class’.83 While it was small and had previously served as an animal quarantine, conditions on 
Motuihi were better than on Somes Island, but there were still complaints from those interned 
there.84 From former Governor Erich Schultz’s point of view it was an outrage that he had had 
to share transportation to Motuihi with lower class prisoners, and he demanded that he and 
his wife be either treated in accordance with their social status or, if the New Zealand 
authorities could not provide such conditions, they should be sent to Fiji, where he promised 
to assent to giving his parole.85 Schultz and his secretary (his wife was repatriated due to 
illness) were given a separate six bedroom cottage to live in on the opposite side of Motuihi 
Island to placate him. Here Schultz spent the rest of the war brooding, and writing letters of 
complaint to the authorities.86  
Although remaining on the whole patriotic towards Germany, because the prisoners were 
‘hermetically sealed’ from the outside world the camps formed into microcosms of German 
society in much the same way as Ruhleben, Berlin, became a model English village. They were 
also places where Germans not just from different class backgrounds came into contact with 
one another but also those from different colonies. One German officer, on his arrival in Sidi-
Bishr, Egypt, met old friends from German East Africa and noted that the camp also held many 
Germans from Palestine and the Balkans.87 Adolf Müller, a prisoner in Pietermaritzburg, was 
surprised by the differing social backgrounds of the inmates, noting that even ‘Frankfurt Jews’ 
were interned there. 88  Soldiers, workers, government officials, missionaries and the 
unemployed all spent the war together in European internment cut off from their colonial 
surroundings by barbed wire. While not all accounts were positive, there was a feeling of a 
‘national spirit’ that in some ways transcended class, at least from the point of view of the 
officers. However, those from the bottom rung of the social ladder may have felt quite 
differently. The only inhabitants missing from many of these model German societies were 
women. 
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While there were fewer female internees than male ones, many of the same class and 
patriotism issues also applied. Of course their experiences were intertwined with those of men 
and the metaphorical ‘emasculation’ through racial role reversal was felt equally, if not more 
strongly among women. Propaganda in Germany in the pre-war years had focused on 
attracting the right kind of women to settle in the far reaches of Germany’s new empire. Fears 
that German men were being led into sin and vice by the lack of European women and thus 
lacked opportunities to establish a stable homestead worried the RKA and not least the 
Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft Frauenbund. 89  Repatriation to Germany did not alleviate 
problems for women: oftentimes it worsened them. Separation from their husbands who 
remained interned in the colonies caused hardship for married women, especially those with 
children, and many begged the British government to be allowed to remain in the colonies 
with their husbands, as in this extract from a petition received by the Foreign Office from India 
protesting against a planned repatriation of women to Germany; ‘We beg to stay at the civil 
camp here until the end of the war. We plead that we have no homes now in our native 
countries, our homes having been where our husbands were […] we beg to remain in the same 
country until the Indian government thinks it fit to remove us together.’90 
Three other camps in India were dedicated to housing civilian internees. There were also 
camps to house Ottoman Turkish prisoners, mainly taken from the Mesopotamian Front. Apart 
from C camp at Ahmednagar, the other camp to house civilians from the East African theatre 
was Belgaum, a fort town in present day Karnataka state in South-West India, which was 
initially reserved for women although after protests some husbands were allowed to cohabit in 
the camp. As at Ahmednagar, the camp numbers swelled with the new arrivals, although this 
had been offset by repatriations of some of the original inmates before the blockade was in 
full operation. The camp was divided up into two sections; bungalows for families situated 
outside the fort and barracks consisting of one room each subdivided by teakwood partitions. 
Unsurprisingly, more complaints were heard from those who were housed in the barracks. In 
one case the Red Cross inspector found two families, consisting of ten children and four adults, 
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sharing one barrack room, much to their discomfort. After successful petitions and the 
decision to allow husbands to live with their wives and children, however, Belgaum came to be 
referred to as a ‘family camp’.91 When J.H. Smith of the US Consulate visited in July 1916, out 
of a total of 124 there were twenty-nine men. The forty-four children in Belgaum were allowed 
to attend school at the local Catholic convent.92 
A camp for women and children from British and German East Africa was based in Nyasaland, 
but the inmates were eventually sent to Tempe, near Bloemfontein, South Africa, where 
through the assistance of the Dutch Consul, women were able to keep in touch with their 
husbands in other camps.93 The South African authorities were not pleased about having to 
house women and children in camps. They had only agreed to maintain them on a temporary 
basis, but by October 1917 they had been in Bloemfontein for nine months necessitating the 
building of more permanent structures. F.S. Malan,94 hoping to spur repatriation efforts, noted 
that the South African authorities were considering allowing the women and children to live 
with relatives or friends, if the internees had any in the area, to keep costs down.95 Robert 
Vansittart’s reply was simple: as Germany was not allowing women and children to leave 
Belgium, there would be no question of them being repatriated at that time.96  
As in the Boer War, the British government felt it necessary for the successful military 
completion of the campaigns in the colonies to round up German women and children. 
However, in the First World War the immediate military necessity masked a more long-term 
strategy. If the British were to deprive Germany of its colonies for good, it would be expedient 
to remove anyone who could lay claims to German property.97 In contrast to this the RKA, 
using the same logic as the British, hoped to keep women and other non-combatants in place 
in the colonies. Thus, Otto Gleim, the Unterstaatssekretär of the RKA and former Governor of 
Cameroon, in a letter to General Erich Ludendorff argued against exchanges of women, 
children and other civilians. Writing in December 1916, Gleim realised that there was not much 
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hope of retaining the German colonies apart from German East Africa, which was still fighting. 
Exchange agreements for women and children would affect the one place where Germany did 
have a foothold, German South-West Africa. 98  On the other side, the South African 
government was also keen to hang on to the German population in the interests of 
maintaining a European population in the colony.  
The fear that exchange agreements made for one colony, mainly German East Africa, would 
affect other colonies essentially put an end to any exchange agreements and brought civilian 
internees in German East Africa into the reprisal cycle whereby they were used to get 
concessions for British civilians in occupied Belgium. 
The effect of the British takeover of property and the colonial role reversal attached to it 
affected women as much as, if not more than, men. They were not only expected to maintain 
the matriarchal roles of housewife and mother; they were also expected to provide a moral 
example for young adventurous men who were said to lose their morals once separated from 
Europe.99 Indeed women in the colonies were the embodiment of would be Deutschtum 
(‘Germanness’) in Africa, a reference that was made in contemporary literature and more 
obviously in 1930s German films about the loss of the German colonies.100 In contrast to 
Germany, where the woman’s ‘life-world’ was outside the realm of public male society, in the 
colonies German women were key in maintaining German identity and the structures of 
colonial society.101 For women in the colonies, race gave them status.102 Much as Rachamimov 
described capture in the European theatre as ‘a precipitous loss of status in the social and 
gender hierarchy’103, the capture of women in the colonies and their internment illustrated the 
added loss of status for Germans in the colonial racial hierarchy. 
For example, in her answers to an RKA questionnaire, filled out on arrival in Germany, Magda 
Bubeck-Rodatz (captured on 3rd September 1914 but remained on parole until transport to 
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Germany), noted that women had had to give up their guns and that the English were lying 
when they claimed that women and children had chosen to leave the colony. It was not only 
the colonial men who were disempowered on capture by having their weapons taken away. 
She maintained that they were being forced out and she had to move from her home in Kribi, 
in southern Cameroon, to the port-town Victoria, where she had been under the charge of 
‘Negersoldaten’ and a drunken British Sergeant.104 Women displayed a similar attitude to the 
loss of the colonies as men: ‘Es war für uns alle ein trauriger Gedanke, dass die Feinde nun 
auch von diesem schönen Flecken Erde Besitz ergriffen, und unser einzigen Trost war, dass der 
Krieg nicht in den Kolonien entschieden würde, und es zu Hause um uns gut stand.‘105 The 
shock of the role reversal entailed in the loss of the colonies can be summed up in the words 
of Frau von der Heyden, who was brought to Tabora, German East Africa (Map 1, no. 73) for 
internment; ‘In Urundi the natives were terrible, I did not even once have someone to carry 
my child and had to carry him myself.’106 That Frau von der Heyden had to carry her own child 
signified, for her, how far the German settlers had fallen down the colonial hierarchy. 
The loss of the colonies affected the social standing of Germans. After defeat in Buea, Bubeck-
Rodatz noted that her own house help had lost respect for her and was no longer willing to 
take orders from Germans. ‘I experienced the he highest degree of insubordination when my 
long-serving black chef refused to work, and when I went to give him a clip round the ears, he 
raised his hand as if to strike me. Needless to say, I threw him out immediately.’107 Not only did 
she have to deal with the loss of social status, but according to her answers to the 
questionnaire it was awful to have to abandon the country where Germans with so much 
‘effort and diligence established an area of Kultur.’108 According to Bubeck-Rodatz such 
shameful behaviour was not limited to Cameroon as they were transported ‘like a herd of 
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cattle’ surrounded by black soldiers through three colonies.109 In sum, the takeover of the 
German colonies upset the colonial racial hierarchy, expressed by one female missionary in her 
remark: ‘The blacks walk around in our clothes.’110 
The breakdown of the common European ‘civilising mission’ in Africa reflected the general 
breakdown in the development of a homogenous cultural globalisation that was disrupted by 
the Great War.111 A Herr Simon, in response to the RKA questionnaires on his return from 
Cameroon, described how he felt it necessary to apologise to a ‘Neger’ in Freetown (and to 
record this apology in the questionnaire) for the behaviour of German soldiers in Belgium by 
telling him that ‘it was not right what our soldiers did in Belgium, they tied women and girls to 
trees and raped them to death.’ 112 The sense that the war had had discredited the civilising 
mission and upset gender relations is felt in this statement. German propaganda denounced 
the employment of colonial non-white troops on the European front as it was believed it 
would threaten the future of colonialism and the supremacy of the ‘white race’. The argument, 
reflected in the statements of Magda Bubeck-Rodatz, was that once Asian and African soldiers 
were trained in the use of modern arms, and had participated in a war between white nations, 
experiencing white soldiers’ 'vulnerability, they would lose respect for the white race once and 
forever’.113 In contrast, E.D. Morel, the British liberal, argued that Black soldiers should not be 
brought to fight in Europe, not because they would lose respect for Europeans, but to protect 
them from being tainted by European barbarity. Africa, he claimed, needed to be culturally 
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insulated from Europe.114 Faced with the realities of colonial conflict in Africa, however, 
German commanders put aside their beliefs in Social Darwinism, and black troops were 
employed out of necessity.115 The following section, although by no means doing full justice to 
the topic, will look at indigenous troops in captivity. 
Michelle Moyd in an article on Askari in the East African Front has tried to move the 
historiography, and image of the Askari troops away from the idea of the loyal soldier that was 
so often touted in inter-war propaganda by Lettow-Vorbeck and others.116 In her analysis of 
the motivations for Askari to fight for Germany, patriotism or a sense of loyalty to the German 
authorities ranked very low down the list.117 However, the image of Askari loyalty, while 
essentially a German creation to counter Allied post-war accusations that Germany was not fit 
to run colonies, has been an enduring and powerful one in explaining why many Askari troops 
fought for Germany until the end. 118 Moyd focuses in contrast on the idea of the masculinity 
of the fighting man rather than loyalty as one of the main forces for keeping indigenous troops 
fighting for the German side, but this also poses problems. British references to internment of 
African soldiers while scarce, present the loyalty of African soldiers as malleable. Willi 
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Federowski, who was captured in East Africa and sent to Ahmednagar, found that his black 
servants had moved into the employment of his arresting Officer, J.E.T. Phillips.119 In the case 
of professional African soldiers, this question of loyalties is becoming clearer in the light of new 
research. As Moyd argues, the Askari fought as and understood themselves as professional 
soldiers whose willingness to fight was based on their evaluation of their officers’ mettle 
rather than an abstract loyalty to Germany.120 
The Askari’s motivation for fighting, not unlike soldiers in Europe, was reliant on a number of 
factors. For example, from the early 1900’s the chiefs of the Beti had been nurtured by the 
German administration and developed into a middle-class elite in Cameroon. Karl Atangana, 
the paramount chief of the Beti, had been schooled by the German administration and was 
even sent to Hamburg, eventually becoming an Oberhäuptling or Paramount Chief. 121 
Atangana not only spoke German fluently; he also wore European clothes and even had a 
house built in a German colonial style.122 The reason for Atangana’s loyalty to the Germans is 
more apparent given these factors, not to mention the 1-1.5 million marks he and other Beti 
chiefs had banked with the Basel Mission before the war, funds that would not be accessible 
until a favourable German outcome to the war.123 Not even British offers of amnesty or the 
offer of land in Bekoko (in Spanish Guinea), or the opportunity to join the new Cameroonian 
police force could deter the chiefs away from following the Germans to Fernando Po for 
internment and subsequently on to Spain itself.124 Loyalty was not the only issue at stake for 
Atangana, his social status in Cameroon depended on Germany’s retention of the colony.125 
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Jan-Bart Gewald’s study of Mbadamassi, a prisoner of war in Aus, German South-West Africa, 
offers a revealing account of the complex identities of African soldiers. Mbadamassi, a Nigerian, 
was a former British soldier who had served in the West African Frontier Force before being 
shanghaied into German military service in Cameroon. After being deported to German South-
West Africa in the wake of the Banyo Mutiny in 1909, where fifty black Schutztruppen refused 
to carry out their officer’s orders, he re-joined the German troops there. On the fall of German 
South-West Africa, Mbadamassi was interned with the other German troops in Aus where he 
was employed in sanitary work.126 In another documented case, this time from the British 
archives, a former servant of the John Holts agency (a British company) in Duala, Chalgo alias 
Mateo contacted the British embassy in Spain asking to be allowed to return to Cameroon.127 
Although Chalgo was a member of the German Askari and still wearing a German military tunic, 
Arthur Hardinge, the British Ambassador to Spain, argued that ‘whatever the political future of 
the former Cameroon colony, this man has for the time being ceased to be from our point of 
view a German subject.’ It seems that Hardinge did not buy into the myth of the loyal to death 
Askari and hoped to use Chalgo’s return to Cameroon as a chance to entice more to follow. 
‘The man’s treatment by us may have a good effect upon his fellow countrymen and former 
fellow soldiers in the Cameroons.’128 A similar case to this involving twenty-four Cameroon 
Askari who were brought as prisoners to Aus, was solved to the same effect.129 The Foreign 
Office again did not object to their repatriation to the colony and twenty-three men, ten 
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women and one child were sent back to Cameroon on 28th October 1917.130As Atangana, 
Mbadamassi and Chalgo’s diverse cases suggest, there was a lot more to Askari identity than 
‘treu bis den Tod’ German loyalty. 
The treatment of colonial prisoners of war was also affected by post-war concerns for the 
establishment of British influence in the former German colonies.131 In East Africa the majority 
of the Askari were housed at makeshift camps in Tabora. The treatment or mal-treatment of 
German Askari affected the German (and indeed British) imperial image. There were also 
allegations that Askari captives still in their German uniforms were chained together around 
the neck and forced to do quarry work.132 According to the German Hauptmann Kieckhöfer, 
through forcing Askari to work in chains while still in uniform ‘the English endeavour to 
undermine German prestige in those parts of the protectorate under their occupation.’133 
Heinrich Schnee claimed that the British singled out the Askari for harsh punishments such as 
floggings of up to fifty strokes, twenty-five over the legal limit.134 
However, contrary to what Schnee believed, the British were not ‘doing everything in their 
power to ruin our [German] prestige in front of the natives’,135 but were in fact, explicitly 
allowing the European rank and file to retain their arms ‘in order that they should not lose 
prestige with their Askari.’136 In addition, General Jaap van Deventer (Commander of the 
British armed forces in the East African region), was so wary of the unrest that could be caused 
by the veteran Askari that he argued for their quick release from internment even arguing that 
the Crown should pay the wages that were owed to them by the German government in order 
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that they could return to their home villages. This he claimed would in the long-term be much 
better than the ‘very serious trouble’ the new occupying force would have ‘if we repatriate 
nearly 3,000 veteran Askari and carriers practically penniless’ or left them idle in large groups 
in the major towns.137 Payment would, in his view, ‘have an excellent effect. It may save us 
very serious disturbances and will be an excellent investment.’138 However, due to good care 
of prisoners, or that van Deventer’s fears were exaggerated, the Askari peacefully disbanded 
after reaching the camp at Abercorn.139 The overall British attitude toward indigenous 
prisoners in the colonies seems, from the evidence available in Britain, to have been one of re-
education. The general attitude taken was that once Germany was defeated the ‘question of 
the natives will settle itself’.140 How this worked in reality was certainly more complex and 
while a complete picture may never been drawn, this section has tried to highlight the 
treatment of black German troops once captured.  
To conclude, this chapter sought to look at captivity from the perspective of the prisoners 
themselves. German colonial society did not exist in isolation in the years before the war, and 
the interactions between Germans, their neighbours in British and French colonies, and other 
Europeans and non-Europeans within their own borders shaped their identities. The outbreak 
of war forced a reappraisal of their place within the global and colonial sphere.141 After the war 
and with the return of the majority of Germans to Germany, the wartime experience of 
captivity, coupled with pre-existing identities forged in the colonial sphere, made it difficult for 
these Germans to adapt and settle down in the Weimar Republic.  
From the German colonial settlers’ point of view, the war in the colonies redrew the 
boundaries of nationality. Germans in the colonies were no longer Europeans, but became 
identified by the country of origin. This meant a further categorisation of peoples and caused a 
dilemma for the British as to where Germans fitted in racial hierarchies. It also made the 
Germans more German. In everyday life, patriotic displays throughout the camp network were 
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evident. Celebrations of the Kaiser’s birthday, brewing beer and maintaining general ‘German’ 
standards of hygiene in the camps were all expressions of the imagined camp community. Such 
expressions were not only possible in the extra-European camps, but also conformed with 
similar expressions to those in the camps in Europe.  
In common with prisoner of war conduct across the globe, many of the German colonial 
prisoners of war initially sought to perform their patriotic duty to attempt to escape. This was 
almost to be expected of officers, and The Hague Convention made provisions for escape 
attempts. Although very few were successful, they highlighted the prisoners’ need to display 
patriotism and also to be seen to be fulfilling their masculine role as soldiers. There are no 
records of escape attempts by women.142 In contrast to prisoner narratives from the Western 
Front, the sense of shame at capture was not as strong in the colonies as it was elsewhere. The 
Schutztruppe knew from the outset that they were outnumbered and most likely destined to 
lose the battle for the colonies. They could, however, take comfort in the fact that they had 
performed their patriotic duty and would have to be content with watching from the side-lines 
the war in Europe, where they felt the future of the German Empire and its colonies would be 
decided. 
The development of a closer sense of German belonging through patriotic acts did not disguise 
underlying class tensions. Within the camps the old class order was re-established, with the 
better off prisoners (if they had not been able to bring their own ‘boys’) being able to hire 
others to do various chores for them. The camps for prisoners from the German colonies were 
mainly stationed outside the colonies themselves and meant that prisoners from the German 
colonies were housed with fellow Germans who had often been better established in their 
host country, as in the example of the Indian Germans at Ahmednagar. While there were 
opportunities for those at the bottom of the camp class scale to gain extra funds through 
employment, there remained underlying resentment against those better off than themselves.  
Female settlers suffered a harsher role reversal than perhaps the men. The reasoning behind 
the internment or repatriation of women lay in the long-term military strategy, as ‘the removal 
of all Germans from the occupied territory is an urgent necessity on military and political 
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grounds.’143 Leaving women on the various farms and plantations throughout the German 
colonies would firstly entail the risk of them harbouring and aiding the male soldiers. The logic 
of the Boer War continued here: intern the women, i.e. the base of support, and through lack 
of supplies, safe havens or concern for wives and loved ones, the men would be defeated or 
give themselves up. The Boer War, however, had the eventual goal that the defeated Boers 
would become loyal British subjects.144 In the case of German colonial settlers, the long-term 
goal was a total takeover of their possessions. Therefore women and children were interned in 
camps outside the colonies or sent back to Germany, so there would be no one in the colony 
to directly lay claim to property that had been taken over by the British.145  
Women experienced the same ‘emasculation’ as did men in having their guns taken away, 
Charlotte Deppe was armed and ready to fight against the British in East Africa, and 
experienced first-hand, through insubordination from her house help, the effect of the loss of 
the colonies on the local population. ‘It was remarkable how often one encountered theatrical-
patriotism (Theaterpatriotismus) and how people with fundamentally nothing against another 
nation were now filled with hate because of the inconveniences caused or simply that one 
could now “shoot a man“.’146 While the term ‘Theaterpatriotismus’ implies a very transitory 
notion, the patriotism that was unleashed by the war lasted well into the post-war period, 
forming a notion of ‘Deutschtum’ among former German colonial settlers that was at odds 
with the Weimar image of Germany and was taken more seriously than the term suggests.  
The deportation from the German colonies of German settlers also highlights the general 
British attitude towards Germany’s colonial rule.147 For Britain, following the outbreak of the 
First World War, German men and women did not belong in the colonial world and the First 
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World War afforded the British Empire a chance to send them ‘home’.148 However, in the case 
of the former German Askari troops and German colonial subjects, it was hoped, by people like 
van Deventer, that these could be made into British subjects and through the presentation of 
Britain as a benevolent ruler consolidate control over the newly captured territories. Control of 
how the war was presented was not just important for projecting British power in the colonies. 
It was also necessary to gain the favour of public opinion in Europe, to which the next chapter 
will turn. 
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Chapter Five: Presenting the War and Internment in the Colonies 
to Europe 
 
What was the view from Europe on the conflict and internment in the extra-European world? 
This chapter discusses the communicative links between interned and repatriated German 
colonial settlers, and their influence in shaping the image in Europe of the war in the extra-
European theatre. British maltreatment (real or imagined) of German colonial settlers was 
used by the German government as a propaganda tool to counteract the various atrocity 
stories that were connected to the German abuses of civilians in German-occupied Belgium 
and France.1 As John Horne and Alan Kramer point out, comparisons were made between the 
‘foul deeds’ of the Belgian population and the Herero of South-West Africa to justify German 
reprisals against Belgian civilians.2 The image of barbarity in Europe partly stemmed from the 
pre-war colonial theatre. Violent colonial imagery ‘intruded into the substance of the “atrocity” 
question.’3 Through examining propaganda, this chapter links the extra-European theatre to 
the European front with a focus on the Cameroon theatre as a case study for how some of the 
accusations of barbarous practices by colonial troops arose. An illustrative case study of the 
murder of two Germans in Spanish Guinea by British levies (locally recruited soldiers, spies and 
trackers)4 will show that British initiatives in rewarding troops to gather information and 
possibly capture Germans helped fuel anti-British propaganda in Germany and in neutral 
countries.  
Official German propaganda did not concentrate on the war in the colonies, instead placing 
more emphasis on the alleged cruelty of Allied colonial troops fighting in Europe. Probably the 
most important propaganda document on this topic, the Employment, Contrary to 
International Law, of Coloured Troops on the Western Front Upon the European Arena of War 
by England and France 5 (issued by the German government in July 1915), related solely to 
brutality by colonial troops against German soldiers on the Western Front and contained 
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accounts of ‘barbaric’ practices such as mutilation. However, attempts were made to integrate 
the colonial theatre of the war into this propaganda narrative, as highlighted in this extract 
from a Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft pamphlet: ‘France, Belgium and England, who claim to be 
fighting on behalf of civilisation, have considered it compatible with the dignity of the white 
races not only to bring over coloured ones, placed under their tutelage to Europe, in order to 
defend that civilisation; but also to treat the native population in Africa and elsewhere to the 
spectacle of white i.e. German, men and women being subjected to the utmost degradation.’6 
The targets of the propaganda during the war were three-fold. First, Germany, although having 
had a head start over its enemies in the establishment of a formal propaganda administration 
under Matthias Erzberger, was on the defensive.7 Having invaded neutral countries (Belgium 
and Luxembourg), Germany needed to make its war aims clear to international opinion and 
also had to counter stories relating to abuses in occupied Belgium and France. The colonies 
offered a way to do this. Although Alice Goldfarb Marquis argued that the discussion of losses 
in the colonies was discouraged by the German government,8 once the colonies, with the 
exception of German East Africa, were irretrievably defeated, there was space to portray 
Germans as the victims of empires that did not have the common European civilising mission 
at heart. Prisoners who were sent back to Germany by the Allies shortly after capture were 
thus able to campaign against the British and bring the war in the colonies into German public 
discourse. On their return to Europe, they publicly expressed their dissatisfaction with their 
treatment in a way that those who remained in the camps in the colonies could not. They were 
also able to utilise connections and groups to which they belonged, like the Basel missionaries, 
as well as their associated publications.  
The German colonies, as the only German territory occupied by the British, provided the 
terrain in which to seek propaganda stories. They also provided ready-made imagery of 
colonial violence in the form of a mental ‘European colonial archive’ (the common knowledge 
of the treatment, exploitation and extermination of ‘sub-humans’ accumulated by western 
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powers over the course of colonial history) recognisable to the majority of Europeans.9 The key 
focus on the war in the colonies for the German propaganda campaign was racial and violent 
and drew on imagery of savage warfare and mutilation. According to this propaganda, the 
employment of colonial troops by the Allies on the Western Front violated the laws of war and 
white racial solidarity, and, after participating in warfare in Europe, colonial troops would 
become accustomed to the idea of killing white men, thereby weakening the legitimacy of 
European imperial rule. 10  Hence the British, according to this narrative, through the 
mobilisation of their multi-racial empire for war and by turning against the Germans in Africa, 
had betrayed the common Christian civilising mission. Apart from the damage done to imperial 
prestige, this would, the narrative claimed, also spark unrest and rebellion.11 
Secondly, and conversely, it was necessary for the British, especially in the early stages of the 
war, to present their involvement in the war as a reaction to the German invasion of Belgium.12 
A large part of the literature on the war focuses on the ‘rape of Belgium’ as the key mobilising 
factor for the British. In terms of formal organisation, Lord Newton, controller of the Foreign 
Office prisoner of war department, also became the nominal head of the Foreign Office News 
Department which dealt with the organisation of propaganda.13 To maintain Britain’s image as 
acting in the interests of defenceless Belgium, it was important that the British be presented as 
the civilised power in every aspect of the fighting, including treatment of prisoners of war in 
the colonies, to contrast with the Germans. The propaganda campaign also spread across 
borders and was seen as vital in winning over neutrals, with the United States in the first half 
of the war providing the main theatre for the propaganda campaign. The British monitored the 
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American pro-German press closely and were quick to rebut any negative portrayals of 
Britain’s war effort.14 
Finally, and in addition to the moral outrage caused by Germany’s actions in Belgium, Britain 
looked to Germany’s colonial record for fodder for the propaganda campaign. Britain shied 
away from trying Germans in the colonies for crimes committed during the fighting, preferring 
instead to keep a dossier that could be used in a future post-war war-crimes tribunal.15 The 
argument that the Germans, as the aggressors in Belgium, were not fit to run colonies or be 
the vanguard of the civilising mission was backed up through references to German atrocities 
against the Herero (1904-07) and during the Maji-Maji (1905-07) rebellions. As William Roger 
Louis argued, the doctrine of Germany’s ‘colonial guilt’ began from the outbreak of the war 
and was linked to events in Belgium: ‘Huns could not be trusted with the sacred task of 
civilising other peoples.’16 This of course signified that there was something different about 
Germany compared with other European colonising powers and that it was not to be counted 
as part of the great civilising mission. This propaganda about Germany’s unsuitability to run a 
colony would become especially important after America’s entry into the war and the imperial 
powers’ need to stake their claims at the Paris Peace Conference on German territory not only 
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through the right of conquest but also in the interests of the inhabitants of the colonies.17 It 
would also affect German colonial settlers’ self-perception in the inter-war years, when they 
rejected this idea of a specific German ‘colonial guilt’.18  
Communication with Europe from the internment camps of the extra-European theatre was 
restricted through the difficulties in sending letters over long-distances in war time, limits on 
the frequency and length of prisoner letters, censorship and reprisal punishments. For 
example, Heinrich Schnee’s wife, Ada, who was initially interned in Tabora and then moved to 
the Belgian Congo before her release in 1917, was not able to hear from her husband even 
after her return to Germany, mainly due to the guerrilla-style combat in German East Africa 
and the problems this posed for communication.19 The inability to communicate effectively 
increased prisoners’ isolation and their fear of being forgotten in Germany. Reverend Hübner,  
of the Berliner Missionsgesellschaft, writing back to Berlin in 1916 expressed anxiety about the 
lack of information in Germany about the extra-European theatres: ‘Hoffentlich erkennt man 
in Deutschland die wahre Bedeutung dieses Krieges, in dem es sich um Ausrottung aller 
Deutscher aus dem Kolonien nach den bisherigen Erfahrungen handelt.‘20  
Erich Schultz (the former governor of Samoa) complained bitterly about the restrictions 
imposed on prisoner mail. He questioned the power structures that were in place to deal with 
prisoners of war in the extra-European theatre, in his case with the New Zealand authorities 
and their involvement in censoring mail. He argued that ‘making the transmission to Europe of 
correspondence of Ps.o.W. [sic] dependent upon the assent of the New Zealand Government 
[…] simply empowers the latter [New Zealand] to control and prevent at pleasure all 
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communication between the Ps.o.W. and their diplomatic representatives in London as well as 
with their own government.’21 Giving the New Zealand government the chance to censor 
letters before they reached Britain meant that any negative comments on the New Zealand 
authorities would be blocked. Moreover, prisoners, he argued, were ‘being practically 
deprived of their status as British Imperial Prisoners and subjected to the arbitrary power of a 
British colonial Government which, although participating in the military operations of the 
British Empire under the British Flag, has no international standing and more particularly no 
standing as a belligerent unit.’22 Schultz throughout his time in internment argued with the 
Swiss Consul in Auckland and the New Zealand and British governments over correspondence, 
the lack of inspections of the camp, and his warranted distrust of the Swiss Consul (headed by 
a British citizen, William Pugh).23 While these complaints were mainly self-serving, they at least 
kept the authorities aware of the camp and may have helped bring improvements in 
conditions there.  
Censorship of mail also erected barriers to communicating with Germany. Avoiding the censor 
was difficult, as Karl Hanssen in Samoa found out when attempting to send his diaries home. 
Hanssen had been on parole in Apia, Samoa, until his diaries were intercepted by the censor in 
London. The diaries revealed sensitive information pertaining to the war and administration in 
Samoa and also that he was trying to establish a credit in San Francisco that could then be 
transferred to Hamburg.24 For this he was sentenced to six months imprisonment in a common 
jail and to be retained as a prisoner of war until the cessation of hostilities, and six of his 
employees were fined for ‘violation of the censorship regulation’.25  
Regardless of the potential punishments, however, some prisoners tried to send messages 
home through using codes or references that only family members or friends would 
understand. A simple, although very transparent, example from a prisoner in Egypt to his 
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parents noted: ‘I find myself in an internment camp in Egypt. It is no wonder that Moses and 
his flock fled.’‘26 Karl Grün, an internee on Somes Island, included a more sophisticated code in 
his bi-monthly letters to his sister.27 When deciphered it read out ‘warum hilft ihr uns nicht.’ 
(Why do you not help us?) Using a reference to a mental health facility in Aachen, Illenau, he 
was able to indicate that nine men in the camp had gone insane.28 The camp in Maadi, Egypt 
was similarly compared to ‘Raspelhus’ (a jail) and Stephansfeld (an insane asylum).29 Hermann 
Degenhardt in Sidi Bishr, Egypt, in a letter to his uncle said of the camp that ‘all in all it is like 
being in Moabit’ (a Berlin prison). Degenhardt’s letter also highlighted the separation of 
families; he had to write to Europe in the hope of finding out about his wife as he was unable 
to contact her for four months following his transfer from German East Africa to Egypt.30 In 
one case however, the British were willing to relax their censorship. John Pabst, a prisoner in 
Malta, attempted to send a photograph of himself to his wife in Dar es Salaam. Although it was 
intercepted by the censor, Robert Vansittart of the British Foreign Office argued, ‘I think we 
might in this case relax our prohibition and let the photo go to its destination. The prisoner 
does not look ill-fed or badly treated and the photo may be of some sort of use from a 
propaganda point of view.’31 
Apart from content, the length and regularity of prisoner mail placed further restrictions on 
communication. The Swiss consul in a report on India in 1917 condemned the restrictions on 
mail; in Ahmednagar inspectors found the camp overall satisfactory but, ‘a sore point with the 
prisoners is undoubtedly the question of correspondence, and I must say that their complaints 
are justified.’32 A further report into the same camp found that the restriction of prisoners to 
writing one letter per week on one small sheet of paper made correspondence ‘practically 
illusory’.33 Letter writing was the main method of contacting home, and although the camp 
network claimed to have standardised treatment, there were disparities in how mail was 
handled. Inmates at the camp at Verdala, Malta for example, complained at only being allowed 
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to write in English and their protests were published in the Frankfurter Zeitung with the retort 
‘imagine the commotion the British would make were they restricted to writing letters only in 
German.’ 34  
Letters could also be used to agitate against British rule in the colonies. Reverend Jakob 
Hofmeister, in Cameroon, played a double role as Christian missionary and German soldier. 
During his brief spell in captivity he was caught smuggling letters to his converts among the 
Duala.35 He wrote that any Duala who had supported the British would be punished after the 
inevitable German victory, threatening ‘if Germans will have to return to Duala then all those 
that are against them will be killed without mercy.’36 The letter had been read out to a 
gathering on the banks of the Wouri River and was subsequently handed in to the British 
authorities.37 In fact, Hofmeister smuggled these letters out of his internment camp with the 
intention that they would be discovered, in an attempt to trick the British into thinking that he 
was at the forefront of a campaign to turn the Duala against British rule and thus distract 
British resources (however small) from the main theatres of war.38 While, in this case, the 
Duala had been anti-German even before the war and Hofmeister’s threats would not alter 
that,39 the British nonetheless took measures to prevent agitation by German internees in the 
colonies (one of which was to deport Hofmeister to Germany), feeling it unwise to allow the 
spread of inflammatory anti-British propaganda. 
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Furthermore, in India measures were taken to cut communication between prisoners and the 
local population for fear of the potential for agitation. The Ahmednagar camp authorities 
feared that German prisoners had been specifically instructed to take up the study of 
‘languages of the Near East […] to enable them to take up positions after the war where those 
languages are spoken and continue Germany’s ‘Drang nach Osten’ (push eastwards). 40 While 
facilities were provided for the tuition of English, French and other European languages in the 
camp, for this reason none were provided for Turkish, Arabic, Persian or other Asian languages. 
This served two purposes. Firstly, knowledge of local languages could aid prisoners in making 
escape attempts, but more importantly and noted by the Foreign Office, it was undesirable for 
Germans to become fluent in a language through which they could agitate against the Crown. 
This fear of German agitation was far from illusory. The Berlin India Committee, established by 
the Auswärtiges Amt shortly after the break out of war, recruited prominent Indian activists in 
Europe and the United States with the express goal of creating unrest in the sub-continent. 
The British uncovered and foiled plans for an uprising in India scheduled for February 1915.41 
Germany also set up special camps for the recruitment of would be Indian agitators and spies. 
The goal was to give first preference in any repatriation schemes to prisoners who were 
‘Deutschfreundlich’.42 
Most importantly for prisoners, reprisals disrupted the ability of prisoners to communicate 
with one another. The exact date of when reprisals, in the form of restrictions on mail, were 
enacted is unclear from the archival evidence but they seem to have been introduced in late 
1916 to early 1917.43 From this time on, prisoners could write to Germany but not to their 
families who remained in the colonies or in colonial internment camps.44 Reprisals against the 
treatment of British civilians in occupied Belgium meant that ‘no correspondence with German 
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subjects in the former colonies can be permitted, other than short personal messages through 
the diplomatic channels. This is a consequence of the prohibition by the German government 
of correspondence with persons in the occupied districts of Belgium.’45 The inability to directly 
contact loved ones was trying, as noted in Degenhardt’s case above, and in a letter from ‘Hans’, 
a  prisoner in Sidi Bishr, to his mother in Germany: ‘What tortures me most is that I have not 
heard from Annel in two years. I wonder how my poor children are. If only Germany would do 
something for the poor women in Africa rather than leaving them helpless in the tropical 
climate.’46  
The British, to make the reprisals effective, allowed the prisoners to mention them in their 
letters home as in the quoted extract from Hans’s letter. There would be no reason in effecting 
reciprocal punishments if the German government could not hear about them. While the issue 
of legalising reprisals was raised at a conference at The Hague in June 1917,47 throughout the 
war Britain was concerned about its reputation as a law-abiding nation and the vulnerability of 
British prisoners in German hands, and was thus not keen to enshrine reprisal practice in law.48 
Legalising the methods of reprisals might not have had much effect in any case, as the very 
reason for their use was to compensate for the inadequacies of international law.49 
German official sources on conditions in the extra-European theatre were often misleading 
and were coloured by pre-war conceptions of conditions in the extra-European world. A report, 
from the Auswärtiges Amt (supposedly written by an internee50), on a camp in Tenom, North 
Borneo, reached the British Foreign Office on 22nd October 1915. According to the report, the 
internees in Tenom were living in terror and could not receive fresh food supplies or medical 
attention due to the thickness of the jungle making the camp inaccessible. To make matters 
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worse, the camp was allegedly surrounded by cannibals and head-hunters who had taken to 
the nasty habit of leaving severed heads, hands and feet hanging in the trees near the camp to 
dry, which was not only vile and threatening but also caused an unbearable stench.51 The 
authorities in Berlin were prepared to believe this outlandish story and threatened the British 
with reprisals. 
The Foreign Office took the complaint seriously and requested that an investigation be 
launched. Fred W. Fraser, the deputy Governor of Northern Borneo, along with the neutral Mr 
Hanson of the US consulate, conducted the inspection and compiled a report. Their findings 
told a different story from the one sent by the anonymous internee. Fraser conceded that, 
although ‘grossly exaggerated’ there was a certain element of truth in the story: a few 
tribesmen from Keningar after a battle with their rivals, the neighbouring Rundum, had passed 
through Tenom with their trophies (severed heads). However they did not hang them to dry on 
any trees and not only were there no cannibals surrounding the camp, but cannibalism had 
never even existed in North Borneo. The report detailed that there were only five Germans 
interned in Tenom, all of whom were in excellent health, and in Fraser’s view their treatment 
was very liberal as it was ‘thought advisable to take into consideration the prestige of 
Europeans generally’.52 From these reports the Foreign Office decided that the five internees 
should be sent to India and Australia to spare the expense to the authorities in North Borneo 
and to stifle any opportunity for further complaints.53The distance of the camps from Europe 
and from efficient postal routes often led to this kind of misinformation. The contemporary 
imagination of what life was like in the remote areas of the German and British Empires did 
not need much prompting to picture scenes such as the one described above. Even though the 
accusations turned out to be false, the British took them seriously enough to file an official 
report to ward off any potential anti-British propaganda and to prevent reprisals against British 
prisoners in German captivity. 
Repatriated prisoners provided a more reliable source of information for the German 
government. Apart from relating their own experiences of internment, repatriated prisoners 
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were also a source of interest as they had been through the ‘war zones’ of the sea and 
transported through the United Kingdom as ships coming from Africa and the United States 
(carrying returnees from New Guinea and Samoa) docked at Liverpool and prisoners were then 
brought by train to London for transfer to the Netherlands. Thus, the Frankfurter Zeitung 
published a detailed report from an unnamed female prisoner who described her journey from 
Cameroon back to Germany. Although the journey passed without incident, perhaps of 
particular interest to the reader was the attitude of the British crews to the threat of U-boat 
attacks.54  
Moreover, the German government through the Auswärtiges Amt and the RKA organised a 
questionnaire for returning prisoners of war and civilians from Togo and Cameroon. This in 
itself was not unusual; all belligerent governments had similar practices. The questions asked, 
however, show the interest the government had in the way captivity created racial inversion in 
the colonies; and in particular, the interest in whites being mistreated by blacks. Of the 
twenty-two questions, (the others mainly dealing with; name, address, place of capture etc…) 
four made explicit reference to skin colour. The final question (Question 22) referred to the 
issue of bounties (Kopfgeld) as throughout the war in West Africa and indeed other colonial 
theatres, German troops had accused the British authorities of putting a price on German 
heads: 
“To Make our own information more reliable can you state the name and address of anyone 
who was either interned or killed by enemy forces in return for a bounty or any other 
incentives? In particular, were Germans killed or handed over to the enemy by black Africans 
for such bounties?” 55 
Responses to Question 22 were most often left blank. In cases where it was answered it was 
always in terms of hearsay as in this typical example from Albert Rexter, a priest in Rio del Ray: 
‘I have heard rumours of the capture and killing of German soldiers for a bounty but I do not 
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have direct evidence of such.’56 Gustav Schwab, another missionary from Cameroon, had 
heard through a ‘reliable’ source of the murder of Arms and Lehning, two German 
businessmen who were killed in Spanish Guinea (this case will be discussed later), and that the 
British were offering bounties which were to be paid upon the presentation of ears.57 Although 
inconclusive and based on rumour in relation to bounties, the questionnaires provide 
interesting accounts of the arrest and transport of German civilians in the colonies, which will 
be dealt with here. 
As in other colonies, many of the Germans in Cameroon had not, even after the defeat of the 
German army, expected to be deported from their homes. Nicoletta Gullace’s idea that 
atrocity propaganda in Europe was central to the Allies’ privileging of an image of international 
law that placed primacy on the safety of women and the family has parallels in German 
portrayals of the war in the extra-European theatre.58 Citing international law, German colonial 
settlers felt that, as non-combatants, they were protected from internment and deportation. 
Britain’s breach of international agreements provided an opportunity to counter propaganda 
circulating in the United Kingdom regarding Germany’s treatment of Belgium. For Germans in 
the colonies, bringing the war to Africa only served to undermine the basis of European rule 
and destroy the positive example of moral values that they believed had been set by the 
whites, which would be completely impossible to recreate.59 The British were not only treating 
the Germans with particular cruelty, it was argued; they were allowing former German colonial 
subjects to do the same. A. Haberlein graphically detailed this argument in his memoirs: ‘Black 
gangs and black soldiers brutally raped white women.  They took white women from their 
beds, tied them, beat them and threw them on the ground.’60 
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Missionaries, through their organisational links, were better able to publicise their experiences 
than were ordinary prisoners trying to communicate with Europe through coded letters. The 
Basel mission gave Germans from the colonies a public voice in Germany and outside 
Germany’s borders through its own publications in Switzerland and in the Swiss newspapers.61 
The initial focus of the mission’s publications on the war was the complaint that Britain had 
extended the conflict outside Europe, thus irreversibly damaging the European Christian 
mission in Africa. It had turned a war of nations into a world war.62 The reports the mission 
wrote up, especially after the Cameroon campaign painted a negative picture of British troops, 
an image that spurred reaction from the British Foreign Office. Once repatriated or interned in 
the United Kingdom, the former settlers of Cameroon published and sent a list of their 
complaints to the British government. For example, Otto Wienecke (encountered in chapter 
three), a prominent missionary and member of the Schutztruppe, delivered a lengthy and vivid 
list of complaints focusing mainly on the negative effects that ill-treatment of German settlers 
had on the local population. Wieneke’s complaints were threefold and highlighted the 
importance the prisoners placed on their grievances. Firstly, contrary to promises from 
General Dobell, private property had not been respected. Secondly, the entire German 
population had been ‘tricked’ into being removed from Duala. The third point, and the one 
Wienecke most emphasised, was the placing of prisoners under black guards: ‘I should 
especially like to bring forward that for Germans, it is impossible and incomprehensible to be 
under the orders of coloured men.’63  
Articles in The Basler Nachrichten, many written by repatriated Basel missionaries, echoed 
Wieneke’s complaints in their damnation of British behaviour. Dr Theodor Oehler, the 
mission’s director, accused Britain of needlessly extending a European conflict into the colonial 
sphere: ‘England has wantonly carried the war into the colonies, and so made a world war out 
of the war of nations. England has turned the war into a fight against the guiltless and women. 
They have been made prisoner, drafted away and treated with revolting brutality.’64 Oehler 
focused on the treatment of the missionaries in captivity. The twenty to thirty eye-witnesses 
he interviewed claimed that the missionaries had been rounded up and kept for twenty-four 
hours under the watch of black soldiers who ‘carried out their duty of guarding them in a way 
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which decency forbids me to indicate more clearly.’65 Around 112 missionaries with their wives 
and families had been removed from the eight stations that the missionaries operated in 
Cameroon. Whole families had been ‘torn asunder’ by the British. The property of the missions 
was then plundered and on board the transport ships the white British officers continued to 
steal from them.  
Moreover, on board the SS Obuassi the black crew were well provided for, while the Germans 
had to make do with meagre rations, including meat that was infested with maggots. These 
complaints were published in the Frankfurter Zeitung in an article written by Director Schreiber 
of the Missionshilfe in Berlin. Similar complaints were made about other transport ships. For 
example, repatriated Germans on the SS Ascania complained of having food stolen from them, 
among other general complaints about the ship. During transport to England four Germans on 
the Ascania died from fever. 66 More seriously, bounties were allegedly put on the heads of the 
German officers. Coupled with accusations of the maltreatment of women by or with the 
consent of British officers, this made for alarming reading in London. 67  
On 26th February Sir Evelyn Grant Duff, the British Minister to Switzerland, at the request of 
the Foreign Office sent a communiqué to the Basler Nachrichten arguing that ‘the statement 
that the missionaries were treated with brutality is a fable.’68 The Foreign Office was aware 
that the letters from the missionaries were calculated to do the British harm and that any 
charges of ill treatment had to be rebutted.69 Based on Dobell’s reports from Cameroon, the 
British communiqué stressed the necessity for the removal of all civilians from what was 
essentially a war zone. According to Dobell the captives were treated respectfully and he 
maintained that due to the ‘passive resistance’ of the German population it was necessary to 
trick them into assembling at the hospital in Duala as they would not otherwise ‘comport 
themselves in a reasonable manner.’70 He also reasoned that as they were German citizens and 
not Cameroonians he was well within the bounds of International law in deporting them. In a 
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letter to the Colonial Office, Dobell argued that while the area was under British occupation it 
was necessary on military grounds to close down all German trading concerns including the 
Basel mission as it was half Christian mission, half trading company and was helping the 
German war effort.71  
Although mindful that repercussions in the form of reprisals against British prisoners in 
Germany could occur, articles on Britain’s treatment of German colonial settlers came in the 
wake of the sinking of the Lusitania and according to Horace Rumbold, it was bold of the 
Germans to accuse the British of being ‘barbarians’, in view of the unrestricted U-Boat 
campaign.72 To bolster their image abroad the British had commissioned a report into camps in 
the United Kingdom in January 1915 for publication in the Swiss Journal de Genève. 73 The 
Foreign Office felt the missionaries’ complaints in regard to their capture and repatriation 
were unjustified, and Britain had done enough through its own counter-propaganda to 
highlight the fact. In any case, the sinking of the Lusitania helped to turn public opinion against 
Germany, not just in Britain but among the neutrals also, especially the United States. This 
issue of the accusations of bounties will be dealt with below. 
The image of violence conducted by colonial troops on the Western Front in German 
propaganda stemmed from pre-First World War colonial war-zones. So too did the image of 
atrocities committed by the Germans in occupied France and Belgium, some of which focused 
on mutilation among several other strands of Allied propaganda. 74  As Christian Koller 
highlighted, allegations that Africans and Indians engaged in brutal practices, such as 
mistreating prisoners, hunting for ‘trophies’ (fingers, ears or heads of the enemy) and the use 
of unlawful weapons (such as bush-knives) became a standard topic in German propaganda.75 
This propaganda was not just limited to colonial troops on the Western Front, but the image of 
the ‘barbaric’ colonial soldier was also used in the extra-European theatres. Hermann Röseler, 
a prisoner of war from the East African theatre, noted the fear induced by Belgian colonial 
troops, some of whom he claimed were cannibals, who would show their filed-down teeth to 
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interned women and children ‘and stare and the children and say: Let’s eat!’76 Although 
incidents of cruelty by colonial troops were isolated, they provided the basis for propaganda 
myths published in Europe, and returning prisoners from the colonies wrote about their 
experience of the war in the extra-European theatre through these images of colonial 
violence.77 The following case study of two murdered German businessmen, Arms and Lehning, 
in Spanish Guinea, highlights some of the truth behind these myths. 
In January 1916, the British Foreign Office received a report from the Spanish Embassy in 
London on the discovery of the bodies of two Germans in Ayameken (now Ayamiken in 
Equatorial Guinea) close to the Cameroon border: 
“When the grave was completely reopened, we found the bodies of two Europeans already, 
considerably decomposed, with bush ropes around their necks, […] Their features were 
unrecognisable, but from the build, the remains of the hair, and in one case the remains of 
beard, we could positively recognise Arms and Lehning who were both known to us. Both were 
naked and […] from both the ears and left hands were missing, otherwise they were not 
mutilated.78” 
Ángel Barrera y Luyando, the pro-German governor of Spanish Guinea, launched an 
investigation into the murders.79 It would not look good for Spain as a neutral power, or 
Barrera’s chances of getting (according to Karl Ebermaier) the ‘Prussian decoration which he 
confidently hoped for,’80 if two Germans had been murdered by Spanish colonial subjects. The 
investigation questioned why the Ayameken (the group from which the village took its name) 
would murder two Europeans in their own village. It would have made more sense, according 
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to the investigation, to have allowed the Germans to leave the village, follow them, and then 
kill them in the remote bush. The method of mutilation further cast doubt on local 
involvement. ‘The fact is that among the Pangwe [an appellation for the groups in Rio Muni 
including the Ayameken] this kind of mutilation is unknown. They are accustomed to carry out 
others, not with the object of mangling corpses but in order to obtain certain organs of the 
human body with which to make medicines.’81 
The report accused a party of ‘five natives’ under the command of the British Officer, 
Lieutenant Law, of the murders. Law was in charge of a vessel harboured at the small island of 
Dipikar82 which was monitoring Germans crossing the Campo River from Cameroon into 
neutral Spanish Guinea. The two leaders of the party of ‘natives’, British levies Undomingo and 
Makamendo, were accused of having received orders to follow the Germans into Spanish 
territory to seize documents ‘which they could only do by killing them to get the letters or 
orders that they were supposed to have with them.’83 Responsibility was judged to lie with 
Lieutenant Law. Barrera demanded that Makamendo, Undomingo and the three others 
responsible be handed over for trial for murder on Spanish soil. He also requested that the 
Naval Officer in charge be reprimanded for neglect of his duties. 
In Germany, Arms’ company, L. Pagenstecher and Co., based in Hamburg, wanted the RKA to 
take action. Firstly they wanted RM100,000 from the British government in compensation to 
be paid to Arms’ mother. Secondly they pressed the Colonial Ministry to lodge a strong protest 
and take action. Although what shape this action should take was not discussed, without a 
strong line from the German government, the company argued, there would be negative 
repercussions for Germans living in neutral countries and a serious effect on German firms’ 
ability to do business abroad.84 
In response, the British launched an investigation into the incident. Although unwilling to hand 
over British soldiers to Spain, they promised a thorough investigation and punishment of those 
responsible. Lieutenant Law was ordered to write up a report. Law denied that any reward had 
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been offered to the patrol. They had been ordered merely to bring in any weapons, 
ammunition and books or diaries that they could capture.85 According to Law’s investigation, 
Undomingo had ambushed and shot the two Germans, resulting in the looting of all the 
Germans’ possessions. A large sum of money, apparently taken from the two Germans, had 
been divided among them, which Law recovered as well as their arms and ammunition, which 
he arranged to be sent to Fernando Po. The party that returned to Law (Undomingo and 
Makamendo had fled), reported to him that ‘they had killed the European Germans and 4 
natives, producing some ears to prove they had done so.’86 
What this incident highlighted from a propaganda point of view was a certain grain of truth in 
the accusations that the British were encouraging, through financial incentives, local 
mercenaries to murder and mutilate Europeans. The incident led Sir Edward Grey to pay a visit 
to the Spanish Embassy to clear up the matter. General Dobell, in a letter to Lewis Harcourt, 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, referred to a practice which was probably the cause of the 
accusations and the perceived legitimising factor for the levies involved in the murder of the 
two Germans: 
“As the reference made in paragraph 7 of Governor General Barrera’s letter of the 3rd of April 
is the second that has reached me to the effect that pecuniary rewards are issued by the Allied 
Forces under my command for the death of Germans at the hands of natives[,] I have now 
stopped a practice which previously obtained of rewarding partisans for displaying exceptional 
gallantry in encounters with the enemy’s levies and partisans. The issue of these small extra 
emoluments may have given rise to these small rumours.87”    
What Dobell meant by exceptional gallantry is unclear and he did not state what exactly the 
emoluments were. This statement alone in no way proves that British forces in Cameroon 
were offering a bounty, but it left room for misinterpretation on all sides. The three Spanish 
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reports compiled on the murder frequently referred to the soldiers as saying they were under 
orders to kill the Germans and prove that they had done so by presenting the hands and ears. 
This may have been how the troops interpreted what gallantry in combat meant. However, 
regardless of whether the rewards on offer were enough to encourage levies to act above their 
station, or they were simply badly trained, the German press exploited the situation. 
The Arms and Lehning murders fulfilled European preconceptions of colonial brutality with its 
echoes of mutilation in King Leopold’s Congo88 and many similar horror stories were reported 
in the German press, often written by returning prisoners.89 According to an article entitled 
‘England’s Price for Assassins’ in the Weser Zeitung in February 1915 two Germans, a seaman 
Nickstadt and Quartermaster Schlichting from the ship the Kamerun, had been murdered for a 
fifty-shilling bounty, Nickstadt being drowned and Schlichting being ‘cut to pieces’.90 The writer, 
Fr Valentin Wolf, a prisoner repatriated from Cameroon, had published a similar article in the 
American-based Detroiter Abendpost which focused on the looting and robbing of mission 
stations.91 The bounty, he claimed, was being offered not just on German men but also on the 
heads of German women and children.92 The DKG’s Kolonialzeitung reported similar stories. 
British complicity in these ‘native’ attacks was often highlighted, as in the example of one 
German being slashed across the head with a machete in the train station at Duala in the open 
view of British soldiers.93  Pauline Kessler, of the German Baptist Mission in Ndogongi 
(Cameroon), in her contribution to the mission’s pamphlet, ‘Hewn-Off Hands’, claimed to have 
seen German workmen attacked, robbed, murdered, and ‘their hands brought to Duala’ (i.e. to 
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the British authorities) to be exchanged for money. According to her the bodies of ‘the 
mutilated and dead [were] lying near to our station.’94 These claims were dismissed by the 
British, but with the evidence from the murder case in Spanish Guinea, appear to have at least 
some basis in reality. The main worry for the Foreign Office on reading these articles was that, 
whether the incidents were real or not, the German press were demanding reprisals in the 
form of ‘employment without reference to their rank of French and British prisoners of war, on 
severe manual labour, such as the draining of marshes’.95  
Stories of mutilations in the colonies were spread by word of mouth and brought to Europe by 
returning prisoners. These accounts of Allied maltreatment of Germans were not just limited 
to reports in the German press. Spanish newspapers portrayed the war in the colonies as one 
of British-sponsored barbarism. A pro-German, Spanish newspaper, ABC, published a 
sensational account of the treatment of prisoners in (French) Dahomey but also alluded to 
misdeeds by British troops.96 The paper claimed that Britain was hiring its levies from among 
cannibals and that not only had a German missionary been murdered ‘por Negros Anglofilos’ 
but also a German NCO and four of his black soldiers had been eaten.97 Their use as a tool in 
propaganda also meant that there would be embellishments. But, as Heather Jones has shown 
in relation to prisoner of war propaganda relating to prisoners captured in Europe, there was 
often a certain grain of truth, although small, in captivity propaganda stories.98 In the archives 
consulted, the only case of murder and mutilation for which there is actual hard evidence is 
that of Arms and Lehning, but there may have been more. What is known is that this case 
formed the basis for some of the more sensational stories such as that which appeared in ABC. 
The Frankfurter Zeitung, further exaggerating the Spanish Guinea murders, reported that 
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fifteen Germans had been murdered and had their hands and ears cut off in the Spanish 
colony.99  
The reporting and sensationalism of atrocity stories did lead to some policy changes on the 
ground. The British cessation of incentives for levies was a direct result of this propaganda and 
fear of misinterpretation in Europe with ensuing negative consequences for Britons held in 
German captivity. A fear of the misrepresentation of internment in the extra-European world 
was also a factor in British plans to send German prisoners to Australia. Through attempts to 
equate the barbarity of the war in the colonies with that on the Western Front repatriated 
German colonial settlers sought to integrate themselves into the German narrative of the war. 
The war in the colonies did, to some extent, stir the imagination of the metropole with its 
references to mutilation, torture and the ill-treatment of white women by black soldiers and 
echoes of it remained in inter-war German representations of the war. 
To conclude, this chapter, building on chapter three, highlighted three aspects of the extra-
European theatre of the First World War. First, contrary to the image of the war in Africa as an 
eccentric side-show, contemporary German colonialists saw the loss of their colonies as a 
radical shift in the balance of power that was carried out through violence. This violence, 
either real or imagined, was the determining factor through which they described their time in 
captivity with prisoner of war and civilian internee camps being compared with common jails 
and insane asylums. German writers hoped that reports of and publications about mutilations 
of Germans in the colonies would strike a chord with a European audience raised on horror 
stories of colonial violence. The notion of a common western ‘colonial archive’ as 
conceptualised by historians can be applied to propaganda on the treatment of German 
prisoners of war and civilian internees in the colonies: clearly these activated common ideas of 
the ‘colonial’.100  
The portrayal of Britain as reneging on the European civilising mission through its treatment of 
German colonial settlers fitted with such ideas and triggered older images of colonial barbarity 
which internees in their reports sought to exploit. This theme is summed up in the comment 
published in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung in 1916, ‘it is a shame that Joseph 
Chamberlain and Cecil Rhodes are no longer alive. One wonders what they would have to say 
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about the embrace of the blacks and Anglo-Saxons.’101 Britain was also aware of these issues. 
However, although conscious of its imperial prestige and image among neutral countries, 
Britain did carry out reprisals against German prisoners in the form of postal restrictions. These 
restrictions further cut off German colonial settlers in internment from Germany and the lack 
of reliable information on internment contributed to exaggeration, as highlighted in the 
extreme example of Tenom.  
Secondly, the German government and press used the perceived violent racial role reversal of 
German colonial settlers that ensued upon the British capture of the colonies as a counter-
balance to Allied propaganda about German-occupied territory. The German colonies were, in 
propaganda terms, Germany’s Belgium. The incarceration of, violence against and deportation 
of German civilians outside Europe served as a strong propaganda tool to highlight to the 
German people and neutral countries that Britain was not the just and noble power which had 
the rights of civilians of weaker nations in mind that it claimed to be. The German propaganda 
employed was similar to that used in describing the multi-national makeup of the Allied forces 
in Europe and a direct link was made between savage practices on the Western Front and 
those in Africa and beyond. However, the fall of the German colonies and the ensuing 
treatment of German colonial settlers did not provide an adequate counter-balance to British 
propaganda. Michael Sanders and Philip Taylor argue that British overseas propaganda was 
only effective due to the inadequacies of its German counterpart.102 The Germans’ propaganda 
was ‘ham-fisted’ and through their treatment of Belgian and French civilians and their U-Boat 
atrocities, they did themselves no favours.103  In fact, Sir Cecil Spring Rice, the British 
Ambassador to the United States, noted that ‘in the glorious annals of German achievement 
nothing is so remarkable as the fact that Germany has almost made England popular in 
America.’104 In sum, propaganda relating to the mistreatment of German colonial settlers could 
not compete on an international stage with the ‘defining act of the war - the “rape” of 
Belgium’.105  
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In Germany, the colonial propaganda narrative during the war had to compete with that of the 
‘Senegalese’ troops on the Western Front.106 In attempts to link their experiences with that of 
Europe, the Germans from the colonies found themselves subsumed in and lost to greater 
events. However, the memory of take-over of the German colonies found its way into post-war 
propaganda and lobbying for the return of the colonies. The Volksbuch unserer Kolonien, 
published in 1938, carried accounts of black soldiers entering the bedrooms of sick and 
pregnant women during the war in Cameroon and stealing their money after roughly handling 
them.107 In addition, as the next chapter highlights, France and its poor treatment of prisoners 
in Dahomey, French West Africa, became linked to German post-war ‘black shame on the 
Rhine’ propaganda and overshadowed Britain’s better record.  
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Chapter Six: The British Empire and the extra-European Camp 
System 
 
The British Empire was not the only imperial power to intern Germans in the colonial world 
during the war. Building on chapter two, here attention will turn to Allied internment systems 
in other parts of the extra-European world. Not only will a focus on other Allied camps in the 
colonies provide models for comparison; but it will also serve to flesh out the picture of 
internment beyond the borders of the British Empire and through examining the interaction 
between empires will highlight how inter-connected internment in the First World War was, 
with the notable exception of Japan.  
Firstly we will examine the mirror image of our study, British internees in German captivity in 
the extra-European theatre. Then, by way of comparison with the British Empire case, the 
chapter will introduce the camp systems of Belgium, Portugal and (neutral) Spain in Africa and 
conclude with a few notes on camps in the Americas and Asia. For the purposes of this study, 
Russia and the well documented camps in Siberia are included in terms of European 
internment and will not be discussed in any detail.1 Internment in the Ottoman Empire will 
also, regrettably, be omitted, due to limited source material, although this is an aspect of the 
war that is receiving attention elsewhere.2 With this overview a fuller picture of global 
internment will be presented, allowing us to focus on the two chosen case studies – France 
and Japan, for a detailed comparison. 
France and Japan offer the best comparative case studies, for as well as being Allied powers, 
they both held internees from the former German colonies. Both France and Japan came into 
conflict with the British through their imperial aims: France in West Africa and Japan through 
its expansion into the Pacific. The camps themselves had a greater (but differing) impact on 
the post-war image of the belligerents than did the camps under British control. The French 
camps in Dahomey (Benin) became interlinked with post-war ‘black shame’ propaganda while 
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the Japanese camps, especially Bando on Shikoku Island, are still presented in popular history 
in Japan today as an outstanding example of transnational and cultural exchange. 
It would seem natural to start this comparative chapter with a look at the experience of British 
prisoners in German hands. Due to British sea dominance and the nature of the guerrilla 
warfare that was waged on most of the extra-European fronts, German colonial prison camps 
were very much ad hoc affairs. With the exception of German East Africa and to a certain 
extent German South-West Africa, the war did not last long enough for any settled camp 
system to be developed.3 The campaign in Cameroon highlighted the logistical problems of 
maintaining prisoners for an army on the move with no real central base. More often than not, 
the German Schutztruppe simply handed over prisoners (on condition of parole) to enemy 
forces.  
The improvised nature of prisoner internment in the German Empire and lack of facilities to 
maintain captives invariably led to abuses. A case of a British prisoner being tied to the ‘wheel 
of a cannon and beaten by a native by order of a European’ was heard of in East Africa, while 
the African World in September 1916 claimed a British woman in German East Africa had had 
her breasts cut off by German troops and the killing out-of-hand of members of the British 
forces was reported from the campaign in German South-West Africa. 4  The German 
government’s response to these accusations in a Note Verbale to British Foreign Office, was 
that either the stories were false, or (in the case of the ‘wheel’ punishment), the German 
officer concerned had some justification for punishing the soldier, who was ‘doubtless a 
coloured man’. The British felt that this reply was not adequate and that the colour of the 
man’s skin was not the issue. Even had he been black, they argued, ‘the barbarity shown would 
not in any degree have been diminished’.5 From the archival evidence, German maltreatment 
of defeated British soldiers does not seem to have been related to any reprisals for 
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mistreatment of prisoners in British hands, mainly happening in the immediate aftermath of 
capture. These cases, while used for their propaganda value by the British, were rarely brought 
to trial following the British takeover of the colonies. It was reasoned by the British Foreign 
Office that each reported atrocity would make an entry in the dossier against the German 
government to be used in a war crimes trial once the conflict in Europe had come to an end.6 
Additionally, there never really was a German camp system along the lines that the British 
were able to establish.7 
Moving to the Allied belligerents, the Belgian-run camp system was the most intertwined with 
the British and French. German troops captured by Belgian forces in East Africa were 
sometimes transferred to British hands or transported (In what German prisoners referred to 
as forced marches but may be more realistically referred to as the movement of internees 
under difficult circumstances where transport and infrastructures were limited and poor) 
across the Congo for either internment in Dahomey or further transport to Switzerland via 
North Africa. Belgian troops also controlled Tabora, German East Africa, for long periods during 
the war.8 Tabora was an important holding site for Askari troops, and German civilians, such as 
Ada Schnee9 were interned or on parole there. The Reichsdruckerei published a book on 
internment in the Congo in 1918 in which it accused the Belgian authorities of forcing women 
and children to endure periods of up to twenty-four hours without food or water while being 
taunted by black and European guards during their transport from Tabora to the west coast of 
Africa.10 Perhaps in an effort to balance out Allied propaganda on German brutality in Belgium, 
Germany accused the Belgians of also being complicit in the racial role reversal in the African 
theatre. First Leutnant von Botsch, writing about his transfer from the Belgian Congo to North 
Africa, noted ‘I have had altogether the impression… that it was the expressed intention of the 
Belgians to shame and lower us before the natives as much and anyhow possible […] Thus the 
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Belgians have placed themselves […] by the side of the French as regards inhumanity and 
contrariety of culture.’11  
Belgian-British relations were also strained during the war. Jan Smuts (commander of the 
British forces in East Africa until 1917), in particular, was concerned about the possibility of 
Belgium using the conflict to encroach on German East Africa. Belgium had early on in the war 
gained control of Ruanda-Urundi (Rwanda and Burundi) and in the summer of 1916 it looked 
as if it might reach the southern shore of Lake Victoria, thus straddling the proposed British 
Cape to Cairo corridor. This led to a propaganda war between Britain and Belgium, with 
Belgian Askari accused by Britain of all manner of atrocities, even cannibalism, while Belgian 
officers were accused of brutality in their treatment of soldiers and carriers.12 
Although Portugal did not enter the war in Europe until 1916 (after a German declaration of 
war), it had been fighting Germany in skirmishes in the colonies from August 1914.13 The 
Portuguese Empire ‘interned’ Germans and Austro-Hungarian males of military age in Goa at 
the outset of the war (Map 1, no. 82).14 While the Portuguese were nominally in control of 
prisoner treatment, the fact that the main postal network was run by the British had a 
significant influence on prisoners’ affairs, ensuring that, in this aspect, enemy civilians in 
Portuguese India were treated very much like their counterparts in British India. Eventually 
those who were not repatriated, mainly men of military age, were transferred to camps in 
British India. This did not stop internees and prisoners of war in British India from trying to 
escape into Goa, as in the case of the Austrian, Erwin Alfred Klug, who was killed in a train 
tunnel in the colony after escaping from Ahmednagar. The investigation into Klug’s death 
found that he had sought shelter with German sympathisers in Goa.15 
In Africa, however, the Portuguese, unlike the Belgians, followed a more independent line in 
prisoner treatment. In the initial stages of the war, there was relatively heavy fighting on the 
border lands between Angola and German South-West Africa, resulting in the capture of many 
German prisoners who were interned in Loanda (Luanda, map 1, no. 57). The Portuguese also 
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fought similar battles on the borderlands of Mozambique and German East Africa for control 
of the Kionga triangle.16 However, in Africa the Germans were a secondary enemy for the 
Portuguese during the First World War. Portuguese colonial armies spent more time and 
resources quelling internal rebellion than fighting their neighbours. This was partly reflected in 
their treatment of their German prisoners with the Red Cross in Frankfurt citing unrest among 
the indigenous population as the main reason for the relatively good treatment of prisoners. It 
reported that; ‘Portuguese treatment of the numerous German internees and the few 
prisoners of war helped create an amicable atmosphere between Germany and Portugal unlike 
the treatment of German internees by other enemies, namely in Africa where Germans are 
interned before the eyes of blacks.’‘17 The main holding camp for German prisoners in 
Portuguese Africa was in Mozambique at Lourenço Marques (Maputo, map 1, no. 69).18 The 
photographic evidence and Red Cross reports present the camp in a favourable light and 
comparisons can be drawn with the Japanese camp at Bando which will be described in more 
detail below. The Brazil based Sociedade Beneficente Alemã o Gerente, acting as a relief agency 
for German prisoners in Mozambique and South Africa, offered to repatriate prisoners from 
Lourenço Marques to Germany in summer 1918, but not all accepted. In total eighty-two 
prisoners asked to remain in the colony.19 This partly attests to the lenient treatment by 
Portugal of its German internees. 
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For Portugal, the Germans in Africa were a real threat. Germany exploited the unrest in 
Portugal’s colonies that had been ongoing since before the start of the war, and although 
repelled in Angola, German forces were able to enter Mozambique, thus prolonging the 
conflict in East Africa.20 As with the Belgians, Portuguese encroachment on German territory 
caused tension with Britain. The British were suspicious of Portuguese treatment of indigenous 
populations during and after the war, especially following reports accompanied by gruesome 
photographs of a post-war massacre in Kionga (German East Africa) that involved atrocities of 
‘so hideous a character that, if they were published […] people would almost wonder whether 
such incidents were not too high a price to pay for the Portuguese Alliance’.21  
The final ally to be looked at here is the United States. Before entering the war, the United 
States had served as a transport route for returning prisoners from the Pacific and Asia. These 
trips through the United States en route to Germany provided a platform for German prisoners 
such as Eduard Haber to publicise their treatment to a wider neutral (or even sympathetic) 
audience.22 With the American entry into the war in 1917, however, this was no longer 
possible and many Germans in the United States were interned and the transport route for 
repatriating prisoners was closed down. In all, the United States interned between 8,500 and 
10,000 German civilians as ‘enemy aliens’ (around eight percent of German males living in the 
United States at the time).23 Senator Frederick Hale of Maine introduced a resolution in the 
Senate on 3rd May 1917, calling for the transportation of German prisoners of war from Europe 
to the United States. The argument was that it would be cheaper and more efficient to feed 
prisoners in the United States, thus freeing up funds and manpower for the overall Allied war 
effort. Unsurprisingly this resolution was not well received by the American public.24 Whether 
                                                                                                                                         
from Major C.F. Bagenal (District Political Officer at Tabora) to the Senior Political Officer in Dar es 
Salaam. 
20
 A key example of this is the German raid and battle of Naulila in Angola in December 1914. The 
Portuguese defeat here sparked a massive indigenous rebellion. Ribeiro de Meneses, ‘The Portuguese 
Empire’, in Gerwarth and Manela, Empires at War, p. 186. 
21
 TNA, FO608/216, 6911, 11
th
 April 1919, Earl Curzon to Sir L. Carnegie, dated 2
nd
 April 1919. British 
officials believed that the massacre could be used to Britain’s advantage, as Curzon went on to write 
that should the atrocities come before the peace conference ‘the account of them might react most 
unfavourably upon the claims of Portugal to retain her share of the administration of African territories 
and populations.’ 
22
 See chapter two. 
23
 Janz, Der Grosse Krieg, p. 300. Most of these were interned under the Sedition Act of 1918, Leonhard, 
Die Büchse der Pandora, p. 698. 
24
 ICRC, C G1 A 18-18, Traitement des prisonniers de guerre en mains américaines: un article de presse, 
16
th
 May 1917. 
156 
 
 
 
because of anti-German hostility in the USA is unclear, but after the war Germans who were 
repatriated from Japan and other Asian locations did not travel through the United States but 
travelled via the Suez Canal.25  
Neutral countries also interned German civilians, often under pressure from neighbouring 
colonial powers or because of the need to win favour with British authorities. Siam interned 
many German civilians at the outbreak of the war, mainly taken from merchant vessels.26 The 
Siamese government worked closely with the British Foreign Office in this respect. In South 
America the governments of Brazil, Venezuela and Chile, under pressure from Britain, also 
enacted legislation allowing for the internment of Germans taken from merchant ships. In the 
Dutch empire, Britain even considered a propaganda campaign through ‘a few articles in the 
local press on the pleasures of life (with photographs if possible) in Australian internment 
camps’ in a bid to attract Germans living in the Dutch East Indies to volunteer for internment 
rather than possibly ending up as spies for their government.27 This plan was inspired by a 
letter the Foreign Office received from a German, Karl Martin in Batavia, who asked to be 
interned in a British camp. H.B. Warner of the Foreign Office recommended that Martin be 
‘discreetly’ encouraged to go to the nearest British possession and that his internment ‘might 
be advantageously used for the purpose of propaganda’.28 However, this plan was aborted 
after the Colonial Office raised objections, arguing that the scheme would put the British in a 
difficult position with the neutral Dutch.29  
Spain and its African possessions, while neutral, were directly involved in the war in Cameroon. 
A large detachment of Schutztruppe, approximately 200 Europeans, 6,000 Askari, 6,000 
Cameroonian women and roughly 4,000 servants and carriers, led by the German governor of 
Cameroon, Karl Ebermaier, fled across the border into Spanish Guinea during the war to seek 
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internment under neutral Spanish authorities.30 The majority of Spain’s military elite were pro-
German, including Ángel Barrera, the Governor of Spanish Guinea, discussed earlier in this 
thesis. However, even they realised that due to Spain’s geographic and economic position it 
would be ‘suicide’ to join the German side. The best the pro-German military could do was to 
hope to keep Spain from joining the Allied side and to remain neutral.31 The German troops in 
Cameroon were aware of the likelihood of internment in the United Kingdom if captured by 
the British, or even worse, internment at the notorious camp in Dahomey if captured by the 
French, but as long as they could make it across the river Campo and into Spanish Guinea they 
would be safe. From Spanish Guinea they were then shipped to Fernando Po.  
Governor Barrera believed that the war had offered an excellent opportunity for the 
development of agriculture on Fernando Po: the Cameroonians who followed the German 
officers were to be put to work on the farms and plantations.32 Barrera soon realised, to his 
dismay, that the German Askari were not keen to settle down to a life of farming on the island, 
as they were highly trained soldiers who ‘despise[d] agriculture and all manual labour as fit 
only for slaves and have absolutely refused to work.’33 The scheme backfired as the German 
army, vastly outnumbering the Spanish police, essentially took over the island and began plans 
to rearm in preparation for a renewed assault on Cameroon. Spanish ships smuggled 
munitions to the island for the Germans and the prisoners, having become the jailers, began to 
openly drill.34 
Under British and French pressure and with an eye on their status as a neutral power, the 
Spanish authorities arranged to ship all the German officers to mainland Spain, where they 
could be better supervised. Barrera was removed only in May 1918, in an effort to reassert 
Spain’s neutral status.35 The Foreign Office discussed the idea of allowing Germans in Spain 
                                               
30
 Quinn, ‘The Impact of the First World War and its Aftermath on the Beti of Cameroon’, p. 176. 
31
 Francisco J. Romero Salvadó, Spain 1914-1918: Between War and Revolution (Routledge, New York, 
2012), p. 11. 
32
 Not all of whom went to Fernando Po. Most remained in Spanish Guinea, with around 3,000 being 
moved to the island. 
33
 TNA, FO383/214, 168924, Letter from Hardinge, British Embassy San Sebastián, 26
th
 August 1916. 
34
 TNA, FO383/213, 72564, Disposal of German refugees and natives from the Cameroons, 17
th
 April 
1916. 
35
 This was commented on in the Auswärtiges Amt as a blow to German influence in West Africa. TNA, 
GFM21/81, Telegram from the German Embassy in Madrid to Berlin 27
th
 April 1918. After the war 
Barrera was again able to take up his position as governor of the island. William O’Reilly of the Foreign 
Office maintained that Spain was being far too lenient on its prisoners and the ‘internment in Spain is a 
farce.’ TNA, FO383/449 109822, 26
th
 July 1917. O’Reilly memorandum. 
158 
 
 
 
free passage to return to Germany, as there was ‘no doubt that they are doing much more 
harm in Spain than they can in Germany […] if it were not for the position of British women 
and children in Belgium I should see no objection to their returning to Germany.’36 Again 
concerns for the treatment of British prisoners and civilians affected the conditions of German 
prisoners. 
Hong Kong, being a British possession, had naturally acted early in the war to intern its German 
civilian population. Women and children were kept in a downtown hotel and were catered for 
by the chefs and staff there. The men, however, were placed on St John’s Island, more 
commonly known by the less appealing name of Stone Cutter’s island. This former quarantine 
colony with its inadequate housing was not suitable for the internment of the 226 civilian 
prisoners, and they complained of having to work like ‘coolies’.37 Efforts were made in the 
course of the war to have the prisoners shipped to Australia, with all internees in Hong Kong 
reaching Australia before the Armistice. In China, Germans and other nationals in Tientsin 
(Tianjin)38 provided aid to German prisoners of war in Japan, in the form of clothing, food and 
money. For lower class prisoners of war this was a lifeline. Upon China’s entry to the war, a 
similar evacuation of German and Austro-Hungarian civilians from Shanghai and other areas 
with enemy residents took place. Initially there were discussions about allowing the Japanese 
to take in the civilians, but as, Madeleine Chi argued, Britain was reluctant to allow this as 
Japan was treating its German civilians so well.39 However, a more plausible explanation is that, 
as Japan did not intern German civilians in Japan itself it was unlikely to be keen on interning 
German civilians from China. It is still unclear from the records available who initiated the 
policy of evacuation from China after its entry into the war and how the British government 
was able to ship German civilians from independent China to Australia.  
Before moving onto the analysis of France and Japan, it remains to touch on the Ottoman 
prisoners in the British Empire. The Turkish newspaper Hilal in November 1916 reported that 
Turkish prisoners were photographed for the amusement of British soldiers, although the 
paper noted that this amusement could take a nasty turn as in the killing of all wounded 
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Turkish soldiers in Basra. The newspaper maintained that if one were caught by the British or 
Australians then it was a sure way to suffer ‘martyrdom’. The article contrasted this (for 
propaganda purposes) with the usually good treatment offered Turkish prisoners when 
captured by Indian troops.40  
Most Ottoman soldiers captured by the British were kept in India or Egypt, and these prisoners 
did not often come into contact with their German counterparts. Some of the camps used in 
Egypt to temporarily house German prisoners who were repatriated from India had previously 
been used to intern Ottoman prisoners. The closest German and Ottoman prisoners came to 
one another was in Ras el-Tin, Egypt, which had separate Ottoman and German sections. 
Those interned in India, as with their German counter-parts, all found the climate ‘horrible’.41 
Although separate, the treatment of Ottoman prisoners does not appear to have been very 
different from that of German ones, with one major exception, rations. The ‘Oriental’ diet 
allowed to Ottoman prisoners caused much more serious cases of nutritional deficiencies and 
related diseases such as pellagra than were suffered by the Germans who received ‘European’ 
rations.42 The ICRC reports on the camps in India reported similar complaints from the 
Ottoman prisoners to those of the Germans and made little of what was a serious dietary 
problem: ‘It requires much practice and discrimination to pick out such complaints as have any 
solid foundation. A prisoner, in whatever country he may be, complains because he suffers. 
The loss of freedom upsets his sense of proportion. A porter from Constantinople or a 
fisherman from the Black Sea coast, though he draws every day the same rations as a British 
soldier, manages to complain about his food.’43  
France was second only to Britain in terms of the global reach of its empire, and its internment 
camps in West Africa were linked to the British camp network through transfers. Internment 
camps were established all across the French Empire, from Tahiti to Madagascar to Indo-
China.44 By 1916, the British government was willing to concede control of German West 
African ports in exchange for, as Andrew Bonar Law, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
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argued, ‘a quid pro quo’ of France relinquishing any claims it had in German East Africa.45 This 
seemed to work well in France’s favour, and indeed in the immediate aftermath of the war 
Britain had to deal with Portuguese and Belgian claims on Kionga and Ruanda-Urundi while 
France was free to deal with Togo alone and had the majority of influence in Cameroon. From 
the point of view of German propaganda, this newly enlarged French West Africa created the 
threat of former German colonial subjects being shipped to Europe to serve in the French 
occupation force on the left bank of the Rhine. From a captivity point of view, it meant that 
during the war, especially from 1916 on, any Germans captured in Cameroon were to come 
under French control.46 Similarly to those captured by the British, they would all eventually be 
shipped back to Germany, although after a much longer period of internment. 
France also established camps in North Africa: Heather Jones in her comparative analysis of 
German, French and British camps touched on these captivity systems. Her book refers to 
around 17,300 prisoners in 1916, in Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, who were sent there from 
the Western Front.47 The reception received by Germans in Algeria, where’ stood thousands 
upon thousands of people on the dock who began howling and growling with knives in their 
hands,’  was similar to the rough send-off that other Germans had received elsewhere in Africa, 
when leaving their former colonies.48 In the French case, as Jones shows, military necessity was 
not the only determining factor in sending prisoners to Morocco. The French Governor-
General of Morocco, Louis Herbert Gonzalve Lyautey, specifically wanted German labour 
battalions in the colony in order to lower German prestige and confirm French superiority in 
the eyes of the indigenous population, as a way of reversing Germany’s pre-war diplomatic 
overtures in the region.49 The desire by the French military to ‘humiliate took precedence over 
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prisoners’ welfare.’50 A similar process affected the German colonial prisoners taken to French 
West Africa from Togo and Cameroon.  
Dahomey was colonised by the French in 1872 and incorporated into French West Africa in 
1904. The internment camps in Dahomey received more attention in the German press than 
any other camp in the extra-European world.51 The name itself, Dahomey, became a by-word 
for ‘barbaric’ treatment and for a colonial race reversal whereby black guards watched over 
white prisoners. The image of the ‘barbaric’ black guard directly related to the image of the 
‘barbaric’ black soldier on the Western Front. Dahomey comprised several different camps, but 
the focus of German propaganda was the civilian internment camp at Abomey, the area’s main 
town. Konteradmiral Conrad Albrecht, commander of a torpedo boat flotilla in Flanders, wrote 
to the Reichskanzler in July 1917, almost three years after the capture of most of the civilians 
from Togo and Cameroon, asking him to use his influence to have these internees, who were 
now in France, transferred to neutral Switzerland.52 The grounds for this were the ‘inhuman 
treatment’ (unmenschlichen Behandlung) they had received during internment in Abomey, the 
adverse effects of the tropical climate and diseases, such as yellow fever, blackwater fever and 
typhus, and the flogging with ox-hide whips and application of thumbscrews along with other 
medieval tortures  used by ‘blacks’ on the prisoners.53  
The French camps in West Africa, like the British colonial camps, saw a lot of movement of 
prisoners through transfers. While it was common for German prisoners from the British 
colonies to be shipped around the global network laid out in this thesis, it was unheard of for 
civilians who were first interned in the United Kingdom to be sent on to Dominion or colonial 
camps.54 In the French system, however, before major German reprisals set in, some Germans 
(mainly combatant prisoners of war) were sent from mainland France to one of the many 
camps in Algeria and Morocco, although it is not clear if any of them were then sent on to 
Dahomey. This sparked some of the harshest and most deliberate reprisals from the German 
government. In response to the shipping of German prisoners to French North Africa and the 
continued internment of German civilians, the German government enacted the Rhineland 
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marsh reprisals. Around 400 French civilians55 were sent to work under extreme conditions in 
the Rhineland marshes. In response to this the French government took prompt action and 
shut down Dahomey, transporting the prisoners to Algeria and then on to mainland Europe.56 
These German reprisals were part of a larger set of reprisals undertaken by the German 
government in response to French transfers of prisoners to North Africa.57 In an attempt to 
force France to remove its German prisoners from North Africa, in 1916, Germany sent 30,000 
French prisoners of war to work in reprisal camps in German-occupied Russia.58 This had the 
desired effect and all German prisoners of war were evacuated from North Africa to France 
and then on to Switzerland within a year, further strengthening the German War Ministry’s 
belief that reprisals were effective.59 It was clear that in the first half of the war Germany had 
‘the whip hand’ when it came to enacting reprisals.60 
Dahomey was only in operation for two years, but its reputation in Germany as one of the 
harshest camps of the war lasted well into the 1920s. The German Red Cross reports on 
Dahomey and Abomey (based on ICRC reports and press cuttings) noted that physical 
punishments were being carried out on prisoners in the form of canings.61 The Berliner 
Illustrierte Zeitung from 4th July 1915 carried a painting of prisoners labouring with pick axes in 
Dahomey, while one man lay collapsed on the ground all under the gaze of indigenous guards 
and the African sun.62 The Frankfurter Zeitung from the previous month described the 
treatment of Germans in Dahomey as a ‘disgrace to the French Nation’.63 While British camps 
certainly came in for criticism in German propaganda for the use of black soldiers as guards, 
they never gained the same notoriety as the French-run camps. This was due to two factors. As 
Jones argued for the North African camps, the French camps in the colonies were explicitly 
organised to humiliate prisoners, to lower German prestige among indigenous populations. 
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Reprisals against British and French prisoners in Europe also had an effect on how the British 
treated their extra-European prisoners. It was one of the contributing factors in the evacuation 
of prisoners from camps in Borneo, Singapore and Hong Kong to Australia, a predominantly 
white colony where the charges of racial defilement could not be maintained by the 
Auswärtiges Amt. 64 Secondly, the racist propaganda based on the post-war French occupation 
of the Rhineland used the established cultural ‘colonial archive’ of the West African theatre. 
Theodor Seitz, writing in Der Tag in May 1920, drew upon the wartime takeover of Cameroon, 
where he claimed German women had been raped, murdered or used as slaves by black 
troops, as a warning as to what would happen in the French-occupied Rhineland.65  
The French camp network in the initial stages of the war was inter-connected with that of the 
British, through British agreements to transfer prisoners taken in German West Africa to the 
French. In the West African campaign, with both powers working together, this was only to be 
expected. From the archival evidence it does seem that there was some reluctance on the 
British side to hand over prisoners to the French. One can cite the pragmatic factors, of 
preferring to keep prisoners as bargaining chips and the other advantages that holding enemy 
captives offered, as being the grounds for this reluctance. There is also evidence, however, 
that the British perception of French internment was not too different from that of their 
German enemies. In a letter to the firm Messrs Soedecker and Meyer concerning property 
claims made by their employee in Togo, a Mr Pette, Major General Dobell (C in C British forces 
in West Africa and therefore in charge of the occupation of Lomé, Togo), threw out the 
complaints, but noted: ‘I may remind Mr Pette and other German prisoners of war in Lomé, 
that they have considerable cause for congratulation by reason of the fact, that they are 
permitted to reside where they are, and are not employed in road making in say - Upper 
Dahomey.’66   
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In the wake of the Rhineland marsh reprisals in 1916, the British refused to transfer any other 
colonial Germans to French camps in Africa. This caused some tension between the two Allies 
when a French request for black prisoners for labour regiments in Morocco was turned down 
by the Foreign Office.67 Britain had transferred German captives captured on the Western 
Front to French labour battalions but was very clear on how these prisoners were to be 
treated and where they were to be confined to work. Nonetheless, the German government 
threatened reprisals in the form of sending British prisoners to labour camps in German-
Occupied Russia.68 In April-May 1916, Germany sent 2,000 British prisoners, along with 30,000 
French, to the Eastern Front, to work in Courland (Latvia), in direct reprisal for alleged French 
maltreatment of German prisoners in North Africa.69 In light of this previous experience Britain 
was not prepared to transfer thousands of German and black prisoners to French Africa later in 
the war.70 In a similar vein, in late 1916 Britain refused French proposals for a uniform Allied 
reprisal ‘regime’. Britain did not trust that France (and Russia) were treating their captives well 
and did not want to be ‘tainted’ by association.71 
In addition to the request for transfers of black prisoners to Morocco, the French government 
asked the British for a further consignment of German prisoner labour to be transported to 
Réunion. Again the British steadfastly refused on the grounds that the Germans would surely 
react with reprisals against British captives with Lord Newton, Controller of the Foreign Office 
Prisoners of War Department, noting: ‘this proposal in view of the trouble the French have got 
us into over prisoners’ questions is perfectly preposterous.’ 72 H.B. Warner of the Foreign 
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Office Prisoners of War Department explained in a letter to the Army Council that Newton was 
‘strongly opposed to this proposal, as it would certainly lead to reprisals and that he thinks 
that Monsieur [Jules] Cambon should be so informed.’73 This protection of Britain’s own 
soldiers and British prisoners in German hands did not transfer into policy towards captured 
African carriers serving with the German forces, however, and the transfer and displacement 
of hundreds of thousands of carriers continued throughout the war. In addition, British African 
troops were sent across the African continent between the various theatres as need dictated, 
with troops from Nigeria and the Gold Coast fighting on both the Eastern and Western African 
Fronts, causing some discomfort to Smuts and others in the  South African government who 
feared the consequences of allowing black soldiers to fight against Europeans.  
After the war the French African camps maintained a higher profile in the German press than 
the British ones. In 1921 flyers (Flugblätter) were published under the title Französischer 
Sadismus: Szenen Sadistischer Verbrechen und Morde und ihre Opfer.74 This revived the 
accusations of barbaric treatment in France’s wartime camps in Africa, particularly through the 
use of thumbscrews and whips on prisoners; ‘Thumbscrews! Yes! The very same as used in the 
torture chambers of the Middle-Ages only slightly updated to be used as the latest colonial 
instrument of culture!’‘75 Abomey, according to the German propaganda of the 1920s, was the 
testing ground for brutal methods of internment that would be exported to French-occupied 
Germany. The flyers contended that France had combined some of the worst depravities of 
medieval Europe with African barbarism. The thumbscrews, once fastened onto a prisoner’s 
thumbs, were then linked to another prisoner’s thumbs through a chain from which hung a 
block of wood. The prisoners had to suspend the block in the air or risk receiving a beating 
from a black guard if it were to touch the ground. Karl Fischer in his memoirs cited one case 
where one German was led through Abomey while attached to the thumbscrews by two black 
guards, in a public humiliation.76 ICRC reports during the war were accompanied by sketches of 
the thumbscrews which were also reproduced in post-war propaganda. Although the ICRC 
never inspected Dahomey itself, it interviewed prisoners who had been transferred from there 
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to Casablanca and found them to be in ill health mainly from a lack of quinine while interned in 
West Africa and it confirmed that thumbscrews had been used on prisoners.77  
German propaganda on the French camps in Africa was translated into English, Spanish, French 
and Portuguese. Here again the ‘Schreckenslager Abomey’ (The horror camp Abomey) was 
singled out as the worst camp.78 However the German propaganda was contradictory in its 
dealing with racial humiliation. On the one hand it spoke of Africa as a place where a ‘never to 
be repaired disgrace [was] publicly in evidence which the white race by means of the 
shamelessly inflicted indignity on the Germans perpetrated before the eyes of the black.’79 On 
the other hand this was not a collective European shaming; the charge was aimed at merely 
the French: ‘The intuition of the Negro is as follows […] if the white Frenchmen treat their 
white brethren, the Germans, so badly - however may they treat only one of us […] all 
mistreatment of the French against us [German prisoners] failed completely in their design.’80 
More generally, contemporary comparisons between French and British colonial internment 
were firmly in Britain’s favour. Letters and reports from prisoners taken in Togo and Cameroon 
often cited their disappointment at having been handed over to the French and not having 
been repatriated by the British. One such example from two sisters wrote of their, and 278 
other Germans’, despair at being taken off their ship by a French officer (the day before setting 
sail for Europe and being sent to Dahomey).81 Paul Müller, a missionary and employee of the 
British firm F and A Swanzy, in Togo, reported that while the British did plunder Lomé, it was 
preferable to capture by the French. He went on to state that German officers would have 
never surrendered to the French forces, and if necessary would have fought to the last man.82 
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Whether this painting of Britain in a favourable light in comparison with the French had 
ulterior motives is difficult to say. It is however plain from the evidence that the Germans saw 
the British as the lesser of two evils. 
The Japanese internment regime, in contrast, stands apart from the other case studies in this 
chapter. Internment in Japan has been memorialized through one of the most curious 
historiographies of the war. If the Western Front had its legend of Christmas truce football 
matches, the East-Asian front has a legacy of cultural exchange that is still being celebrated in 
Japan today. From a cultural perspective the memory of German prisoners in Japan is stronger 
than in any other country and remains a focus of attention in Japanese popular histories. The 
emphasis in this historiography has been on the relatively good treatment of prisoners by the 
Japanese government. 83  There is a wealth of sources and historiography available on 
internment in Japan in the First World War. A small cottage industry has developed around the 
German prisoners held by Japan during the war, taken at Tsingtao, with anything from books, 
films, cartoons and comics to cakes and hot-dogs being associated with them. Of course the 
romanticised image of prisoners of war in Japanese popular literature does not necessarily 
match the reality, but there are more and more serious studies of the prisoners in wartime, 
appearing in Japan, with which to balance the picture out. In terms of this thesis, comparisons 
between Japanese internment of German prisoners of war and the treatment of their 
compatriots held in the British Empire do not seem, on the surface, to be very apposite. 
However, similar themes link the two cases as regards the disruption of racial hierarchies 
through captivity and the development of the camp system. Moreover, with Japan largely 
isolated from the global camp network and not involved in prisoner transfers, it provides us 
with a well-documented, entirely separate control study to compare with the more integrated 
global internment system run by Britain. It also offers us a different model of how an imperial 
power at war used camp systems for security. 
Japan’s involvement in the First World War began at the harbour town of Tsingtao (Qingdao) 
on the Shantung peninsula in China. Tsingtao was taken by the German Reich in 1897 in 
reparation for the murder of German missionaries in Shandong (the Juye incident). Once in 
control of the town the colonisers completely levelled it and rebuilt it along German lines, 
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from installing a sewage system to building modern German red-roofed houses.84  The 
development of Tsingtao was particularly galling for Japan, because Germany, as part of the 
Triple Intervention (with France and Russia) had directly intervened in the wake of the Sino-
Japanese War in 1895 and denied Japanese claims to territory in China. Riots also broke out in 
Tokyo in response to the Japanese feeling that they had again been denied the spoils of a 
successful war after defeating Russia and signing the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905.85 Japan 
entered the First World War in August 1914 determined not to be denied its just rewards for a 
third time.  
Although no British or Japanese territorial possessions were under immediate threat from the 
Germans in the Far East, Britain asked Japan to join the war to protect shipping routes in the 
Pacific. 86  The Japanese foreign minister, Kato Takaaki, realized that Japanese combat 
participation in the war and the taking of Tsingtao was a once-in-a-century opportunity for the 
Japanese to gain greater political influence in China, and Kato almost single-handedly brought 
Japan into the conflict.87 The Allies viewed Japan’s entry into the war with mixed opinions. 
While the British felt the Japanese would be very useful in helping relieve the strain on the 
Royal Navy by patrolling the Pacific, the growth of Japanese influence in East Asia was not as 
welcome. In the decade before 1914, Australia and New Zealand had been particularly 
concerned about the ‘Yellow Peril’, fearing a possible Japanese attack since the Japanese 
takeover of Formosa (Taiwan) in 1895, a threat that became more real with the destruction of 
the Russian fleet in Tsushima a decade later.88  
Kaiser Wilhelm II, ever mindful of the ‘Yellow Peril’, allegedly remarked to the Governor of 
Tsingtao Alfred von Meyer-Waldeck that, ‘to lose Tsingtao to the Japanese would shame 
Germany more than to lose Berlin to the Russians’, but the garrison simply did not possess the 
necessary man power to prevent this.89 The combined Japanese-British force that attacked 
Tsingtao under Japanese command vastly out-numbered the opposition. After the German 
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surrender, the Japanese gathered the 4,800 prisoners of war and arranged to bring them to 
Japan for incarceration. With particular historical irony the Germans were evacuated from 
Tsingtao on 14th November 1914, seventeen years to the day since they had first arrived 
there.90 The German prisoners of war would be in captivity in Japan from November 1914 up 
to their release in early 1921. 
The Japanese takeover of the Marshall and Caroline Islands in the Pacific, although agreed to 
by the Allied powers, caused further tension with Britain, the Dominions and the United 
States.91 In the takeover of the Islands in the North Pacific very few Germans were interned. 
From the available documents, it seems that only four Germans from the islands were added 
to the numbers of those taken from Tsingtao. Japan’s policy in the islands and its attitudes 
toward the indigenous population differed from those of Australia and New Zealand in New 
Guinea and Samoa respectively. Whereas the Australians cut back on education and focused 
on economic exploitation, the Japanese opened schools. The motives were far from altruistic, 
as the school system was designed to ‘civilise’ the islanders along Japanese lines and expand 
Japanese cultural imperialism.92 
Coupled with the handful of prisoners taken from the Pacific, the large number of prisoners 
from Tsingtao presented an administrative challenge to the Japanese authorities, and the 
initial treatment of captives was improvised.93 The round up and internment of the German 
and Austro-Hungarian prisoners in Tsingtao for transportation to Japan was harsh, with some 
of the prisoners having to sleep out in the open in a graveyard until eventually being afforded 
shelter with some local Chinese.94 However, Japan had conducted itself well in its treatment of 
prisoners of war during the Russo-Japanese War and some of the camps used to house the 
German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners had been used in 1904-05 as well.95 In the earlier 
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conflict, Russian officers had even been offered their release once they signed a parole 
promising not to take up arms against Japan again.96 Although no parole was offered to the 
German or Austro-Hungarian officers, they were allowed to keep their swords, a powerful 
symbol of martial spirit in Europe as well as Japan. Unlike the Russians, the Germans and 
Austro-Hungarians also received salaries and allowances comparable to their rank.97 In the 
initial stages of internment, Japan again followed the norms established by international law 
and as in the Russo-Japanese war it incorporated the articles of The Hague Convention into its 
guidelines on how to treat prisoners of war. Notably, prisoners of war were not forced to 
work.98 
The contemporary Allied consensus on the treatment of prisoners of war in Japan was that 
they were, if anything, being too well treated. The French War Ministry noted in a letter to the 
British that the Germans in Japan were enjoying ‘a certain level of freedom.’99 The German 
press published positive reports on the takeover of Tsingtao and the internment of the 
defeated German garrison. ‘Im ganzen haben sich die Japaner als sehr human bewiesen; wir 
könnten uns in dieser Hinsicht nicht beklagen. Auch die deutsche Kriegsgefangenen sind in 
Japan gut aufgehoben.’100 Foreign media based in Yokohama made many references to the 
lenient treatment of German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners and civilians. Reporting initially 
focused on the ‘most chivalrous courtesy’101 extended to prisoners by the Japanese. There 
was, however, a notable bitterness in articles in the pro-British Japan Times pertaining to 
prisoners of war. An article decrying the fact that the Japanese government was not 
adequately using the available prisoner labour force posed the question; ‘Does Japan want 
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sausages or roads?’102 Clearly the post-war ‘myth of comfortable internment’103 in Japan 
actually already existed amongst the Allied powers during the war and was a contributing 
factor to tensions between the British and the Japanese. In addition, the Japanese press was 
also critical of its own government’s good treatment of prisoners: the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi 
Shinbun complained of hospitality in excess of the standards set by international law being 
extended to German prisoners.104 
Austro-Hungarian officer Adalbert Freiherr von Kuhn’s reminiscences105 show the interactions 
in Japanese captivity between prisoners and their guards in a racial light. Published in 1931, 
von Kuhn was writing to dispel the myths created by those whose only knowledge about Japan 
came from reading Lafcadio Hearn or Pierre Loti and who imagined that prisoners in Japan had 
lived like emperors, in paper houses surrounded by geisha.106 He felt that the Japanese had 
considered the prisoners more like children than men. As long as they behaved themselves 
well they would be treated well. Although von Kuhn criticized others who held stereotypical 
views on ‘quaint’ Japan, his own opinions were equally prejudiced, coloured by the ‘Yellow 
Peril’ and what he saw as the emphasis on Bushido.107 Von Kuhn felt that the German and 
Austro-Hungarian officers, through their capture, had lost the respect of the Japanese soldiers 
and were merely to be treated as cattle.108  
Although very bitter at his perceived mistreatment, the only major complaints von Kuhn could 
make were in relation to the way the Japanese punished escape attempts.109 He even 
remarked on what a comfortable place Japan was to live in, with its climate, sea and 
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mountains. The only problem, according to von Kuhn, was that it was inhabited by the wrong 
race.110 However the brunt of his ill-will focused upon the British rather than the Japanese. 
Other writers transferred an image of the English as cowards fighting in the rear lines of the 
Allies in Flanders (with colonial troops to the front, then the Belgians, followed by the French 
with the British taking up the rear) to the siege of Tsingtao.111 British troops had taken little 
part in the siege, having only suffered thirteen dead. They were not involved in the major 
fighting, more due to the primacy of Japanese commanders than a lack of bravery on their 
part. However, the Germans saw this as an example of the British bullying Japanese soldiers to 
fight while they remained out of the action.112  
Like most other camps during the First World War, those in Japan were open to independent 
inspection by the neutral embassy of the prisoners’ protecting power and the International 
Committee of the Red Cross.113  The records of these inspections show disparities in treatment 
from camp to camp. As with the camp systems in Europe, there was no uniformity. The 
conditions a prisoner would have to endure depended on the luck of the draw when being 
assigned to a camp. Initially the prisoners were housed in improvised camps, mainly temple 
grounds or Red Cross buildings.114 Interestingly and importantly for cultural interaction, the 
camps were all located near large population centres. For example, before being moved thirty 
kilometres out of Tokyo to Narashino, 314 prisoners were held in the temple complex at 
Asakusa in the heart of the city.115 In contrast to their counterparts in Algeria, on arrival at 
Shinagawa train station in Tokyo the prisoners were greeted by throngs of people and handed 
yellow or white chrysanthemums as a welcome gift.116 As the war lengthened more permanent 
military-style barracks were constructed to house the prisoners, although this was not applied 
to every camp.117 German prisoners in Japan also never suffered from reprisals as there were 
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so few Japanese prisoners on the German side. They were relatively well treated and 
eventually repatriated, so reprisals were never seen as necessary for either state.118 The only 
punishments prisoners in Japan suffered were for insubordination, escapes or other actions 
that were within their own control. 
Moreover, Japan never interned German civilians, which helped to provide imprisoned 
German combatant prisoners of war with an extra supply of income and rations, through local 
support, in addition to the adequate rations allowed them by the Japanese government. 
Japan’s good treatment of German civilians was even known to prisoners in the British Empire 
colonies, as this complaint from prisoners in Pietermaritzburg highlights: ‘We understand that 
in Japan civilians are treated in every respect as is becoming to international law and passed 
usage [sic]. They are neither interned there nor are they severely restricted from carrying on 
their business and everyday life.’119  
The Japanese-run camps were more hermetically sealed from the world beyond Japan than 
were the camps in French West Africa. Few prisoners were repatriated to Germany and there 
were practically no prisoner exchanges. However, being released by Japan was no guarantee of 
freedom as six members of the German medical corps in Tsingtao, released by the Japanese 
and allowed to travel back to Germany via the United States, discovered. They were picked up 
en route to Germany by the British and interned at Knockaloe on the Isle of Man for possessing 
insufficient documentation.120 Clearly Japan and Britain were not communicating with one 
another in this case. All the same, this cutting off of prisoners from the global camp network 
kept prisoners safe from reprisals. Conversely, exclusion from the global camp network, cut 
the German prisoners in Japan off from opportunities for repatriation and kept their plight out 
of the public eye. The prisoners were not part of any tabled exchange agreements. The British 
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Foreign Office in the early stages of the war looked into the possibility of Japan offering up its 
prisoners in exchange for British prisoners held in Germany. The Auswärtiges Amt, contacting 
Britain through the ICRC, had also sought the possibility of exchanging captured British officers 
for Germans captured at Tsingtao, in particular Alfred Meyer-Waldeck. The Japanese, 
however, were unwilling to even discuss the possibility of exchanges, further highlighting 
Tokyo’s aloofness from the war in Europe.  
Overall, the fighting in East Asia in the 1914-1918 conflict was brief, ending in November 1914, 
but the diplomatic war continued well into the peace conference, with Japan clashing with 
China, and America, pushing German prisoners in Japan further into the diplomatic 
background. As Shinichi Yamamuro argues, Japan was more concerned with a future Pacific 
conflict with the United States than the current war in Europe.121 Japanese expansion into 
China and the Pacific threatened America’s influence in the Philippines. Paul Arendt, a former 
Kriegs Beamter in Samoa (who, as an official, was entitled to repatriation to Germany via the 
United States), was sent by New Zealand to Hawaii in 1916 where he spent the rest of the War. 
There he noted that the Americans were nervous about the influence of Japan on Hawaii and 
what it would mean for the future. Arendt, writing in 1920, added that during the war, the 
Japanese, ‘like most other Orientals’, were ‘Deutschfreundlich’.122 Although Japan and America 
worked together in the Siberian intervention in the Russian Civil War, they were 
uncomfortable allies with the US essentially intervening to prevent Japan from having a free 
hand.123 The First World War brought Britain closer to the United States and resulted in the 
deterioration of Anglo-Japanese relations, culminating in the end of the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance in 1923. 
The camp network that was established during the Great War was not the exclusive domain of 
the British. The German colonial empire had camps to mirror that of its rival, but these were 
temporary affairs and the nature of the campaign in East Africa meant that housing prisoners 
of war was difficult, with them often being merely disarmed and sent to Red Cross tents 
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instead of being interned. In Africa France, Belgium, Portugal, Italy and Spain were also 
involved in taking captives. France bore the brunt of the German propaganda campaign 
against internment in the colonies, with maltreatment in French internment seen as indicative 
of France having reneged on the European civilising mission. It also carried on into the inter-
war years, when anti-French propaganda linked internment in French West Africa with the 
occupation of the Rhine. Belgium’s involvement in the war in the colonies also provided a 
counter-foil to the image of innocent Belgium that was so often put forward by the Allied 
powers. Japan then was the exception: the contemporary image of treatment there was 
favourable and continued into the post-war period. This positive image of Japan’s internment 
of its German captives has been absorbed into contemporary popular portrayals in Japan of its 
First World War experience. If one were to assess where British internment would rank in a 
table of humane treatment, then it would be somewhere between Japan and France. Britain’s 
reprisals against German prisoners in the colonies were not as harsh as the French ones but 
there certainly was not the same positive image of Britain in Germany as there was for the 
Japanese.  
France, like Belgium and Portugal, the other belligerents allied with Britain involved in fighting 
in the German colonies, integrated its internment system and policies into the overall global 
camp network. In the takeover of Togo and Cameroon, France and Britain worked quite closely 
together, with prisoners being handed over to either side. Mainly the French received 
prisoners of war from the British, while the French handed over civilians to Britain, although 
this was not always the case. The war in Europe, as in the British case, directly affected French 
treatment of prisoners in West Africa. Pressure through German reprisals against French 
civilians and combatant prisoners of war forced France to revise its policies on internment in 
Africa. This eventually led to the closing down of civilian and prisoner of war camps in 
Dahomey and the shipping of civilian internees to mainland France and on to neutral 
internment in Switzerland. While more research needs to be done on prisoners of war in 
French North Africa, prisoners there were kept in tough conditions, and had mainly been 
captured on the Western Front, thus representing a reverse Europe-to-colonies exchange, 
which differs from the pattern of direction of transfer we have become accustomed to 
throughout this thesis.  
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Britain viewed French internment in Africa negatively, as seen through its eventual refusal to 
hand over prisoners from Togo and Cameroon to the French, even advising German civilian 
women to choose repatriation over joining their husbands in Abomey. The knowledge of what 
conditions were like in French West Africa also dissuaded the British from transferring 
prisoners captured in East Africa across the continent. Whether this was for prestige reasons 
or due to fear of reprisal is difficult to tell. However, once Britain and France had agreed on 
their spheres of influence with France staying out of the conflict in East Africa and Britain 
giving up its influence in German West Africa,124 the British showed no more concern for 
German prisoners under French influence and distanced themselves from French treatment of 
captives.  
Japanese internment practices illustrated Japan’s aspirations to ‘civilised’ Great Power 
status.125 Japan played a peripheral part in the fighting, limiting itself militarily to taking over 
Tsingtao and the German islands north of the equator, although the Japanese navy did send 
some ships to the Mediterranean.126  The treatment of prisoners of war in Japan was 
comparatively excellent. There were a few cases of maltreatment but on the whole nothing 
comparable to Dahomey, or even Australia. On the surface prisoners in Japan should have 
been satisfied with their lot, however, this isolation from the global camp network meant that 
there was no chance of repatriation. The overall positive reports of Japanese treatment of 
prisoners of war in the European and German press meant that the German government never 
seriously lobbied for their return. Japan’s refusal to allow Germans in their captivity to be 
exchanged for British prisoners in Germany kept prisoners in Japan out of the, albeit largely 
unsuccessful, negotiations on prisoner exchanges.  
Prisoners of war from Tsingtao are certainly the most well studied case of prisoners from the 
former German colonies; they were also the most isolated. Their role in this thesis is as that of 
a control experiment to highlight how treatment of prisoners could be handled when kept 
separate from the larger conflict. Japan was unsure where its loyalties lay in the First World 
War, and given the minuscule number of Japanese prisoners in Germany there was not much 
public pressure on the Japanese government to act on their behalf. Anti-German feeling in 
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Japan was nowhere near as severe as it was in other belligerent countries, and in turn, the 
prisoners focused their ire not on their captors but on their captor’s ally, Britain. Japan 
followed the Hague regulations closely and ultimately Japan had nothing to gain out of 
mistreating its prisoners of war. Rather, through the good treatment of prisoners, it could 
ensure cordial post-war relations with Germany and also maintain the image of Japan as a 
‘civilised’ nation on a par with the other Great Powers while also finding favour with neutral 
countries. 
Prisoners from West Africa who had been sent to Dahomey were, after a large public outcry in 
Germany and reprisals against French prisoners, transferred to Switzerland for internment. 
After suffering forced marches and the harsh climate of West Africa, it was deemed humane 
by the German government that they be sent to Switzerland to join other civilian internees 
whom the Swiss were keeping for the duration of the war. The French, under pressure from 
the German reprisals against their own civilians, agreed.127 Prisoners of war from Tsingtao 
perhaps enjoyed the most lengthy but stable time in internment of all the extra-European 
prisoners. The post-armistice years in captivity in Japan were similar here to other camps 
around the world, although without the threat of rioting. The years of waiting for ships to 
come and take them home made the prisoners very disconsolate: as the Red Cross inspector 
Dr Fritz Paravicini noted, they felt themselves forgotten at the edge of the world.128 However, 
as with Dahomey the legacy of Bando continued on well beyond the Armistice, although in a 
different way. Bando was revived in the 1970s, with the establishment of the Doitsu-Haus 
Naruto museum by the Japanese state, as an example of cross-cultural and transnational 
exchange in a period untainted by the horrors of the Second World War. 
In Africa, Germany, France and Britain were not the only colonial powers with a stake in the 
outcome of the Great War in Europe. Portugal and Belgium also used the war to lay their 
claims to German colonial territory in what was essentially a second scramble for Africa. Spain, 
although neutral, hoped to make use of the situation to export a labour force from Cameroon 
to the Spanish island of Fernando Po. In the Pacific, the Japanese and British Empires clashed 
over control of Germany’s islands. The repatriation of German prisoners from these contested 
spaces was a huge logistical undertaking and will be the subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter Seven: Repatriation and the Inter-War Years 
 
The signing of the Armistice on 11th November 1918 marked the end of the hostilities between 
Germany and the Allies but logistically there was much to be done. Indeed November 1918 
does not mark the beginning or the end point of the repatriation story, to which our attention 
now turns. Examining the camp network as outlined in chapter two, we will analyse how the 
British closed down the camp system across the Empire and how the prisoners and internees 
were repatriated. Most of the final decisions regarding repatriation were made by the War 
Cabinet, but the Foreign Office was the main party behind the planning.  
Repatriation had in fact occurred during the conflict and was not something that had to be 
developed from scratch after the ceasefire. As Jean-Jacques Becker noted, ‘diplomacy never 
ceased to matter during the First World War,’1 and there were frequent attempts, either 
through the Red Cross or via neutral governments such as Sweden, to get the belligerent 
Powers together to discuss repatriation. Lord Newton, as head of the Prisoner of War 
Department, spent a considerable amount of time abroad at repatriation meetings. However, 
the changing nature of this diplomacy during the conflict meant that negotiations over 
repatriation were long drawn out and frequently came to nothing. This chapter will sketch out 
the process of repatriation during the war and the post-Armistice period. It also looks at how 
access to the extra-European world became more restricted for Germans and other ‘enemy 
aliens’ into the 1920s as well as at ideas of colonial irredentism in inter-war Germany.2  
Of course German prisoners of war and civilian internees from the extra-European theatre of 
the war made up only a small percentage of the overall number of prisoners to be repatriated. 
Reinhard Nachtigal estimated a number of around 1.5 million prisoners that had to be sent 
home from the Western Front, with around 740,000 Germans captured by the Allies.3 The 
victorious Allies were naturally keen to secure the return of their 770,000 or so soldiers first 
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 ‘Enemy Aliens’ became the preferred term to use when referring to Germans and Austrians; the term 
foreigner was too broad, and something more specific but not explicitly referencing the Central Powers 
needed to be applied. TNA, CO323/809, 44829, War Cabinet memorandum, August 1919, ‘Exclusion of 
Germans from British Colonies and Protectorates’ 27
th
 June 1919. For in depth discussion on Enemy 
Aliens in Britain see Bird, Control of Enemy Aliens in Great Britain. 
3
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before turning their attention to sending home prisoners from the Central Powers. Nachtigal 
also gives a figure of 300,000 prisoners of war in the Near East, the African Colonies and Asia. 
The majority of these were Ottoman prisoners held in French or British hands.4 This thesis 
began by stating a number of around 25,000 Germans living in the Reich colonies before the 
war, with an estimated 20,000 having spent time in Allied captivity. However, the fluid and 
sometimes temporary nature of captivity, coupled with various wartime repatriations, makes it 
difficult to say with certainty how many of these people were left in captivity at the end of the 
war. The cross-border internment of civilians from German South-West Africa in South Africa, 
for example, and the various attempts to repatriate them, either back to German South-West 
Africa, to Germany or by shipping of prisoners to Australia, complicates the tracking of these 
prisoners. If one includes those prisoners taken from Tsingtao, whose number stayed constant 
during the war, then one can hazard an estimate of 15,000 prisoners from the former Reich 
colonies still in captivity globally at the Armistice.5    
The repatriation process was on-going and it was the constant desire of the British War, 
Foreign and Colonial Offices from very early in the war that all extra-European German 
prisoners should be returned ‘home’, leaving room for the British to expand their influence 
and secure their new and old colonies. Most of the civilian prisoners from Togo and Cameroon 
were sent back to Germany in early 1915.6 However, policy changed that year and repatriation 
became much more problematic. Disagreements between Britain and Germany over 
exchanges of civilians, invalids and men above military age meant that many people who 
otherwise would have been sent home had to spend the war under curfew or behind barbed 
wire.7 Prisoner policy continually evolved throughout the war and only really began to reach an 
established structure towards the end of 1918, with the decision to send prisoners in the 
British Empire to the final holding destination of Australia. However, before the escalation of 
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unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917 there had been extensive repatriation, especially of 
civilians.8 
During the war there were extensive, if not altogether successful, talks on prisoner repatriation. 
Offers of parole, i.e. freedom to leave the camp, for captive officers were still in evidence in 
the colonies, and some were repatriated after giving their parole, as in the case of Eduard 
Haber discussed in chapter two. There were numerous petitions and appeals for exchanges 
sent to the Foreign Office or directly to some of its staff. While there were individual 
exchanges for consular officials and retired officers, the institution of man for man exchanges 
was not going to be the norm in the First World War.9 Edwin Williams, a released British 
prisoner from Ruhleben, the civilian internment camp in Berlin, claimed that one of the camp 
officials, a Herr von Kessler, treated prisoners badly because his son was interned by the British 
in Ceylon. Proposals to exchange von Kessler’s son with a British prisoner in Germany were 
rejected as, according to Horace Rumbold of the Foreign Office Prisoners Department, ‘we 
have absolutely set our faces against individual exchange.’ Moreover in von Kessler’s case 
Rumbold felt the British would be ‘bribing the father to carry out his duties in a manner in 
which he ought to carry them out anyhow.’10  Similarly, Dr Walther Sulzbach, held in 
Ahmednagar, had appeals on his behalf from a friend in Germany for an exchange or, at least, 
a transfer to the more suitable climate of Britain turned down. As the India Office argued, 
‘personal convenience of the prisoner appears to be the only grounds urged for his transfer to 
a place of internment in England. We have refused similar applications made to us by prisoners 
of war at Ahmednagar and consider it undesirable to make [an] exception in this case.’11  
Personal ties in Britain did not usually help one get out of internment either.12 In one situation 
Lord Newton received a request from an old family friend, Lady Courtney, that some friends of 
hers, Germans who were interned in the Belgian Congo, be transferred to internment in Britain. 
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He noted in his reply that it was no wonder in view of ‘German precedings [sic] that they 
should object to being handed over to the Belgian government’, but they were prisoners of the 
Belgians and would remain so.13  
While the Foreign Office was keen to get any British civilians, notably those in Belgium, out of 
German hands and repatriated, shipping restrictions caused problems when it came to 
exchanges. Moreover, public perception of repatriation during the war was mixed. While 
newspaper articles at once decried the perceived bad treatment of British people in German 
hands and complained of the good treatment afforded Germans in Britain, the British 
government was still unwilling to agree to demands for exchanges. In a war that required the 
total and equitable mobilisation of society, exchanges could cause problems for the public war 
effort as, according to Rumbold; ‘Only those who could command sufficient influence could 
bring about individual exchanges.’ This would disadvantage those prisoners who were ‘poor 
and unknown people whose cases might be ever so much more deserving than those of the 
better classes.'14 In any event, Britain, with its greater number of civilian internees, held all the 
cards, although negotiations over repatriation almost always broke down over German 
demands for full exchange i.e. the repatriation of all civilians, as opposed to Britain’s proposed 
exchange quotas which would have left Britain with a surplus of prisoners.15 
The repatriation of civilians from Cameroon and Togo fitted the ideal strategy for how the 
British wanted to deal with their internees. With some exceptions (internees who were 
handed over to the French, some missionaries who were allowed to move to the Gold Coast, 
or the handful of Germans who were allowed to remain in Lomé),16 all Germans were swiftly 
removed from Togo and Cameroon early in the war. The combatant prisoners and male 
civilians of military age were kept in Britain itself, mainly on the Isle of Man or at the officer 
camp at Lofthouse Park. Here we will look at the conditions on board transports.  
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On the fall of Duala, as discussed in chapter five, all German civilians were ordered to assemble 
at the hospital, ostensibly for registration, but in reality for deportation which soon followed.17 
This was similar to the takeover of Lomé and Luderitzbucht (German South-West Africa), 
although civilians from Luderitzbucht were only brought as far as South Africa and then 
allowed to return home. In Duala, conditions on the transport SS Obuassi were deemed by 
General Dobell to be more than adequate and he considered that complaints about the rations, 
treatment and ships quarters were coming merely from a disaffected minority.18  Yet reports 
from the military headquarters in Sierra Leone were more in line with the German prisoners’ 
complaints. Major General J.F. Daniel, commanding troops in West Africa, wrote; ‘I think, 
however, it is my duty to point out that the ship, [Obuassi] as she is now, is in my opinion quite 
unfitted to convey so many men, women and children to England at this time of year; and 
could not be made fit without extensive alteration.’19 Daniel, who was in charge of providing 
guards for the ship, filed this report at his own initiative and strongly recommended that, ‘if 
the SS Obuassi is to be sent out again to remove the prisoners from Sierra Leone20 she may be 
properly fitted out first. In such an event it is essential that she be provided with a stock of 
warm clothing and great coats, as the prisoners here only have tropical clothing and the 
resources of the colony are inadequate to provide what is needed.’21 
The paramount strategic objective for the British in fighting in the colonies was securing British 
military lines of communication and disrupting German ones. Prisoners of war were to be 
interned, and civilians were all ear-marked for repatriation to Germany. In the Cameroon 
campaign this was roughly how events transpired, although with some vocal complaints about 
the harsh manner in which German civilians were turned out of their homes and packed on 
transport ships for Europe with inadequate living quarters. In India, the camps at Belgaum and 
Ahmednagar were to be only temporary accommodations, with the view being that all civilians 
would be sent back to Germany before the conflict was resolved. However, with the sinking of 
the Lusitania, shipping shortages due to unrestricted submarine warfare and resources being 
directed toward Europe, and the lengthening of the war in East Africa this policy changed. 
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Most importantly the British government decided on 13th May 1915, about one week after the 
Lusitania sinking to intern all German males of military age as ‘in existing circumstances, prima 
facie, all adult males of this class [German males of military age] should, for their own safety, 
and that of the community, be segregated and interned, or, if over military age, repatriated.’22  
Prioritising shipping lines for military and naval transports meant that the Admiralty was not 
just restrictive on shipping; it banned all passage through the Suez Canal, especially for ships 
containing enemy subjects, leading to the suspension of repatriation of German prisoners from 
India.23 German unrestricted submarine warfare also limited British ability to repatriate 
prisoners.24 In 1916 a letter from the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministry argued that in 
evacuating female prisoners the British would be ‘responsible for the lives and well-being of 
these passengers, the majority of whom are a better class of people, who are being forcibly 
repatriated in wartime and against the will of their husbands and fathers’. The Austro-
Hungarians also complained about the use of third- and second-class berths for their civilian 
returnees. In response to the letter the British government pointed out that as German U-
Boats were the sole danger involved in repatriation, the Austrian government would be best 
advised to ask Berlin to guarantee safe passage. Horace Rumbold responded to the ‘impudent 
note’ by writing; ‘I am at a loss to know why “better class” people should be thought more 
entitled to protection from submarine attack than any other non-combatants […] the only 
danger to them is the one for which the Austro-Hungarian and German governments are 
responsible’.25 Britain did not intend to intern Germans in India in the long-term, however, 
limits on, and dangers to the shipping of prisoners influenced its decision making.  
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More importantly from a British Foreign Office perspective, the argument against repatriating 
prisoners also centred on the British population who were abroad. How would it look, 
commented one Foreign Office official, if they spent a great deal of resources on ensuring the 
safe transport of German civilians from India to the Netherlands while at the same time 
banning mothers and children who were in Australia from returning to the United Kingdom 
while the war was on?26 This notion was succinctly put by the same official in November 1917; 
‘It is to my mind an intolerable thing, even for the sake of getting rid of these Germans out of 
our colonies, that we should give them safe-conduct back to their country so that they are free 
from the attacks of the German submarines, whilst our women and children are either obliged 
to remain abroad or have to face the perils of the submarine campaign […] it is not right that 
we should accord to our enemies facilities which we are unable to accord our own people.’27 
The sinking of the Lusitania also signified a change in the attitude towards prisoners and 
internees in the Pacific. It was not only submarine warfare that brought the reality of war 
home to Australia and New Zealand: the sinking coincided with initial reports of the disaster at 
Gallipoli and the publication of the Bryce report which highlighted alleged German atrocities.28 
In Australia and New Zealand, this bred a more vehement form of anti-German patriotism that 
not only caused logistical problems, such as the refusal of crews to man ships carrying German 
prisoners or internees, but also initiated calls for the mass internment of all Germans, denying 
those who could have independently left the countries the means to do so.29 This new stance 
created tension, for example, between the public and the New Zealand government, whose 
willingness to stick to the centralised rules on prisoner treatment enacted from London was 
seen as too lax. 
Discussions over the repatriation of prisoners continued until after the end of the war but hit a 
number of problems. German protests over the treatment of its U-Boat crews in 1915, and as 
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Heather Jones as shown, the use of forced labour were particularly thorny issues that 
disrupted negotiation.30 In repatriation discussions, German civilian internees from the East 
African theatre, as well as all civilian internees outside Europe were considered by the British 
as a separate entity from those civilians held in the British Isles. Plans were enacted, although 
never completed, in July 1918 to have all civilian internees either in India, Hong Kong or 
Singapore, sent to Australia where they were to remain under the supervision of the Australian 
government.31 However, in reality, the Dominions and the India Office always followed the 
Foreign Office’s guidance on prisoner treatment, leading to some protests in the local press in 
New Zealand and South Africa. 
On 15th December 1915, Otto Gleim of the RKA sent a detailed report to General Ludendorff 
outlining its position on proposals to extend repatriation agreements between Germany and 
Britain for the exchange of women, children and other non-combatants in Europe, to the 
German colonies and German-occupied Europe. This was in preparation for the meetings 
between the two belligerents at The Hague the following summer. The report focused on each 
of the colonies in turn and came to the conclusion that any proposed exchanges should only 
count for civilians from the territory of German East Africa. ‘Conditions have developed to the 
contrary where it is now only the release of women and children from German East Africa that 
is in question.’32 This brought the civilians of German East Africa into a bartering game 
between the German and British governments with regard to exchanging them for British 
civilians in occupied Belgium. But why would Germany omit the chance for exchanges of 
civilians from its other colonies? 
Gleim’s report presented the case for excluding the other colonies as follows: first, repatriation 
of civilians from German South-West Africa went against German interests in the colony. 
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Although initially many German civilians had been interned in South Africa or repatriated, by 
1915 with the end of the fighting in the colony most of those interned were released and 
allowed back to their farms and businesses. According to the terms of capitulation almost all 
the civilians in German South-West Africa were not interned. The only prisoners present in the 
colony itself were the military prisoners of war at Aus and Okanjande although there were 
some civilian prisoners from German South-West Africa interned in Pietermaritzburg and Natal, 
but most including the ex-Governor Theodor Seitz remained on parole in Luderitzbucht and 
elsewhere in the colony. It would not help the German case in potential post-war discussions 
over retention of colonies if there were no Germans present. This logic is also present in the 
argument for excluding New Guinea from any agreements. New Guinea was a similar case to 
German South-West Africa, the terms of capitulation being almost identical.  
In Togo and Cameroon, Gleim noted, there were no German civilians present by late 1915. The 
English and French, according to the RKA had ‘evacuated all German settlers ruthlessly and in 
violation of international law‘33 Nonetheless, the question of repatriation was not applicable 
here as practically all German civilians had been repatriated and the military combatants were 
interned in the United Kingdom thus coming under separate exchange agreements. 
In Samoa, the RKA found that all German plantations had been closed down and all Germans 
were now in New Zealand (although, in fact quite a few Germans remained in the former 
colony). As with civilians from New Guinea, and German South-West Africa, the RKA argued 
that civilians in internment in New Zealand were technically free to return home whenever 
they pleased. This argument was erroneous, and even if civilian internees in Australia and New 
Zealand had been free to leave their camps and return to Germany, how they were going to 
find and pay for transportation would have been a major problem. The RKA also added that 
those interned in Australia, South Africa and New Zealand came under the exchange 
agreement of 1915 covering civilians held in Britain at the outset of the war, as they were 
being held on British soil.34 This was argued by former Governor Erich Schultz in relation to his 
internment and handling in New Zealand. As Britain was in charge of a centralised prison camp 
system and New Zealand had no direct relations with Germany, Schultz claimed that he was 
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essentially in prison on British territory and therefore entitled to the same treatment as those 
prisoners in Britain itself. Unfortunately for Schultz, the British disagreed and, due to a lack of 
exchange agreements, ensured that he stayed interned until the end of the war.35 
As the RKA believed that civilians from German South-West Africa, New Guinea and Samoa 
were technically free to go home whenever they wanted (although the reality was quite 
different) and those from Togo and Cameroon were already in Germany it only remained for 
the German East Africans to be dealt with. The RKA report urged General Ludendorff (perhaps 
showing the extent to which Ludendorff was the war leader at this point) to argue that the 
same conditions, i.e. freedom to return to Germany, be given to civilians from German East 
Africa. This would mean that there would be no exchange, rather just a release of German 
civilian internees in German East Africa, while Germany held onto its British civilians in Belgium 
and other occupied territory. The RKA did recognise the difficulty in the fact that war was still 
being waged in German East Africa, but attempted to argue that the same rules of exchange 
should apply to all German colonies. In the conclusion of their report they went as far as to 
argue that reprisals would be used to force Britain to release prisoners in German East Africa; 
‘as far as the unlawful internment of German women and children in East Africa is concerned it 
is not comparable to the internment of civilians in Belgium, but if necessary reprisals will be 
enacted to bring the British into line with the principles of international law and humane 
treatment.’36 It appears from this report that the RKA wished to disconnect the colonies from 
the war in Europe while the British wanted to use internees from German East Africa to gain 
concessions for British civilians in Belgium. This had negative consequences for German 
civilians in internment in places such as Belgaum, Entebbe and Blantyre as the breakdown in 
exchange negotiations not only prolonged civilian internment but also led the British to look to 
other parts of its empire to send their prisoners. The planned destination for prisoners was to 
be Australia, where the prisoners’ presence was not seen as a threat to internal security, unlike 
in the other colonies.   
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Internment in Australia, as outlined in Gerhard Fischer’s comprehensive study on the subject, 
began with the outbreak of the war. Germans living in Australia were almost immediately 
rounded up and sent to civilian camps, the largest being Liverpool in New South Wales. As 
highlighted in earlier chapters, these internees were then joined by Germans from New Guinea. 
While not all Germans in New Guinea were evacuated to Australia at the beginning of the war, 
the vast majority were.37 As the war dragged on, more and more New Guinea Germans were 
brought to the Australian mainland. Long after the Armistice, in 1923, the Australian 
government removed the last of the German settlers from New Guinea. Fear of the influence 
of Sinn Féin and Bolshevism among soldiers in Australia forced the government of Australia to 
seek outlets for those returning from the battlefields of Europe. This was in part influenced by 
the free passage scheme for British ex-service men and women that was in operation between 
1919 and 1922.38 As Kent Fedorowich argues, although the war had halted imperial migration 
from Britain, it subsequently presented Imperial policy makers with a chance to reinvigorate 
the British Empire.39 This emigration was one of the reasons Fedorowich puts forward for the 
lack of extremism in British politics during the interwar years. Disgruntled servicemen would 
find their wanderlust after the experience of the battlefields in France satisfied in forging a 
living in a new land.40 This also meant that there would be no room for former German colonial 
settlers in this grand scheme. 
By 1918, Australia was to be the ultimate destination for all remaining colonial German civilian 
internees and prisoners of war.41 The Singapore mutiny in 1915 seemed to confirm British 
fears of the negative influence that German prisoners could have on a population whose 
loyalty was uncertain. However, retrospective investigations into the mutiny showed that, 
while some German prisoners took advantage of the unrest to escape, they were far from 
being the main instigators. Rebellion in Singapore was influenced more by the unrest of mainly 
Muslim Indian soldiers who were under the misguided impression that German prisoners of 
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war would immediately join them once they were freed from their camps. Although the role of 
Germans as a fifth column menace was overplayed, the Colonial Office decided it would be 
wise to have all the prisoners (especially those from German East Africa) sent to Australia. 42 
The Singapore German prisoners, mainly from the Emden, were sent to New South Wales, 
where they remained for the rest of the war in officers’ camps.43 In December 1918, a public 
meeting in Singapore resolved to petition the British government ‘that for the safeguarding of 
the decencies of life and preserving good order and government, no German subject should 
for at least ten years after the declaration of peace be allowed to land, reside or trade within 
the Colony of the Straits Settlements or the Federated Malay States.’44 A similar petition was 
signed at a mass meeting at Natal, South Africa, in January 1919, where a motion was passed 
that ‘for the peace of the world and for the safety of the British Empire and the welfare of the 
native races, none of Germany’s former colonial possessions should be restored to her and 
that all German and other enemy residents therein should be repatriated.’45 
After receiving complaints from civilian internees who were housed on Stone Cutter’s island in 
Hong Kong, the Foreign Office decided that it would be best also to send these prisoners to 
Australia. Sending prisoners to Australia would serve two purposes: Australia was due to its 
large white population seen as somewhere where Europeans could live healthy lives, therefore 
removing any German grounds for complaints about its climate conditions. Secondly, as 
Fischer argued, it provided a good opportunity for Britain to shore up colonial holdings and 
remove any German commercial competition from the colonies.46 Internment in Australia of 
Germans who were living there during the war and of later arrivals contributed to the 
upholding of the ideological legitimation for Australia fighting in Europe and created a 
concrete experience of war on the home-front.47 However, the prisoners from Hong Kong 
likened their experience of being shipped to Australia to that of eighteenth-century convicts. 
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‘The notion of “transportation” became a powerful means to interpret their experience in 
Australia.’48 
There were, however, complicated talks between the powers during the war over the issue of 
possible internment in neutral countries. Although, as we have seen, the former Governor 
Schultz pressured the British government for a transfer to Fiji, he was denied. The main 
countries designated for neutral internment were the Netherlands and Switzerland. 
The role that the International Committee of the Red Cross played in the treatment of 
prisoners has already been discussed. In line with its work in inspecting camps and helping 
prisoners get in touch with family and friends, it lobbied for exchange agreements. The most 
notable such agreement was that reached at The Hague in July 1917 between Britain and 
Germany to recognise ‘barbed wire disease’ and civilian and military prisoners’ eligibility for 
internment in camps in neutral Switzerland.49 However, the first bilateral exchanges of 
prisoners were arranged in 1917 through efforts made by the Dutch and Swiss governments 
and not the ICRC. It was not a smooth process and there were never any conclusive 
agreements regarding who qualified for internment in neutral countries.  
In March 1918 the debate on repatriation was still unresolved but arguments in favour were 
prevailing, especially once a proposed exchange had been worked out with Germany for 
British subjects in Belgium and France to be swapped for German East Africans. The problem 
remained that ‘if the arrangement is adopted the Colonial Office will be subjected to very great 
pressure to remove the ban which at present exists against British women and children 
crossing dangerous waters.’50 Ship space was limited and reserving space for German civilians 
would naturally prevent British women and children taking spaces should they be allowed to 
travel. In addition, there was a natural reluctance to expose British nationals to the dangers of 
sea travel during the U-Boat campaign. Of secondary concern was that German civilians would 
gain an insight into the workings of the convoy system, but such information was ‘no doubt 
obtained from crews of neutral ships which join with the convoy.’51 
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There was also the question of what ships to use. The Germans in negotiations were willing to 
foot the bill for chartering neutral Dutch vessels for the purpose, an offer which was refused 
on prestige grounds and connected to the travel ban on British subjects. There was also a 
problem with getting British crews. Australian crews had almost mutinied in Perth, and refused 
to board ships containing German civilians for repatriation. While the case of the Australian 
crews did not completely prevent repatriation, it did highlight a hostile public mood.52 
As Heather Jones argued in the case of German prisoners in France, even after the war the 
image of the German prisoner remained an inherently dangerous figure – ‘a potential 
perpetrator of violence.’53 In a different context, prisoners from the colonies were seen as an 
inherent destabilising factor in the re-establishment of British authority overseas. The idea that 
‘enemy aliens’ in India or the new Mandates would damage the prestige held by the British 
among indigenous populations through the mixed message of their return after having been 
thrown out of the colonies or through their potential to foment revolt themselves was widely 
held in the Colonial and Foreign Offices.  
The absence of the controlling influence of colonial settlers, especially of missionaries certainly 
worried the British, but not to the extent that they retained German missionaries in the former 
German colonies.54 After the expulsion of German missionaries in East Africa it was necessary 
to quickly replace them with trusted Allied ones in order to ‘spike the potential for false 
prophets’ and to introduce benevolent agencies to disprove German propaganda that claimed 
the British were merely ‘malicious militants’.55 Any breakdown in Christian practices through 
the expulsion of missionaries would have dire consequences according to Bishop Neville of 
Zanzibar: ‘withdraw the missionaries and you withdraw the champions of order, law and 
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civilisation, you undo the good work of half a century, and return the native to his primitive 
barbarism.’56 In Cameroon there were reversions to ‘witchcraft’ and other tribal practices.57 
The racially prejudiced attitude toward indigenous converts to Christianity was bluntly 
summed up in a report on German East Africa in 1916: Indigenous converts were ‘cunning and 
deceitful to a degree seldom realised […] but should their white masters be removed they 
become harmless and a danger to themselves for it is only as a carrier they excel and not as a 
collector of information.’58 However, to establish stability and control in the newly taken-over 
colonies it was essential to win the indigenous population over to the British side while 
maintaining colonial social structures.59 In January 1919, the British administrator of German 
East Africa, H.A. Byatt, requested the Colonial Office to retrieve the skull of Sultan Mkwawa 
from the Berlin Museum as ‘this action would give the widest satisfaction to the Wahehe tribe 
and afford tangible proof in the eyes of the natives that German power has been completely 
broken.’60 Consolidating power in the former German colonies after the war was important for 
the British and to do this it was necessary to show that Germany had been defeated and would 
not be returning to reclaim its colonies. 
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At the Paris peace conference there remained some faint hopes that the Allies would allow 
Germany to retain its former possessions. The Beti chiefs from Cameroon, led by Karl Atangana, 
even lobbied King Alfonso XIII of Spain for support for this idea.61 However, and despite the 
King’s delusions of grandeur, Alfonso was not a decision maker at Paris and none of the 
victorious powers were keen to give up possessions they had won through bloodshed. The 
only positive note for Germany was that German civilians in German South-West Africa 
remained relatively unmolested. Japan’s insistence at the Paris Peace Conference on retaining 
Tsingtao and the Kiaochow Concession, caused serious problems but secret Allied agreements 
made during the war to give Japan control of the area had to be honoured. Japan retained 
control of most of the Shandong peninsula, eventually ceding control of it not to Germany but 
to China. German East Africa was under the control of the British, who had bargained with the 
French and allowed Paris to control the former German West African colonies; this status quo 
was effectively approved by the Paris Peace Conference.62 New Guinea and Samoa were to be 
kept out of German hands and any non-Australian or non-New Zealander emigration to these 
colonies was controlled. For policy makers it was clear that German settlers could not be 
allowed to return to their plantations but would be shipped to Germany. 
After the Armistice most extra-European prisoners returned to Germany via Rotterdam with a 
stop-off in Britain. Dealing with the disembarkation of prisoners in the Netherlands caused 
some problems between the Dutch and British governments. The Netherlands had remained 
neutral throughout the war and indeed many of the ships that transported German prisoners 
home were neutral Dutch vessels. Tensions had arisen between Britain and the Netherlands, 
(as well as with many other neutral countries) over British naval arrests of German citizens on 
board Dutch vessels. On arrival at Rotterdam each returning German prisoner and his/her 
possessions were searched by British naval officials. The Dutch in complaints to the Foreign 
Office objected to this practice, as it was a contravention of the Netherlands’s status as a 
sovereign power.63 Under pressure from the Dutch government Britain ceased this search 
policy, entrusting it to the Dutch, but it meant that more rigorous searches of prisoners were 
                                               
61
 Quinn, In Search of Salt, p. 76. 
62
 Orosz, German and French Cameroon 1885-1939, pp. 193-194. 
63
 It also had the effect of lowering British prestige with the Dutch. The main culprit was a Captain 
Crossman who was responsible for ‘treatment unworthy of human beings’. Captain Crossman 
apparently would not allow drinking water on the boat, struck civilians in the face and allegedly forced 
three women to strip naked for corporal examinations. TNA, FO383/501, 4989, Report by Ruoff 
(Secretary of the Committee of Repatriation), Rotterdam, 5
th
 February 1919, received 9
th
 May 1919. 
194 
 
 
 
conducted in British ports. This did not soothe the anger of ships’ captains who claimed that 
after each trip to the Netherlands they had to replace ship cutlery and bedding that were 
stolen by their passengers.64  
There was tension during the war between the British and the Dutch over the Royal Navy’s 
persistent stopping and searching of Dutch vessels at sea. These searches were conducted not 
just on Dutch ships, but also on other neutral vessels and resulted in the arrest of a statistically 
insignificant number of Germans. The Navy was successful in finding military supplies on board 
Spanish ships intended for the German Schutzruppe on Fernando Po.65 The Netherlands were 
never implicated in the supply of aid to the enemy overseas, although there was some 
suspicion about the Dutch East Indies. Nevertheless Dutch ships were often stopped at sea. 
The searching of German returnees in Dutch ports by the British Navy was one affront to Dutch 
neutrality that was not allowed to stand, and the Navy had to back down. 
Repatriation at the end of the war was a complicated issue. Who exactly was going to pay for 
the transportation? Would the German government have to pay, or in the interests of getting 
the prisoners back to Germany quickly and thus lessening the burden of their maintenance 
would the British cover the travel costs? There was also the issue of who was to ship them. The 
German government from a prestige point of view would have liked to bear the costs and 
arrange the shipping. Britain, with similar prestige concerns, decided early in 1918 that 
Germany would not be allowed to charter ships and that the British government would deal 
with all the costs and bill Germany later.66 Thus, the ships were mainly hired from British or 
neutral shipping companies, although some vessels of the German Woermann line were used 
as in one case in South Africa where British crews refused to take German passengers.67 
As during the war itself, the swift removal of the Germans from the colonies was seen as the 
most desirable outcome. However, in France, prisoners of war had become part of the local 
economy. Immediately following the Armistice the French enlarged their prisoner of war 
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labour company system. The prisoners, far from being set free, were viewed not only as 
dangerous enemies but also as a vital labour source to be employed in the reconstruction of 
war damaged French towns.68 In different circumstances, German-held Russian prisoners 
found their release delayed in a scheme to deny the Bolsheviks any potential new recruits.69 In 
contrast, with the exception of Canada, where a large numbers of civilian internees were 
engaged in agriculture, the British Dominions wished to be rid of their mainly civilian internee 
camp populations. There was still a public balancing act to be played, of course. It would not 
have looked very good from the point of view of Australia, for example, if it returned all its 
German prisoners first, before receiving its own Australian prisoners of war back from 
Germany. Furthermore, the French refusal to send prisoners back at the Armistice also meant 
that the British and Americans, in the interests of keeping a united front delayed their 
repatriation schemes but eventually both broke ranks and the British repatriation of its 
German prisoners of war began in earnest in September 1919.70 
Albert Achilles’ memoirs provide a good account of how wartime and post-war repatriation 
arrangements functioned on the ground. He noted; ‘We were transported as prisoners on a 
German ship to Europe because the British could not stand the idea of Germany having 
colonies.’71 Achilles account shows that the transfer of prisoners from camp to camp did not 
end with the war. Repatriation from remote areas of the globe necessitated that prisoners be 
transferred in stages. Achilles wrote that he was first moved from Ahmednagar (where he had 
spent the majority of his time in captivity) to a holding camp nearer the port (Ramandrog). The 
lack of shipping meant he spent a further six weeks in this holding camp, before being sent 
back to Ahmednagar in December 1919 as the ships in Bombay were not forthcoming. He was 
eventually transferred to Port Said, Egypt, in mid-January 1920. As he was suffering from what 
he claimed was Spanish flu, Achilles and the many others who were afflicted were detained in 
Port Said for fear of infecting other ship passengers. This essentially meant further internment. 
After four months in Port Said, in April 1920, a ship was eventually found to take him and his 
fellow in-mates home. After a further stopover in Gibraltar, they arrived in Brunsbüttel on 20th 
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April 1920. They arrived at the quay to a large crowd waiting for them while the band struck up 
a song about a black child who had been kidnapped while playing on the beach,72 symbolising 
for Achilles how the German colonies were lost. The Germany the prisoners came back to was 
different from the one of their imagination over the long years of living abroad and then being 
interned, and the return home was bittersweet.  
As previously noted, the German government was interested in getting stories of ill treatment 
of German civilians by black troops through its questionnaires for returnees on their 
experience of war. These questionnaires also dealt with property rights.73 Alongside the 
immediate military necessity of securing the takeover of the colonies the acquisition of 
German property was seen as an essential part of the British long-term strategy. The German 
government was naturally keen to know about how the British dealt with German property, 
and this was reflected in the questions asked of returning Germans.74 
Complaints were written to the British about the loss of income from plantations, the forced 
evacuation from homes and the takeover of German property by British forces. Little was done 
after the war, however, to return any of these assets to their original owners. This was not 
only the case for the Germans from Togo and Cameroon but also for all the former German 
colonies and the British Empire as a whole. In the inter war period the Deutsche 
Kolonialgesellschaft (DKG) received many petitions from former German settlers to investigate 
their property claims. It was a difficult position for the DKG, which had no real political power 
and could only direct claimants to contact the British, Australian, or relevant Mandate 
authorities.75 
In line with the wartime strategy of securing the German colonies through the expulsion of the 
German population, British policy makers hoped to devise a way to keep ‘enemy aliens’ from 
returning. The draft of the convention that was to replace the Berlin Act 1884/85 allowed for 
the citizens of any power to settle in the colonies. The Colonial and War Offices were, however, 
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anxious to prevent Germans and Austrians from returning, especially to either British East 
Africa or mandated German East Africa. In the initial stages after 11th November 1918 the War 
Cabinet encouraged all the governments of Dominions and Protectorates to legislate 
prohibiting all Germans from entering, residing, and trading locally for a period of five years 
after the war. The consequences of the return of Germans to the colonies ‘could only be grave 
internal disorder and possibly bloodshed’.76 As well as the strong local feeling against the 
readmission of Germans to the colonies, there was the fear of Germans fomenting disloyalty to 
Britain and of the ‘disastrous effect on the native mind of the return of the German whom he 
has seen ignominiously removed’.77 Perhaps the single most important consideration alluded 
to in the Colonial Office memorandum to the War Cabinet was the effect of the return of 
Germans to the colonies on the development of British business. It was paramount, according 
to the Colonial Office, to exclude Germans and Austrians from colonies and Mandates, due to 
the ‘importance of restoring our Oversea trade without being hampered by the unfair 
competition of our late enemies.’78 
While the Treaty of Versailles was unclear on the restriction of movement in British colonies, 
Protectorates and Dominions, it was clear about the Mandates: ‘The Government exercising 
authority over such territories [the Mandates] may make such provisions as it thinks fit with 
reference to the repatriation from them of German nationals and to the conditions upon 
which German subjects of European origin shall, or shall not, be allowed to reside, hold 
property, trade or exercise a profession in them.’79 This gave the British and other Mandate 
powers a free hand to decide who to allow into the newly defined territories. Despite this, the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, Walter Long, noted that once Germany joined the League 
of Nations it would be very difficult to maintain a policy of exclusion. The proposed solution 
was the passing of legislation enabling local governments (in Mandate cases, Britain and the 
Dominions) to keep Germans out but without laying down as a principle that all Germans must 
be excluded.80 As usual in these cases, the Dominions were expected to comply and at the time 
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of the memorandum Canada had already, through an Order in Council, enacted exclusionary 
legislation.81 
New Zealand too was ahead of the Secretary of State in this regard. In December 1918 the 
Wellington government brought in the War Legislation and Statute Law Amendment Bill, 
which required persons of ‘enemy origin’ to apply for and be granted a licence before 
purchasing land in New Zealand. The Bill also allowed for land that had been purchased legally 
by ‘enemy aliens’ to be taken back by the state for public purposes.82 The Bill was hotly 
debated, but was passed with only one amendment, that it did not apply to those born in New 
Zealand. The land seized from the German settlers was, as elsewhere, passed on to returning 
servicemen. 
In New Zealand, the Revocation of Naturalisation Act83 affected many of the settlers on Samoa, 
who had through the close links between the islands become naturalised British citizens. The 
most prominent case was of Karl Hanssen, which we have looked at in earlier chapters. 
Hanssen, who had been allowed to continue working for the Deutsche Handels und Plantagen 
Gesellschaft until his diaries had been intercepted by the censor, also had his naturalization 
revoked after the war. He was, however, one of the few lucky ones to successfully challenge 
the act and in 1923 had his New Zealand naturalisation restored.84 
Hanssen was fortunate. However, the DKG archives document many other stories of those 
who were not so lucky. For those in South-West Africa, the war affected them economically. 
Although the majority of civilians here had not been interned during the war and did not face 
repatriation, there were difficulties for those who had been bankrupted by the conflict in 
getting their family members back to South-West Africa. Although most of the German civilian 
population in South-West Africa were not interned during the conflict, the colony itself was 
affected by the hardships of war. Initial plans to transfer German civilians from German East 
Africa to South-West African farmsteads were abandoned due to protests from the farmers 
about lack of funds. The loss of links to Germany in the post-war era exacerbated some of 
these hardships. After the Versailles treaty negotiations and the establishment of the South 
African Mandate over South-West Africa, the South African government felt they had the 
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opportunity to deport the remaining German civil servants who under the terms of the 
surrender treaty had been able to remain in the country as well as ‘characters of whom the 
government desires to be rid, such as undesirable women, agitators and elements generally 
hostile to the Union Government.’85  
Similar attitudes were also visible in other parts of the Empire when the war ended. Anti-
German sentiment did not disappear in Australia with the end of the conflict, as the treatment 
of internees shows. Although the Fijian government protested, Germans from Fiji were 
eventually allowed to return to their pre-war homes. All other colonial internees in Australia, 
the bulk of whom made up the population of Holsworthy camp were repatriated to 
Germany.86 In comparison with Samoa and New Zealand, the commercial links between New 
Guinea and Australia were weaker and there were few Germans from New Guinea who had 
claims to Australian naturalisation. With the takeover of New Guinea by Australia and new 
legislation (although complicated by New Guinea’s Mandate status), it was difficult for 
Germans to return to their plantations and even to the South Pacific at all. 
Like New Zealand the Australians brought in legislation to restrict the admission of aliens after 
the war. The Aliens Committee, composed of representatives of the Departments of Defence, 
Home, and Territory, Trade and Customs and the Attorney-General, was entrusted with 
formulating cabinet policy. It dealt with four different areas: repatriation of Aliens, possible 
restrictions on the admission of Aliens after the war, changes in naturalisation laws and policy 
to be adopted concerning Alien property.87 The committee consulted closely with Britain, as it 
stated a desire to achieve conformity so that its actions would best coincide with any similar 
policies that Britain was planning to enact domestically. 
It was not until 1931 that anti-German prejudice began to abate in Australia and New Zealand. 
In an editorial that year in the Sydney Morning Herald,88 Tom Inglis Moore, an Australian 
professor at the University of the Philippines, was encouraged by the dissolution of anti-
German prejudice, which he argued was a main factor preventing efficient administration of 
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New Guinea. The terms of the Mandate he argued had harmed the White Australia policy. In 
order to make up for the lack of immigrants from Germany and Austria, Australia had to rely 
on importing non-white workers such as the Chinese. German civilians were once again 
interned in the Second World War in Australia and New Zealand, but as Andrew Francis argues, 
anti-German sentiment was never as intense as it was during the First World War.89 
The establishment of ‘enemy alien’ legislation in Britain and the Dominions was designed to 
prevent Germans from resettling and claiming property in the British Empire, although it was 
complicated by the Mandate systems that were put in place at Versailles. However, the British 
Foreign Office was confident that by the time Germany became eligible to join the League of 
Nations, Britain would have consolidated its hold over the Mandates making a potential 
handover of control to the German government impossible. Conversely the German 
government itself supported the Mandate system, in the short term at least, as a means to 
facilitate its return to colonial activity which would be prevented by any attempt by the Allies 
to enact a de jure annexation of mandated territory.90 
The return to Germany was often a difficult one for the former prisoners of war and internees. 
Ludwig Deppe on his return from German East Africa in 1919 noted;’We found our Heimat in a 
terrible state, much more terrible than our worst fears.’91 Achilles noted a telling example of 
how the situation in Germany had changed since the outbreak of war which occurred when a 
representative from the Auswärtiges Amt requested that the returning prisoners hand over 
the jackets they had received from the British or pay for them. Their reply was to laugh in the 
representative’s face highlighting both the poverty of post-war Germany and the lack of 
respect the returning prisoners had for the new German authorities.92  
German colonial settlers had maintained strong links with Germany before the war and even in 
their long years of internment they overwhelmingly remained loyal to their nation. This did not 
mean, however, that they relished the thought of being sent back to Germany. The most noted 
example is that of German prisoners who were interned in Japan during the war. On their 
return to Germany in 1920 many of them found that the Germany of their memories did not 
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correspond to the reality.93 A large number of them found a way to remain in Japan after the 
war and others after a few years returned to the land of their captors and became successful 
businessmen.94 This was not an option for prisoners captured in other German colonies, and 
the transition to life in Weimar Germany was often difficult.95 Indeed, it must be noted that it 
was not just former colonial German settlers who found it difficult to adapt to the post-war 
world. The 1920s in Europe, as Bruno Cabanes has shown, were marked by the disruption of 
collective identities, new borders resulting from the break-up of empires and revolutions, and 
the transition of society from war to peace. 96 
The German government immediately protested against the loss of the German colonies at the 
peace conference but with the Allies in control of and established in all Germany’s overseas 
territories there was no question of Germany regaining its colonies. Calls for a return of the 
German colonies after the war did not begin in earnest until the mid-1920s and Germany’s 
entry into the League of Nations. This period also saw a rise of irredentist colonial 
organisations such as the DKG, which grew to 250 branches and 30,000 members.97 The 
memory of the wartime experience and the reality of Weimar Germany led many former 
German colonial settlers to reshape their idea of Deutschtum and realign their patriotic 
allegiances. In Germany the Dolchstoßlegende (Stab in the back myth) took hold, and blame for 
Germany’s failure to win the war was placed on internal enemies. Among the former settlers, 
however, a core felt that the whole of Germany was to blame. In East Africa, Germany had not 
been defeated, merely let down by the failures of the metropole. This led to a reformation of 
what German identity meant in the colonial context. The only place where many colonial 
Germans could find a pure Deutschtum, unsullied by the war, was in their memories.98 
Resentment of the Weimar government’s inability to win back the colonies and the idea of the 
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Paris treaty as having enshrined German ‘colonial guilt’ led to a reshaping of the German 
colonial identity as the vanguard of ‘Germanness’ for many of those who had lived in the 
German colonies and their supporters.  
In the Soester Anzeiger of 15th December 1925, the writer Hubert Hennoch-Breslau noted that 
at the Paris Peace Conference, the colonial question had been on everyone’s lips. In the 
intervening years, however, there had been a lot more to think about than the 25,000 
Germans who returned to Germany from the colonies.’99 He asked why, if German colonial rule 
had been so bad, did the Cameroonian chiefs follow Ebermaier to Spain or the Askari fight so 
loyally for Lettow-Vorbeck? Of course the colonial question had never taken the main stage in 
German political discussions before the war and domestic issues in the 1920s meant that there 
was even less chance of the colonies becoming a prominent issue then. While the loss of the 
colonies fitted into the unfair Versailles Treaty and reparations narrative, it took a backseat to 
the financial and social turmoil inflicted upon Germany by its defeat in the war.  
The former colonial settlers themselves found the post-war years very difficult. In 1926 Adolf 
Nauer who, although he had been interned in Samoa from 1915 to 1919 and had lost his 
plantation, still remained on the island, wrote to the DKG for assistance in bringing one of his 
daughters back to Samoa. In 1913, like many colonial Germans before him, he had sent his 
daughters to Germany to receive their education. The only difference was that his daughters 
were half-Samoan, as Nauer had married a Samoan woman. He did not mention how he was 
able to remain in Samoa after being interned, but he was now destitute and could not afford 
the price of a ticket for his daughter. In the interests of promoting the Deutschtum abroad he 
felt the Auswärtiges Amt would pay for her return to Samoa. However, by 1926, the 
Auswärtiges Amt was not interested in taking up the case and neither the DKG nor its 
associated Frauenbund could spare the funds for her return.100 His was not the only case of 
families being separated in the colonies. Grete Nouvack, the daughter of German missionary in 
German South West Africa, again of mixed race had moved to Germany before the war, in 
1933 she requested financial help in getting her back home. In lieu of that she enquired 
whether it would be possible for the DKG to hire her in some capacity, as due to her racial 
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background she was having difficulty getting work in Germany.101 The takeover of the colonies 
and property belonging to German planters and farmers caused many cases of destitution 
among the former colonial settlers and there were few sympathetic ears willing to aid them in 
their time of need.102 A narrative was developed and brought into the public sphere through 
the ‘Afrikabücher’,103 of the colonial German settlers as victims of the war against the British, 
and the Treaty of Versailles had wrongly accused them of bring criminals.104 
However, by the mid-1920s cracks began to show in Britain’s policy of keeping Germans out of 
their former colonies. In 1924, the British offered to allow Germans to recover their land in the 
British-controlled Cameroon at an auction. This was mainly because the British government 
had failed to attract a sufficient number of British settlers to the British section of the 
Cameroon Mandate. The British had unsuccessfully attempted to sell former German property 
in their section of the Mandate in 1922, in an auction restricted to British nationals. In 1924 
they again put the plantations up for sale but this time ‘without reserve and irrespective of the 
nationality of the owners’.105 The new settlers would, however, be part of an immigrant 
community in the British Empire and not part of the German Reich. The French, in their sphere, 
maintained their restrictions on German immigration and were not pleased about Britain’s 
decision to allow Germans to return. 
A letter to the Vossische Zeitung in October 1925 explained the situation in the former German 
colonies and the chances of political control of them being returned to Germany. Written by Dr 
W.H. Edwards, it noted that while ‘throughout the non-German world there passes today a 
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strong current of anti-Imperialism’, the imperial powers were not about to give up on their 
costly colonial experiments by handing them over to Germany. South Africa, while perhaps the 
most German-friendly of the Mandate holders, would not simply hand South-West Africa back, 
as the mineral deposits there were vital for the economy and it would not tolerate ‘two 
different native policies’ in the region. Britain too was strengthening rather than weakening its 
grip on East Africa and its rich cotton and coffee crops. The construction of costly engineering 
projects such as railways highlighted that Britain had no intention of letting East Africa go.106  
In 1933 with the accession of the Nazis to power, Adolf Hitler integrated the return of the 
German colonies into his Grossdeutschland programme, and colonial revision became part of 
official Nazi policy to deconstruct the Versailles Treaty.107 Films about the colonies were 
popular in the 1930s and helped add to calls for a return to Germany’s place in the sun. 
Perhaps enthused by these films, the DKG received many letters from former colonial settlers 
inquiring about a potential return to Africa, or offering plans and advice on how to win the 
colonies back.108 Propaganda pushing for a return of Germany’s colonies had an impact not 
only in Germany but also on the League of Nations and the colonial officials in France and 
Britain.109 As part of Britain’s attempts at appeasement of Germany’s expansionist desires, 
Neville Chamberlain contemplated the return of Togo, Cameroon and Tanganyika to 
Germany.110 However, the reality was that Germany was now looking firmly at Europe for its 
Lebensraum policies and even though the Reichskolonialbund (RKB), the successor 
organisation to the DKG, the return of Germany’s colonies was not a primary foreign policy 
objective.111 Indeed, Andrew Crozier shows that the RKB’s main task was merely to push 
overseas demands in order to make the British more amenable to granting Germany 
concessions in Europe.112 This is not to say that Germany under Hitler was indifferent to 
colonial revival, more that for the Nazis the primary goal was hegemony in Europe: Africa 
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could wait. With the outbreak of the Second World War, the colonial question was no longer a 
matter for negotiation, but a problem to be settled on the battlefield.113 
The repatriation of German prisoners from the extra-European theatre of the First World War 
was a complex and constantly developing process. The obvious difference between prisoners 
who were interned in Britain and those in India, Egypt, the Dominions and elsewhere overseas 
was the distance from Germany and the logistical complications of getting them back there. 
There was also the issue of who was going to finance the repatriation. In some cases, prisoners 
who could afford to pay their own passage were allowed to return to Germany, although this 
was in no way the norm. Eventually prisoners were repatriated by British-chartered ships with 
Germany expected to foot the bill. German consular officials expected their own repatriation 
to occur through reciprocal agreements on the exchange of diplomats. However, this did not 
always happen, as the cases of former Governors Erich Schultz and Theodor Seitz demonstrate.  
The basic military aim of Britain in the takeover of the German colonies was the removal of any 
possible future military threat. This combined with the economic objectives of Dominion 
governments and private businesses, such as the takeover of Nauru for its phosphates.114 In 
contrast to the situation on the Western Front, it was often argued in the British Foreign Office 
that German prisoners from the colonies would do less harm if they were allowed back to 
Germany than if they were to remain interned in their colonial locations. The development of 
the war affected this strategy and with the tightening of the blockade, unrestricted submarine 
warfare, and shipping shortages, simply sending Germans back was no longer an option.   
Once the Paris Treaty was signed and the Mandate issue settled, Britain and the Dominions, 
with the exception of South Africa, could again concentrate on the objective of removing all 
Germans from their territory. South Africa (which was to be granted control over German 
South-West Africa) did not evacuate many of the German population there during its wartime 
occupation and allowed those present in 1919 to remain. This was due to two factors: the 
relationship of the Boer population with the German settlers and the perceived need to 
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maintain a white settler colony.115 In New Guinea the final removal of the German population 
made room for ex-servicemen to take over their plantations. It also, as Gerhard Fischer and 
Andrew Francis argue, left a long lasting legacy for immigration policy in Australia and New 
Zealand. Before 1914, apart from a few restrictions on immigrants who wished to work in 
mines, there had been no immigration barriers for Europeans emigrating to the Pacific 
Dominions. During the war this changed and based on existing Australian legislation designed 
to limit the number of Chinese immigrants, German and Austro-Hungarian nationals (enemy 
aliens) were restricted in their movements.116 While anti-German sentiment was weaker in the 
Second World War (being overshadowed by anti-Japanese propaganda and the direct threat 
from the Japanese Empire), the German community in Australia and New Zealand, and by 
extension New Guinea and Samoa, never recovered its numbers and its self-image was 
transformed radically. Stibbe’s argument for Central Eastern Europe can be applied to 
Australia and New Zealand where through ‘enemy alien’ legislation, wartime ‘expulsion 
fantasies’ and demands for ethnic (white British) homogeneity were brought closer to 
reality.117 
The return to post-war Germany was undoubtedly a shocking experience for returning German 
internees. While Albert Achilles remembered triumphant songs being played on their return in 
1920, the reality of conditions in the turmoil Germany was going through did not take long to 
register. Although restrictions on the return of Germans to the colonies were slackened in the 
mid-1920s, it was clear that political control of the colonies was not going to be handed over 
to Germany. Being cut off from the metropole during wartime may have strengthened German 
settlers’ fondness for their colonial Heimat.118 However, the return of the colonies to Germany 
was never going to be a reality and the only comfort former colonial settlers, like Ludwig 
Deppe, could take was to close their eyes on sunny days and dream of Africa.119 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has investigated the links between the internment of German colonial settlers in 
the extra-European theatre of the First World War and the conflict in mainland Europe. The 
initial reasons for embarking on this project were to fill a major gap in the history of the Great 
War and to improve our understanding of how the British Empire functioned when faced with 
the threats and opportunities that the conflict presented. As Lenin maintained in 1917, the 
First World War was fought, on one level, as a struggle for imperial redistribution.1 However, 
the links between the conflict in the extra-European theatres of war and Europe have only 
recently been seriously investigated. Five issues were posited at the outset for investigation. 
These were: the centralised internment policy of the British Empire, the effect of the takeover 
of German colonies on cultural identity in the British dominions, the effect wartime captivity 
had on German settlers, what extra-European internment tells us about twentieth century 
mobility and warfare, and the integration of the extra-European theatre of the war into the 
overall Global War narrative. In the concluding remarks that follow each issue will be dealt 
with in turn. 
Internment in the extra-European theatre of the First World War functioned as a tool of British 
diplomacy and therefore needed an empire-wide administration. The Foreign Office’s primacy 
in dealing with prisoners outside Europe was in contrast to the war in Europe where the War 
Office had the controlling voice. Experience during the Boer War had produced officially 
corroborated criticism which triggered reforms that ultimately vastly improved Britain’s 
capacity to wage land warfare, in a future war, including its captivity policies, while remaining 
within the limits of international law.2 Some camps were even recycled from the Boer War 
during the First World War but were refurbished and standardised along European lines. While 
the overall treatment of prisoners in the extra-European theatre in 1914-1918 could not be 
said to have been as harsh as that in Germany, Russia or even France, it was worse than British 
treatment of prisoners of war and civilian internees in Britain itself, or prisoners interned by 
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Britain in France. Britain still circumvented international regulations through reprisals and the 
confiscation of property. However, one can reasonably assume that Britain, perhaps with the 
benefit of hindsight from the Boer War, was more aware of the force of public opinion, 
domestic and international, in reference to prisoner treatment.  
While channels of communication may have been cut for extra-European prisoners during 
British reprisals, reprisals themselves kept diplomatic channels open. The escalation of such 
reciprocal actions coupled with the need to maintain the image of an adherence to 
international law, brought Germany and Britain to the negotiating table at The Hague and 
Geneva. Although the talks never achieved their aims, constant dialogue over exchanges, 
treatment and reprisals maintained contact between the belligerent powers. Prisoners in 
German East Africa in particular, were caught up in reprisals which were based on German 
treatment of British civilians in Belgium.  
Changes in wartime Dominion cultural identity influenced how the relationship between 
captors and captives changed as the war developed and attitudes hardened, worsening the 
conditions for internees. If the battle of Gallipoli was the foundation of the Australian and New 
Zealand Army Corps’ (ANZAC) ‘digger myth’ and catalysed the establishment of new Australian 
and New Zealander identities, then this new identity was first brought into practice 
domestically through anti-German legislation. In the case of New Zealand, which was not 
hostile towards its German population before the war, anti-German sentiment reached boiling 
point during the conflict.3 Before the sinking of the Lusitania and the disaster at Gallipoli there 
was even a certain sense of respect for the German fighters. The Sydney Morning Herald in 
October 1914 was able to publish a positive account of prisoners taken from New Guinea, 
especially delighting in the tale of a wounded German who displayed his stiff upper lip by 
refusing chloroform while his hand was being amputated, preferring instead to smoke a cigar. 
The paper noted: ‘In its incongruities, how absurd is war? One tries all day to kill an enemy and 
the very next day, it may be, one is shaking him by the hand with all the cordiality of old 
established friendship.’4 Only a few months later this type of story would not have been 
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published. The participation of Dominion troops in the fighting in Europe drastically changed 
these attitudes.  
The effect of the war on the Dominions’ relationship with Britain can best be summed up  
through Gerhard Fischer’s comments on Australia’s internment of German civilians: ‘This 
episode of the World War constitutes, within the larger context of a history of Australia, a 
relapse into a kind of colonial dependency: a policy in which the ministers of the 
Commonwealth Government, in their eagerness to prove themselves worthy sons of the 
Empire, slipped back into a role of subservient colonial dependent, keen to oblige and to meet 
every demand of the Home Office. Ironically this happened while Australian soldiers at the 
front, fighting in the trenches of Gallipoli, began to discover that their history and their 
experiences as Australians gave them their own identity: the beginning of an act of 
emancipation from the bondage of colonial tutelage that the officials who were administering 
Australia at war from their offices in Melbourne did not, and perhaps could not, share.’5  
This analysis can be applied to the other Dominions and indeed to the government of India. 
The First World War provided national foundation myths and helped to encourage and 
accelerate pre-existing anti-colonial movements throughout the British Empire especially in 
India. Paradoxically, through the treatment of German internees taken from within the 
colonies, at sea and from the former German Empire there remained a wilful subservience to 
the metropole of London. In New Zealand, popular opinion pushed to go further than United 
Kingdom policy, expressed in the media through calls for harsher policies such as the 
internment of all German civilians, the introduction of forced labour for German captives, and 
cuts in their rations. This placed the New Zealand government in an uneasy middle position 
between its electorate and the British government. This radicalisation of public opinion helps 
to explain legislation enacted in New Zealand and Australia during the war and after which 
prevented many Germans from returning to their homes in the former German colonies in this 
region or in Australia and New Zealand themselves. 
The camp network that was established in the extra-European theatre of the war provided the 
structure through which Germans from the former German colonies and other extra-European 
locations came into contact with one another. In addition, the loss of the colonies, as 
symbolised by Germans being led to the docks of their former towns under black guard and in 
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turn being identified as ‘enemy aliens’ who could no longer own property or return to their 
homes, saw a complete racial role reversal for Germans from being at the top of the colonial 
hierarchy to being located at the bottom. Prisoners in the camps saw their capture and 
experience through the lens of colonial violence, either real or imagined. While physical acts of 
violence were isolated and mainly reserved to the initial stages of captivity and the period of 
active military conflict, they became the prism through which prisoners viewed their 
internment and certainly the one through which they chose to attract attention to their plight.  
The war in the colonies affected identities from many angles: above all it affected German-
British relations and the personal interactions between these two groups of colonisers, it then 
affected the relationship between the Germans and their former colonial subjects as well as 
enacting a racial role reversal, with the internment of whites under the watch of black or 
Indian troops. This role reversal was initially felt in the German loss of control not only over 
property but also over the servants hired to do domestic work. Magda Bubeck-Rodatz, in 
Cameroon, was horrified to find that one English Officer had allowed his ‘boys’ not only to 
cook for themselves but also to eat in her kitchen, signifying to her the intrusion of the role 
reversal into the domestic sphere and also that the indigenous inhabitants of the colonies had 
lost all respect for German whites.6 The upsetting of racial hierarchies was the key to how 
German prisoners and the German government viewed the loss of the German colonies.  
Through the continuing repatriations during the war and the final set of repatriations in 
1920/21 Germans from the colonies were sent back to a Germany they were unfamiliar with, 
and sometimes were encouraged to go elsewhere.7 The abdication of the Kaiser and ensuing 
revolutionary turmoil did not correspond with the Empire building project of which they had 
been an integral part. Some of the former colonial settlers joined extreme groups.8 While the 
links between German colonialism and the rise of the Nazi party and its racial policies have 
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been examined in other works, the more common reaction of colonial settlers to their sense of 
disorientation at the loss of Germany’s colonies was to attempt to leave Germany again rather 
than become involved in radical politics. The formation of a new Auslandsdeutschtum that was 
separate from Germany was one of the consequences of the loss of the colonies and 
repatriation of Germans overseas to Europe. It found its strongest manifestation in the 
Mandate of South-West Africa, in which there remained a strong German community that was 
joined by others. Paradoxically, this German identity was allowed to develop by the South 
African government, even though it had conferred British citizenship on all German inhabitants 
of the Mandate in 1924 and by 1935 the Mandate constituted a fifth province of the Union.9 
Capitan Erich Schulte,10 reflecting on the war in the colonies and his internment in South Africa, 
noted: ‘And so with the defeat of our homeland we got our freedom […] Now in Africa we have 
lost of all hope, I will not say forever, but we will have to wait a long time before we can realise 
our needs. We always desire to move to the tropics to work and earn money, that is our 
strength but we will have to do so now under a foreign flag and in the pay of others who will 
pocket the greater part of our pay!’11 The prisoners had gained their freedom through the 
defeat of Germany and the loss of the colonies. The work that men, such as Schulte, had 
undertaken to create a German colonial empire was undone, and the spoils of war had gone to 
the other European colonial powers.  
Extra-European internment is also highly revealing of the wartime relationship between 
mobility and Empire. The British Empire made use of the globalised networks developed in the 
nineteenth century in the developments of steam ships and communications. Internment in 
the extra-European theatre was linked by global shipping routes. Britain’s naval strength 
coupled with its vast commercial reach allowed it to create a huge statistical base of world 
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unter der Fahne unseres Vaterlandes!’ Erich Schulte, ‘Die Internierten und Kriegsgefangenen in der 
Südafrikanischen Union‘, in In Feindeshand, p. 113. 
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trade information from which Germans and German businesses could not hide.12 With the 
exception of the Boer War (on a smaller scale), never had so many Europeans been forcibly 
moved around the globe in such a manner. Sea lanes linked the camps together: apart from 
forced marches into French West Africa, prisoners were usually taken from camp to camp by 
ship. Attitudes to nationality had also changed by the end of the First Word War. While the 
Boer prisoners from the South African War were still regarded as British subjects who were 
expected to become part of a self-governing white-minority ruled Dominion,13 in the First 
World War, with the exception of German South-West Africa, this was not the case for the 
former German colonial settlers. The British Empire enacted immigration restrictions and 
‘enemy alien’ legislation to prevent the settlers returning. Even in German South-West Africa, 
however, measures were taken to remove Germans who did not conform to the image 
envisioned for an enlarged Dominion and who, as Botha noted, were ‘infected with the spirit 
of republicanism […] the sooner we get rid of this element the better for the future of the 
Union.’14 Even once they were allowed back into their now British-controlled former colonies 
in the 1920s, the German settlers remained ‘colonialists without colonies’.15 
A key innovation during the First World War was the development of propaganda. The colonial 
context of the camps provided the German government with a propaganda basis in the form of 
the ‘colonial archive’ to counter-balance accusations of German atrocities in Belgium. In 
addition to accusations of ‘barbaric’ practices by French and British colonial troops on the 
Western Front, the German government sought stories of colonial brutality from returning 
prisoners to add to its propaganda on the planned destruction of European civilisation by its 
enemies and their attempt to embark on a ‘second partition of Africa’.16 In reports on the 
camps it was easy to conjure up pre-existing negative images of the colonial world to colour 
impressions of internment in the colonies. The extreme example of the British Foreign Office 
having to investigate accusations of Germans in North Borneo being surrounded by head 
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 Hull, A Scrap of Paper, p. 181. 
13
 Smith, Stucki, ‘Colonial Development of Concentration Camps’, p. 427. 
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 TNA, FO383/538, 1160, Botha to Mr Long, 10
th
 January 1919. 
15
 Schilling, Postcolonial Germany. p. 165. 
16
 David Killingray, ‘The War in Africa’, in Horne (ed), A Companion to World War I, p. 124. This 
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The War Aims of the Imperial German Navy, 1914-1918’, in Central European History 5, 3 (September 
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hunters and cannibals highlighted this, as did the seriousness with which the British took such 
accusations. The imagined world of colonial violence that the extra-European camp system 
inhabited was mentally interwoven with the experience of colonial internment, even though 
the reality was somewhat different. This propaganda carried on into the post-war years as the 
rhetoric tapped into political anxieties, fears of social degradation and the view of Germany as 
the last defender of European racial purity.17  
The extra-European camp network was inter-linked with its European counterpart. In terms of 
internment the war in the colonies was not a side-show but an integral part of the whole. 
Violence, or perhaps more correctly, the perception of violence, against prisoners in the 
colonies had the potential to affect the conditions of prisoners in Europe. While the idea and 
initial use of concentration camps originated in the colonial world, internment during the First 
World War became radicalised more broadly, allowing for its own situational peculiarities and 
cultural distinctiveness.18 Germany’s colonies, being the only British-occupied German territory 
during the war, provided a counter-foil, in terms of reprisals, for German actions against British 
prisoners of war and civilian internees in occupied France and Belgium. 
The aim of this project was to build on the historiography of internment in Europe during the 
Great War and also aspects of colonial internment in the twentieth century, and apply its tools 
of analysis to a colonial war that involved European troops. Situational and cultural factors 
played a role in how ‘enemy aliens’ were treated and how they perceived themselves.19 This 
thesis started with a question of where to place the story of the internment of German 
civilians and prisoners of war from the German colonies. Do they belong to the narrative of 
European internment or that of colonial internment in the twentieth century? From the 
discussions over the previous chapters the narrative fits more firmly in the former category; 
this thesis argued that through the use of the threat of reprisals and the need to maintain 
imperial prestige we can see that the British authorities exported a European system to the 
colonies and strove to place all the European norms of captivity in terms of barracks, barbed 
wire and even European-style rations at the disposal of their enemy captives. In the case of 
white German colonialists the constant links to Europe through International law, the British 
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 Conrad, German Colonialism, p. 191. 
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need to protect imperial prestige and the use of reprisals links internment in the extra-
European world to that in the European.  
One can hazard to say that the global legacy of the war is currently well recognised, as the 
Great War upset assumptions about European civilisation and under the influence of the 
Russian revolution and ‘Wilsonian’ self-determination proclamations sparked demands for the 
reform of colonial rule.20 The First World War had a massive impact upon its participants and 
bequeathed long-term consequences for international politics in the extra-European sphere. 
Adam Tooze has even gone as far as to reframe the First World War as an essential part of the 
worldwide struggle between East and West (the United States and Japan). For the United 
States, as Tooze presents it, the war was fought in Europe to tame Germany in order to allow 
Britain to focus its forces in Asia.21 Certainly Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck or Karl Ebermaier did not 
see their contributions to Germany’s war effort as being ineffectual, and the Japanese land 
grab in China and the Pacific sparked by the Great War had its repercussions in the 1920s and 
1930s with Japan’s expansion into what the Americans and Australians considered their 
spheres of influence. On the other hand, Jürgen Zimmerer’s ideas about the colonial theatre 
laying the groundwork for Nazi extremism and extermination policies and the links between 
colonial internment in the First World War and internment in Europe during the Second are 
debatable and this study did not ultimately find evidence to support them. Rather, it was the 
mass incarceration of military combatants and civilians and their harsh treatment in Europe 
during the First World War that provided clearer ‘signposts’ on the road towards the 
concentration camps systems of later communist and fascist regimes.22 German colonial 
settlers were only a minor part of this overall development, although their internment was 
relatively peaceful and more liberal than that experienced by captives on the European fronts.  
The camp system established in the extra-European theatre of the First World War, while 
certainly not as repressive as its European counter-parts, highlights the Great War as a truly 
modern and global conflict. The establishment of a global camp system run from the British 
imperial metropole involved the coordination of the military, the Admiralty, the Dominion 
governments, and the Colonial and Foreign Offices. The general principles of international law 
were followed but often overridden through the use of reprisals, and the notion of trying 
                                               
20
 Mulligan, Great War for Peace, p. 4. 
21
 Tooze, The Deluge, p. 60. 
22
 Kramer, ‘Prisoners in the First World War’, in Scheipers (ed), Prisoners in War, p. 86. 
215 
 
 
 
Germans for ‘war crimes’ had an impact into the twentieth century and up to the present.23 
The First World War and the internment of German civilians and military prisoners in the extra-
European theatre ended the notion of a common European civilising mission in the colonial 
world. It upset the established colonial racial hierarchies, and through ‘enemy alien' legislation 
helped establish European hierarchies of race as defined by nationality, disrupting the pre-war 
world order of cultural globalisation.24  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
23
 The First World War directly produced the following developments in international law: trials for war 
criminals, the condemnation of aggressive war, the strengthened prohibition on the use of poison and 
the elaboration of humane treatment for prisoners of war. Although the Second World War, as Hull 
argues, ‘muddied the analytical waters’ thus making it difficult to ascertain which post-1945 
modifications in international law are owed to the First World War and which to the Second. Hull, A 
Scrap of Paper, p. 329.  
24
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